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ABSTRACT
A Transnational Vision: John H. B. Latrobe and Maryland’s African Colonization
Movement.

Eugene S. Van Sickle

The transnational vision of John H. B. Latrobe, the central figure in this study,
was one that sought to tie America’s efforts to overcome the problem of slavery to the
future of the West Coast of Africa. The vehicle for his ideas was African colonization, a
prominent, long-enduring movement that began in Antebellum America. Latrobe
participated in and directed the African colonization efforts of the Maryland State
Colonization Society for much of that organization’s existence. The colonization efforts
of the Maryland society differed in many ways from the national effort, an aspect this
study illustrates. Essentially, Latrobe believed that colonization was the answer to
questions raised in Antebellum America about slavery and emancipation, American
expansion, industrialization, and the place of the United States in a wider transatlantic
community. This study examines the contributions Latrobe made to this movement, how
colonization fit in the context of ideas such as republicanism, the debate over slavery and
emancipation, and what he envisioned as the final result for both the United States and
Africa.
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Introduction

Late in December of 1816, a group of prominent white Americans met in
Washington, D. C. to decide the fate of free blacks in the United States. The American
Colonization Society resulted from that early winter meeting. While not the first time such
discussions took place, this meeting eventually resulted in the colonization of nearly twelve
thousand people in Africa. These settlers formed the basis of the modern nation of Liberia. As
one of America’s earliest national movements, the efforts of antebellum white Americans to
promote African colonization generated an extensive historiography. Such studies show that
colonization drew support from a wide variety of people, including proslavery racists as well as
abolitionists. Scholars thus disagree over whether the essence of colonization was either
proslavery, abolitionist or humanitarian. Colonization was just that complex. Attempts at
generalizations about the movement; however, obscure important differences in the visions of
colonization supporters. Between 1831 and 1853, the Maryland State Colonization Society
(MSCS) and one of its most prominent members, John H. B. Latrobe, promoted a unique vision
for colonization, one that differed from the national organization. Latrobe also encouraged other
states to follow a similar program in the antebellum years. Through an analysis of Latrobe’s
early nineteenth century experiences, this study seeks to provide a new interpretation of
Maryland’s West African colonization scheme, placing Maryland’s movement in the broader
context of America’s emerging sectional conflict leading up to the Civil War. In addition, it will
illuminate the role of one of the most overlooked yet influential of the colonizationists. The
study will trace John H. B. Latrobe’s role in Maryland’s colonization efforts by looking at three
phases of his life in the movement.

1

Latrobe shared some of the goals of the American Colonization Society (ACS), yet
desired a different future for the United States and Africa, one that the Maryland society worked
to implement. The society attempted to realize these goals through its own colony, dubbed
Maryland in Liberia. On the surface, the vision for Maryland in Liberia appeared inconsistent
with Latrobe’s professional career in the United States. Latrobe envisioned a vibrant,
commercial and industrial free labor society for the United States while promoting a Jeffersonian
yeoman ideal in Maryland’s Liberian colony. Taken together, however, his goals for Maryland
in Liberia expressed a unified vision that would make Africa a valuable part of a larger
transatlantic community. Latrobe’s colonization plans also represented a potential solution for
the growing sectional conflict in American society as pressure to end slavery created strong
North-South tensions. Latrobe hoped to reduce this schism by gradually removing both free
African-Americans and slaves from the United States. He further hoped that by doing so, the
subject of slavery could be removed from national politics and tensions eased between the North
and South. 1
By studying Latrobe and his involvement in the MSCS, it is possible not only to see his
influence on the movement but also how colonization emerged out of the complex social,
political and economic fabric of antebellum America. The plan that the MSCS tried to
implement reflected such changes and offered a means to reduce the tensions growing out of
sectional conflict in Maryland between northern industrialists and southern slave interests.
Further, a study of this topic illuminates an overlooked aspect of colonization. Latrobe
developed a distinct plan reflecting his vision, one that had potentially significant ramifications
1

African Colonization: An Address Delivered by John H. B. Latrobe, President of the American
Colonization Society at the Anniversary Meeting of the Massachusetts Colonization Society, May 25, 1853
(Baltimore: John D. Toy, 1853), 7. Microfilm Edition of the Papers of the Maryland State Colonization Society
[microform]. A Collection of the Maryland Historical Society, (Philadelphia: Rhestoric Publications, Inc., c1970),
reel 31, XIII.
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for Africa and the United States. Latrobe tried to develop a model based on his understanding of
how nineteenth century Marylanders coped with dramatic changes that were leading towards the
destruction of the Union. At the same time, a study of Latrobe’s vision demonstrates how one
important leader blended the industrial and humanitarian aspects of colonization into a
transatlantic plan that attempted to benefit both Africa and the United States.
The rapidly changing social and economic situations of such Upper South states as
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri called for a moderate approach, but as this study
will show, moderate policies were ineffective in dealing with social, economic, and political
tensions caused by industrialization. Thus, Maryland colonizationists sided with those seeking a
way to end slavery. This course of action, combined with emigration by blacks, Latrobe thought,
would alleviate the growing tensions in America. However, one should not assume that
Maryland’s colonization movement under Latrobe’s guidance had any sympathy with the
policies of abolitionists. Instead, colonization, as seen by Latrobe, was a distinct movement
reflecting his belief that two free races could not coexist in a republic.
Surprisingly, very few have studied the MSCS, despite its importance to Maryland and its
connections with the state government. The most recognized history of Maryland’s colonization
society and movement comes from Penelope Campbell who wrote her study in the late 1960s.
Campbell’s Maryland in Africa recognized that colonizationists made different appeals to
northerners and southerners to get support. Campbell also acknowledges John Latrobe’s
significance in the Maryland movement, but she does not focus on his role or vision, something
this study will do. 2 Moreover, my study will provide a new interpretation, suggesting that the
impetus for Maryland’s colonization program grew out of the sectional conflict in American
2

Penelope Campbell, Maryland in Africa: The Maryland State Colonization Society, 1831-1857 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1971), 9, 21.
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society. It was Latrobe’s fear of this conflict that led him to formulate the plan of colonizing
Maryland’s black population in Africa. Furthermore, my study will show how Latrobe
symbolized the changing of the guard in Maryland after the 1812 war, thus making his
contribution to the MSCS even more significant.
My study will also correct some assessments made about the Grebo, the indigenous
Africans living where the Maryland colonists settled. In short, Campbell uncritically accepts the
claims of Maryland officials that the Grebo wanted Maryland colonists to settle so they could
learn English and obtain American goods. 3 Such an assessment fails to recognize that the Grebo
had long established trading connections; some already spoke English and others had English
names before the Maryland colonists arrived on the coast. Campbell also makes negative
assertions about the colonists themselves, describing them as a quarrelsome bunch whose
tendency “to look down upon the Africans and enslave them was indicative of their slovenly
ways and haughty spirit.” 4 Such assessments of the colonists and Africans ignore the conflicting
cultural values held by each group. It further ignores the heritage of the settlers. The colonists
had adopted American culture and many behaved as cultural imperialists as they imposed
American political, social and economic institutions on Africans in Liberia. 5 In addition, the
colonists who went to Maryland in Liberia had been selected carefully by the society.
Consequently, the colonists often reflected the views and policies that the society and Latrobe
hoped to implement in Africa.
My study will also explore the economic and commercial aspects that the MSCS
intertwined with its colonization efforts. Campbell suggests commercial trade could not develop
3

Ibid., 74-5.
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Ibid., 85, 241.
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due to the MSCS’s financial difficulties at home. Research for this study suggests that
commerce was a critical element of the MSCS plan from the beginning and that there was
considerable economic activity between Maryland in Liberia and the United States. Latrobe’s
own background convinced him that commercial development was the key to any successful
colonization effort. Further, Latrobe’s records suggest that Baltimore merchants and shipping
companies did at least a half-million dollars worth of business with the colony during its twentythree years before being annexed to Liberia, and the MSCS Papers contain volumes of data on
economic activity in the colony and for the society, much of which Latrobe either encouraged or
initiated. 6
Another difference in interpretation involves the process of the colony’s independence.
While Campbell covers Latrobe’s effort to grant the colony independence in the wake of the
other colonies in 1847, she does not explore why he insisted that Maryland in Liberia not join the
rest of the colonies. My research indicates he did this in the hopes that the colony would become
the foundation of numerous independent states eventually making up a confederacy in Africa
that would resemble the United States. Finally, her conclusion that colonization efforts were of
no consequence in affecting slavery and that the financial aid the state legislature gave the MSCS
was motivated by slave interests in the state is problematic and simplistic. 7 It does not recognize
nor account for the complexity of Maryland’s tilting of economic and political power towards
industrial Baltimore and away from slave interests. The MSCS program, as led by John Latrobe,
represented an effort to reconcile slave and free labor interests in the state and avoid war, but not
to strengthen slavery.

6

Campbell, Maryland in Africa, 149.

7

Ibid., 242.
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Another study by Jane Jackson Martin analyzes the missionary aspects of Maryland’s
colonization effort. Latrobe recognized that this missionary character was important to the
society, and he helped attach the MSCS program to the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Unfortunately, the presence of the missionaries led to numerous
conflicts between mission employees and settlers. The independence given the missionaries by
the MSCS to carry out their work in the colony caused considerable tension with Maryland in
Liberia’s administration as missionaries often asked the United States Navy for assistance in
their conflicts with the Grebo. The missionaries’ accusations about the settlers’ treatment of the
Grebo also forced the board of the MSCS to define the status of the missions within the colony.
Difficulties between the settlers and missionaries at Fair Hope (a mission station) eventually led
those missionaries to leave the colony in 1842. 8
This study relies on several rich collections of primary documents. The research utilized
the vast collection of letters and economic records in the MSCS Papers to examine John
Latrobe’s role in the society, his goals and those of the MSCS, and the colony Maryland in
Liberia. John Latrobe was a prolific writer, and this study also relies on his published works as
well as his personal letters and journals, which his family donated to the Maryland Historical
Society after his death in 1891. Last, but certainly not least, my research included important
ACS records like the African Repository and minutes from ACS annual meetings, microfilm
copies of which are housed at the Library of Congress.
This dissertation moves back and forth between the United States and Africa, exploring
how events and controversies on one continent ultimately had implications for the other. The
first two chapters sketch the political, social, and cultural roots of colonization, particularly as
8

Jane Jackson Martin, “The Dual Legacy: Government Authority and Missionary Influence Among the
Glebo of Eastern Liberia, 1843-1910.” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1968).
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they shaped the ideology of John Latrobe. This earliest phase of his life illustrates how the
revolutionary generation influenced Latrobe in his youth. Chapter one begins with a discussion
of early colonization efforts and an examination of why colonization appealed to such a large
number of white Americans, including Marylanders, and why Latrobe worked within the
movement for much of his life. Critical to colonization’s appeal was the way in which men like
Latrobe understood and clung to republican ideals in the early national period. For Latrobe,
republicanism and slavery were ultimately incompatible, but he also believed that the
coexistence of two races in a republican system was equally impossible. One solution to these
problems was colonization. Chapter one concludes with the formation of the ACS and its
Maryland auxiliary. Chapter two examines the reasons, events and changes in the colonization
movement during its first decade of operation that led Marylanders to form their own
independent state society. This chapter also explores the shift in political power in Maryland
toward the northern part of the state, which was key to the development and support of the
MSCS. Chapter two further marks the end of Latrobe’s youth and the maturity of his own
notions about republicanism and the ways in which subjects such as slavery should be dealt.
Combined, chapters three and four mark the second phase of Latrobe’s career as a
colonizationist in Maryland. They also define the Maryland plan, its differences from the
American Colonization Society, and the founding of Maryland’s own colony in Africa. Chapter
three explores Latrobe’s vision for the movement and what it meant for both the United States
and Africa. This vision helps highlight the tensions emerging in the 1830s within Maryland and
the nation over slavery, as well as how Latrobe’s plan sought to relieve them. Chapter four is a
closer examination of the founding of the colony in Africa and its first ten years, which
demonstrates Latrobe’s influence over Maryland in Liberia. An analysis of the problems the

7

colony faced begins the evolution of Latrobe’s ideas. Unanticipated consequences and problems
forced Latrobe to alter his policies in the colony and sacrifice some of his goals to keep the
colony from completely faltering.
Chapter five examines the politics of colonization in the United States during the 1830s
as the abolitionist movement grew in prominence. This marks the third phase of Maryland
colonization. This chapter also discusses how Latrobe’s plans fit within the controversy over
slavery and the uproar caused by the gag rule. Another issue addressed by Latrobe during this
period was the effort to reunite the colonization movement in response to national crises.
Chapter six shifts between the United States and Africa to show how Latrobe reacted to
problems on both continents, and how these difficulties influenced his policies in each realm.
The growing sectional tensions after 1845 forced Latrobe to adapt his program in ways that he
had not anticipated, further illustrating his flexibility and willingness to compromise in order to
achieve his ultimate goal of removing African Americans from the United States.
Chapter seven examines the last five years of Latrobe’s role in the Maryland colonization
effort. Liberia’s independence from the ACS in 1847 accelerated his plans for the Maryland
colony. Early in the second decade of the colony’s existence the colony was on the verge of
extinction. Latrobe made significant contributions to its continuance, as did unexpected
supporters. The final question he faced, however, was whether Maryland in Liberia would join
Liberia or become its own independent republic. Latrobe felt that if Maryland in Liberia joined
the older settlements all that he had done would have been lost. Latrobe hoped that the colonies
would interact and cooperate as the British colonies of North America had done in the eighteenth
century. If successful, Latrobe’s broader vision for America and Africa would be fulfilled. If
unsuccessful, saving the American republic would most likely fail. The push to make the colony

8

independent, combined with domestic crises in the United States also healed the divisions in the
colonization movement as the American republic appeared in danger of tearing itself apart.
Ultimately, the little colony of Maryland in Liberia followed the path Latrobe wished while he
moved to the national scene. Maryland in Liberia became a new nation in 1854, but it faced a
grim and short future.
My study makes several contributions. First it adds a new interpretation to the
colonization historiography. Colonization was a distinct movement in Maryland that defies such
simple labels as “humanitarian” or “proslavery.” Influenced by the changing social, economic
and political fabric of antebellum America, Latrobe sought to reconcile this new social order
with nineteenth century American republicanism to form what he thought was a viable plan to
resolve sectional conflict and preserve the Union in a form that many white Americans accepted.
Furthermore, this study focuses on Latrobe’s involvement in colonization and the founding of
Liberia, something others have overlooked. Finally, my study adds to the understanding of
antebellum American history by showing how Maryland was a “middle-ground” between slavery
and freedom. In short, Maryland was a microcosm of the national struggles over slavery and
industrialization, which eventually led to the Civil War.

9

Chapter One: “Some are Politically Dangerous”

In December of 1816, several prominent, white Americans gathered near Washington
D.C. to discuss the subject of African colonization. At the end of their deliberations, they
formed a new national organization, the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of
Colour of the United States or the American Colonization Society. To some Americans, the
ACS was a reform-minded society like other organizations created during the second decade of
the nineteenth century. The ACS proposed to change American society by removing free black
Americans from the United States. From its very beginning, the ACS drew its support from all
sections of the Union, even though the reasons for that support varied greatly.1 Nevertheless,
there were unifying factors that allowed those with opposing interests to cooperate in the early
years of the society’s existence.
This chapter examines the appeal of the ACS in its early years by focusing on one of the
most prominent colonizationists in the movement, John H. B. Latrobe. As part of the generation
1

Amos J. Beyan, The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State, 1822-1900.
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1991); Clarence C. Clendenan, Americans in Black Africa. (Stanford
University Press, 1964); Alex Crummel, The Future of Africa. (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969); Early
Lee Fox, The American Colonization Society, 1817-1840 in Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and
Political Science, Vol. XXXVII (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1919); Yekutiel Gershoni, Black
Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Floyd J. Miller,
The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration and Colonization, 1787-1863. (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1975); Tom W. Shick, Behold the Promised Land: A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth
Century Liberia. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); James Wesley Smith, Sojourners in Search of
Freedom: The Settlement of Liberia by Black Americans. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987); Phil J.
Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961);
Amos J. Beyan, “The American Background of Recurrent Themes in the Political History of Liberia.” Liberian
Studies Journal. 19.1:20; “The American Colonization Society and the Origin of Undemocratic Institutions in
Liberia in Historical Perspective.” Liberian Studies Journal. 14.2:140; Frankie Hutton, “Economic Considerations
in the American Colonization Society’s Early Effort to Emigrate Free Blacks to Liberia, 1816-1836.” Journal of
Negro History. 68, Issue 4 (Autumn, 1983), 376-389; Eli. Seifman, “The Passing of the American Colonization
Society.” Liberian Studies Journal. Vol. 2, no, 1 (1969): 1-8; David M. Streifford, “The American Colonization
Society: An Application of Republican Ideology to Early Antebellum Reform.” Journal of Southern History. 45,
No. 2 (May 1979): 201-220. Amos J. Beyan, “The American Colonization Society and the Formation of Political,
Economic, and Religious Institutions in Liberia, 1822-1900.” (Ph. D. diss., West Virginia University, 1985); Eric
Burin, “The Peculiar Solution: The American Colonization Society and Antislavery Sentiment in the South, 18201860.” (Ph. D. diss., University Of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne, 1998).
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born after the American Revolution, Latrobe grappled with the same questions that the founders
of the ACS did: could slavery end peacefully, and what was to be the final fate of black
Americans? While he struggled with these issues, Latrobe also brought a different perspective to
the subject, one that envisioned an alternate future for both the United States and Africa. His
perspective drew on the ideas of leading men from the American Revolution, to which he
combined the reality of an emerging market economy to create a different colonization plan that
benefited both the American and African continents.
On the evening of December 21, 1816, John H. B. Latrobe was a teenage boy riding his
horse, named Codger, into Georgetown on an errand for his mother, Mary. Although not yet
fourteen, Latrobe typically performed such duties, illustrating considerable responsibility on the
part of the young man. Nevertheless, he was still a curious teen apt to investigate seemingly
irregular occurrences. His curiosity drew him to a church near the Rock Creek Bridge north of
town. Since churches often doubled as meeting places, and as it was not an evening for a regular
service, Latrobe stopped. There he observed Francis Scott Key speaking about the possibility of
establishing a colony of African American settlers on the West African coast. This sight did not
strike him as unusual because Latrobe already knew this famous American. But at the moment,
Latrobe was both unclear about and uninterested in the subject of Key’s impassioned speech.
Yet, that seemingly insignificant and coincidental observation by Latrobe turned out to be his
first contact with the ACS and the idea of settling African Americans outside the boundaries of
the United States. Within a decade, Latrobe was also involved in the movement as well as the
organization founded at that meeting, contributing seventy years of his life to the cause of
African colonization. He was also to be the longest serving president of the ACS, a post he held

11

after serving as the chief executive of one of its most influential state organizations, the
Maryland State Colonization Society (MSCS). 2
John Hazlehurst Boneval Latrobe was the first son born to Benjamin Henry Latrobe and
his second wife, Mary Elizabeth Hazlehurst, on May 4, 1803 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Benjamin Latrobe, long revered for his talent as an architect and engineer, migrated from
England to the United States in 1795 and soon after married Mary Hazlehurst. The Latrobe
family lived in Philadelphia until Benjamin won the contract from the Jefferson administration to
complete the Capitol, forcing a move to Washington. 3 The connections Benjamin made through
his profession, combined with the influence of the Hazlehurst family, placed John in an
atmosphere and society that fostered the formative ideals and values, particularly those held by
early republicans like Thomas Jefferson, that he later applied to his professional life and to
colonization. 4 John Latrobe was delivered into a social class that required intellectual cultivation
through a classical education. His heritage included a grandfather who was a partner of financial
mogul Robert Morris; in addition, his father moved in elite circles, associating and building
friendships with doctors, Supreme Court justices, and American presidents. The younger
Latrobe’s education and social connections thus fostered cultural conservatism. His father’s
profession, however, also created an interest in technological innovation. Benjamin Latrobe
hoped that his son’s interest in technology would grow into a career as an architect and
engineer. 5 The result of these influences, the belief in republicanism and technological progress,

2

John E. Semmes, The Life and Times of John H. B. Latrobe, 1803 to 1891, (Baltimore: The Norman,
Remington Co., 1917), 61.
3

Ibid., 10.
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Ibid., 62.
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led John Latrobe to synthesize the two, which allowed him to flourish in Baltimore’s growing
democratic society. 6
In 1807, the Latrobe family moved to Washington, D.C. John Latrobe recalled fondly the
years that his family lived in Washington, in what he referred to as the Navy Yard house. Here
he found the social climate both agreeable and intellectually stimulating. In those days, he
remembered, “Mr. Madison was a frequent visitor,” as were Chief Justice John Marshall; Mr.
Foster, the British minister; Mr. Serrurier, The French minister; Madame Dashkoff, the wife of
the Russian minister; and Robert Fulton, inventor of the steamboat. 7 In 1811, the young John
Latrobe moved with his family from their home near the navy yard to the north side of
Pennsylvania Avenue, midway between the White House and the Capitol. It was there that
Latrobe met some of the most powerful political figures in the country, men such as Francis
Scott Key and Henry Clay. Later in his life, he recounted playing with the children of Albert
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, and recalled frequent visits from Madame Bonaparte,
formerly Elizabeth Patterson of Baltimore, and once the wife of Jerome Bonaparte of France.
Madame Bonaparte’s father was William Patterson, a wealthy Baltimore merchant and one of the
founders of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, John Latrobe’s future employer. These early
contacts proved to be of vital importance to Latrobe when he reached adulthood. Key and Clay
were both founding members of the ACS, but not the only ones involved in the movement
familiar to John Latrobe in his youth. He also knew well Mr. and Mrs. James Madison, Bushrod
Washington, and Robert Goodloe Harper, all of whom sought to preserve the American republic
through colonization. These people introduced him to the subject of colonization. 8

6

Ibid., 4-53.

7

Ibid., 24.
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Ibid., 38-45.

13

Through the contacts his family made in Washington, Latrobe learned of colonization
and the organization formed to carry out the program. Latrobe was also impressed with the
diversity of colonization’s advocates. African colonization drew wide and varied support when
the ACS formed. Many Americans considered the ACS a reform-oriented society much like
other organizations formed during the second decade of the nineteenth century because the ACS
proposed to ease racial hostility by ridding the United States of free black Americans. This goal
allowed the ACS to draw support from all sections of the Union, whether for or against slavery.
Unfortunately, historians have used this fact to label the movement rather than searching for
unifying themes that led such varied interests to join together in the cause. The movement, as
described by historian Matthew Mellon, exemplified the white “attitude toward racial
integration.” 9 Mellon does not fully explain exactly what the attitude was, but most white
Americans in fact feared integration, which they saw as a step toward amalgamation. Thus
racism and slavery contributed to the desire to remove black Americans. But so too did the
republican values espoused by men like Francis Scott Key, Bushrod Washington, Henry Clay,
and Robert G. Harper, all of whom Latrobe knew from his youth.
To understand the colonization movement and the attitude prevailing among such men in
1816, one must examine the origins of colonization in the context of the American Revolution
and ideas such as republicanism, both of which affected the development of the early republic.
The impact of such ideological forces, in short, led many white Americans to perceive the
existence of slavery as a social crisis that threatened the very existence of the republic. In this
context, it becomes clear why African colonization became one of the first national movements

9

Matthew T. Mellon, Early American Views on Negro Slavery From the Letters and Papers of the
Founders of the Republic (New York: Bergman Publishers, 1969), viii; Don B. Kates, “Abolition, Deportation,
Integration: Attitudes Toward Slavery in the Early Republic,” Journal of Negro History Vol. LIII, No. 1 (January,
1968), 37.
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in America. An examination of the impact of such factors also illuminates the reasons Latrobe
became so active in African colonization.
The American Revolution did more than liberate the thirteen British colonies of North
America. The revolution was partly the culmination of Enlightenment political philosophy and
republican principles. However, the doctrines of the revolution placed Americans in a dilemma
owing to the existence of slavery, an institution contradicting the ideals put forth in justifying
rebellion against Great Britain. Complicating the picture even more was the status of free
African Americans, who were denied full social and political rights in the United States.
Thomas Jefferson’s assertion in the Declaration of Independence “that all men are created equal”
coincided with an increased antislavery sentiment. Abolitionists argued that the existence of
slavery undermined the basic republican principles of liberty espoused during and after the war.
They further suggested that slavery eroded the moral foundation of the new republic.
Apparently, many Americans agreed, especially those in Maryland and Virginia where Latrobe
grew up, as state legislatures relaxed manumission laws near the end of the 1780s. 10 But this
created another problem. In Philadelphia, for example, free African Americans petitioned
Congress for equal rights and nationwide emancipation so that they could enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizens put forth in the Constitution. 11 Abolitionist sentiments and the pro-active
efforts of free African Americans soon revealed the fear among white Americans that a rapidly
increasing free black population threatened the republic and their hold on political power. The
problem came in part from the liberal emancipation laws of the post-revolution period. The
Maryland House of Delegates responded to such fears by passing repressive legislation against
10
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antislavery activists while tightening manumission regulations hoping to slow the increase of the
free African American population. By 1790, other states began requiring the removal of
emancipated slaves beyond their boundaries. 12 Plans to repatriate black Americans coincided
with these changes in the law as well.
In his Notes on the State of Virginia published in 1787, Thomas Jefferson put forth his
ideas for removing African Americans. Though he did not necessarily plan to send them to
Africa, Jefferson proposed a scheme of gradual emancipation whereby slaves learned various
skills, according to their abilities, at public expense before removing them from the country. 13
He was not alone in advocating the virtues of colonization; in 1785 William Thornton, another of
Benjamin Latrobe’s friends, sought to colonize a number of West Indian slaves he inherited. 14
As a Quaker, Thornton’s fellow believers opposed slavery and encouraged abolition by members
of the faith. Thornton devised one of the first colonization plans, allowing his slaves to earn
their freedom. He planned to establish a colony in Africa where his slaves would work for a
period of years until they earned enough to purchase their freedom. In many ways the plan
resembled indentured servitude. 15 However, in a letter to Henry Clay written after the first
meeting of the ACS, Thornton revealed another reason for pushing such a course of action. Free
African Americans had to be removed because he doubted that they could “ever be treated with
an equality in a Country where many of their Colour were still held in Slavery.” Morally, this
posed a dilemma for Thornton as his republican feelings told him that treating free blacks with
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equality while slavery persisted was “politically dangerous.” 16 Thus, for Thornton, colonization
was the only answer to this moral, social, and political dilemma. One of Maryland’s delegates to
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 agreed with this assessment. Luther Martin served as the
Attorney General of Maryland after the Constitutional Convention and Latrobe dealt with him in
court after he became a lawyer in 1825. Martin stated that slavery was “inconsistent with the
genius of republicanism and has a tendency to destroy those principals on which it is supported,
as it lessens the sense of equal rights of mankind, and habituates us to tyranny and
oppression.” 17 What both men referred to was the danger seen in having two races in a republic
where the status of one race was blurred between free and slave. This, they believed, prevented
the homogeneous population essential to a republican form of government.
More emancipation and colonization plans emerged in the 1790s as Americans sought a
solution to the problem of slavery and the presence of two free races in one nation. Fernando
Fairfax, a Virginian, proposed that the United States government establish a colony for African
Americans outside North America. Exactly where depended on the proposal. Canada or one of
the Caribbean islands seemed most reasonable. Regardless of the location, Fairfax believed the
plan absolutely necessary to prevent intermarriage between blacks and whites. While many
shared his attitude, Fairfax’s plan received criticism for its harshness and draconian tendencies as
it completely deprived free African Americans of any rights whatsoever.18 Fairfax defended his
proposal as necessary to counter the prevailing belief that colonization was financially
impractical. By purposely depriving free blacks of all rights, they would emigrate of their own
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accord using their own money. Still, such a position was tenuous given revolutionary sentiments
about individual liberty. 19
In the North, colonization plans developed as well. A pair of ministers, Reverend Samuel
Hopkins and Dr. Ezra Stiles, collaborated in the early 1790s to send black Americans to Africa
as missionaries. While emigration for such purposes was strictly voluntary, the missionary
impulse encouraged few African Americans to migrate to Africa. Like Jefferson, Hopkins
believed that education was vital to the plan’s success and he began educating free African
Americans for missionary work in Africa; he even arranged for two volunteers to attend
Princeton College. 20 To his dismay, Hopkins met heavy opposition, much of which came from
his fellow ministers who thought African Americans unworthy of education and incapable of
missionary work. Such opposition was ironic as numerous denominations as well as clergymen
strongly supported later efforts at colonization in both the North and South. Nevertheless, such
hostility toward African Americans, especially in the North, stemmed from what Don Kates
described as the “necessary result of limited opportunity for observation.” 21 Kates argued that
survival in a slave society required African Americans to feign ignorance, stupidity, or laziness,
which consequently fueled attitudes like that demonstrated by Rev. Hopkins’ fellow ministers.
As such, the primary obstacles to colonization in the eighteenth century were the prejudice
against improving African Americans through education, the financial costs necessary to
transport such a large population to Africa and a lack of unity among the early supporters of the
cause.

19

Nash, Race and Revolution, 146-150.

20

Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 4-5.

21

Kates, “Abolition, Deportation, Integration,” 37

18

By 1800, more white Americans looked to colonization as a feasible plan. The rapid
increase of free African Americans in states like Maryland and Virginia, the Gabriel Prosser
Rebellion of 1800, and the Haitian revolution fueled white fears that a racial war was coming.
The Prosser conspiracy, which included the planned abduction of Governor James Monroe, led
the legislature of Virginia to request that Monroe petition President Thomas Jefferson for federal
assistance in colonizing Virginia’s free black population. 22 Jefferson hesitated because he
believed the Constitution prohibited the federal government from directly aiding the colonization
of Americans on other continents. Yet, his consideration of the petition was another indication
of the struggle to define the status of free blacks, an unwanted but undeniably American
population in the early republic. He ordered the United States foreign minister in London to
begin negotiations with the Sierra Leone Company, the controlling body of England’s colony
and the precedent for American efforts on the western coast of Africa. He further instructed the
American representative to “induce them to receive such of these people as might be colonized
thither.” 23 The minister reported that the Sierra Leone Company wanted no part of the American
plan, doubtless disappointing both Monroe and Jefferson. Similar negotiations with European
powers holding colonies in South America failed as well. 24
Further complicating the issue of African colonization were events in Haiti, which caused
American slaveholders much concern in 1804. Prosser rebels had hoped for aid from Haiti once
their revolt began, but more importantly, Haiti stood as a shining example that blacks were
capable of independence. Haitian independence made it even more difficult to suggest that
22
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blacks were incapable of self-government, making some Americans question the denial of
political rights to free African Americans in the United States, a topic both Luther Martin and
William Thornton alluded to in their arguments. The Haitian Revolution also seemed “a fire bell
in the night,” to quote Jefferson, because it was a racial war. As such, fear of rebellions in the
southern states increased, facilitating a greater interest in colonization.
While many supported the cause, colonization efforts remained frustrated in the early
nineteenth century due to doubts about the constitutionality of federal support for such schemes.
Jefferson previously expressed this concern. Henry Clay joined Jefferson when it came to the
rights of property, clearly accepting the contention that slaves were a real form of property
protected by the law. 25 In order for the federal government to aid colonization, they would first
have to address the constitutional protection of property. Jefferson wrote that federal assistance
in colonization would require “a liberal construction” and then “an amendment of the
constitution, the whole length necessary” before Congress could act on the subject. 26 This was a
clear indication that slavery was protected by the Constitution in the mind of at least some of the
founders. The second obstruction to the scheme involved the financial logistics of transporting
thousands of African Americans to a colony. Many, including Jefferson, saw no practical way of
financing the removal of a free population numbering nearly 200,000 and a slave population of
more than one million. 27 In response to these problems, white Americans formulated new plans
to colonize African Americans that joined white fears with republicanism to gain support for the
project.
25
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Jeffersonian thinkers believed that there were preconditions necessary for the existence of
a republic, namely, “that republican government required a body of free, independent, propertyowning citizens.” 28 To Jefferson, one needed property to be truly independent. But equally
important, many Americans in the early nineteenth century believed that a successful republic
depended on a homogeneous group of citizens. Otherwise, political unity was not possible. The
presence of free blacks threatened that unity because they generally lacked the preconditions
necessary for citizenship as defined by Jeffersonians. 29 Feeling that free African Americans
threatened political harmony, however, did not necessarily mean slavery could not exist in a
republic. Many reconciled republicanism with the existence of slavery. After all, pro-slavery
republicans could point to history: Had not slavery existed in Rome’s Republic? Yet as the
antislavery impulse grew in America, emancipated slaves threatened the republic in two key
ways. One was the perceived danger of unleashing a million slaves, something Jefferson in
particular feared because he distrusted free, propertyless workers dependent on the exchange of
labor for money. Second, caution came from Europe’s own experience with the poor.
Jeffersonians believed that former slaves could quickly become the idle poor, and many
Americans assumed that such a class would turn to crime, preying on property holders. Still
another historical analogy played into this equation. Adam Ferguson, an Enlightenment thinker
read by men like Jefferson, argued that the Roman Republic fell in part because emancipated
slaves became “the weight of that dreg, which, in great and prosperous cities, ever sinks, by the
tendency of vice and misconduct to the lowest condition.” 30 On the other hand, Robert Goodloe
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Harper, one of the founders of the ACS, explained that the characterization of freed African
Americans, as “idle and useless, and too often vicious and mischievous” was in part the result of
slavery. 31 Ultimately, the question Americans could not answer easily was what to do with
African Americans. The effort of these Americans to resolve this very issue affected Latrobe’s
generation, emerging as leaders in the 1820s.
Most white Americans familiar with ancient history also knew well that the difference
between the United States and Greece or Rome was the rigidity of race-based slavery. The fact
that most Roman slaves were the same race as their oppressors made it easy to manumit them,
but even more applicable was the fact that ancient slavery had not been so closely associated
with one specific racial group. Jefferson acknowledged, as did Robert G. Harper, that
emancipation in the United States was not a one-step process primarily due to the negative
feelings many whites held toward blacks. 32 The existence of another free race in a republic, it
was argued, divided the citizenry into parties. 33 This was a key point advocated by supporters of
the Jeffersonian republican ideal. What scared Americans such as Jefferson most was the
potential for conflicting parties resulting from the presence of two free races, especially if both
had political rights. Denying political rights to free people, even if not white, contradicted much
of what Americans used to justify their independence. Furthermore, a republic simply could not
exist with two free races because it was assumed that one would ultimately subordinate the other
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or worse yet, exterminate the other in a race war. The Haitian Revolution provided an example
of what might occur. 34
Racism thus complicated the American dilemma. Not only did one race already
subordinate the other, but also many white Americans openly admitted what Jefferson wrote
about slavery—that the institution had ingrained “deep-rooted prejudices” that made a race war
inevitable. The prejudices held by white Americans meant that the most probable means of
ending racial oppression was amalgamation, and few would accept an integrated society whether
in the North or the South. On this subject, Robert G. Harper also expressed an opinion
representative of many white Americans. Harper recognized that free blacks were “condemned
to a state of hopeless inferiority and degradation, by their colour; which is an indelible mark of
their origin and former condition, and establishes an impassible barrier between them and the
whites.” Harper added that the barrier was “closed forever, by our habits and our feelings, which
perhaps it would be more correct to call our prejudices, or a mixture of both.” Such feelings
“make us recoil with horror from the idea of an intimate union with the free blacks, and preclude
the possibility of such a state of equality between them and us, as alone could make us one
people.” 35 The potential solutions, therefore, to the race problem in America were unacceptable
politically to men like Harper. Another course had to be found to preserve the republic as
envisioned by the founders.
Interestingly, the attitude displayed toward African Americans did not apply to all nonwhite components of America’s population. Some whites differentiated between American
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Indians and black Americans. 36 When it came to American Indians, the elusive and seemingly
contradictory Jefferson entertained a different position. Like African Americans, Indians had no
future in the United States as the “other.” However, amalgamation and assimilation of North
America’s native population, which was unacceptable regarding African Americans, was the
destiny of Indians. Jefferson expressed his thoughts that the future of American Indians was the
inevitable “citizenship and amalgamation with whites” who would eventually cover the whole
continent. 37 While even this belief had faded by the end of the bloody conflict known as the War
of 1812, the status of disparate ethnic groups had changed and republicanism required a different
program as a new generation came to power. Those non-white groups unwilling to adopt white
ways or seen by whites as being unassimilable had to be removed. 38 Andrew Jackson would
remove many American Indians beyond areas of white settlement by forcing them west of the
Mississippi River. Though the process began before1815, resettlement intensified after the War
of 1812 and Jackson finished Indian removal in the eastern United States by the 1830s. 39 As for
African Americans, white Americans turned to colonization.
Racial homogeneity remained a key element for a republican society. White Americans
in the southern states wrote more about the social and political consequences of emancipation
than the potential economic impact. In the early nineteenth century, many slaveholders wished
to free their bond-persons while others feared injuring their communities by releasing their
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chattels. 40 The first president of the ACS, Bushrod Washington, admitted as much in his address
to the society at its first annual meeting. At the time, Washington was a Supreme Court justice, a
slaveholder, and a close friend of Benjamin Latrobe. In this address, Washington intimated that
slaveholders, at least those who considered slavery an evil, would gladly take advantage of “the
opportunity, which this settlement will afford him of emancipating his slaves without injury to
his country.” 41 John Latrobe readily received such ideas from Washington who associated with
Latrobe’s father during their years in Washington, D.C. 42 Other Americans did as well; nearly
half of those African Americans who went to Africa during the antebellum period were
emancipated slaves.
Colonizationists readily admitted that slavery itself contradicted “the primary principles”
of republican government and stood “in direct opposition to all the acknowledged and boasted
maxims in which is laid the foundation of our political institutions.” 43 The problems facing
slaveholders as identified by Washington was what to do with slaves after emancipation. In
southern states like Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina for example, this was a serious issue
due to the size of the slave population. In Maryland, slaves made up twenty-nine percent of the
total population in 1810, while in South Carolina they composed forty-seven percent of the total
population. Virginia was between these two with slaves making up forty percent of its total
population. 44 Few thought that freemen could remain peaceful indefinitely without the exercise
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of political rights, and that once African Americans gained their freedom, demands for political
equality were sure to follow. Free blacks in northern states had already proved this point by
petitioning Congress for equal rights under the Constitution. Republican theorists feared such an
outcome because African Americans would immediately affect political power in states where
free blacks and slaves made up a large portion of the population, and they assumed that the
resulting factions would destroy the republic.
ACS member and Speaker of the House of Representatives, Henry Clay, accurately
diagnosed this as the key problem when he admonished northern abolitionists. Clay defended
slavery as an institution protected by the Constitution and subject to state control only. The
states could free their slaves. However, the crucial question of “emancipation in the farming
states,” said Clay “is one whose solution depends upon the relative numbers of the two races, in
any given state.” 45 Free blacks were “peculiarly situated,” neither enjoying “the immunities of
freemen, nor subject to the incapacities of slaves” yet partaking in “the qualities of both.” 46 This
was why they were perceived as a threat to the republic by those in the South if allowed to
remain and exercise equal rights. Almost all slaves lived in the southern states, and by 1820 they
numbered over one and a half million. In some counties of Maryland, Virginia, and South
Carolina, slaves were the majority of the population. If freed, they could potentially seize power
in the local governments through the exercise of political rights. One writer defending the ACS
from abolitionists stated that slavery continued out of the “necessity, which requires us to submit
to existing evils, rather than substitute, by their removal, others of a more serious and destructive
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character.” 47 This became a common argument in the defense of slavery as well as in favor of
colonization. If Americans had to choose between slavery and two free races in the republic,
many saw free blacks as the more serious threat, which was one reason so many opposed
emancipation.
By 1817, both Maryland and Virginia had large free African American populations and
Latrobe spent most of his life in the Chesapeake region. As such, he understood these arguments
well. Whites in those states knew that keeping this portion of their population in Clay’s legal
limbo violated the very principles that they had upheld since the revolution. 48 Historian David
Streifford described the status of free African Americans as “the antithesis of the independent,
republican citizen.” 49 If whites in the Upper South recognized that free blacks could not forever
remain in such a status, neither fully free nor fully slaves, then they must be given rights or
expelled from the country. This problem was compounded by the possibility of swelling that
portion of the population with emancipated slaves.
Such was the milieu of contacts, ideas, and events that shaped Latrobe’s youth before he
moved to Baltimore in 1817. These early connections and the atmosphere John enjoyed on
Pennsylvania Avenue continued in the family’s new home. Yet Baltimore was a vastly different
city, and Latrobe’s synthesis of republican conservatism and increasing democracy enabled him
to enjoy great success. In Baltimore, Latrobe mingled with the likes of the Carrolls of Carrolton,
the Pattersons, and, most important for John Latrobe, the family of General Robert Goodloe
Harper. Harper had been a Congressman from South Carolina before moving to Maryland after
he married the daughter of Charles Carroll. He then established a successful legal practice in
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Baltimore. Latrobe’s friendship with the Harpers turned out to be life-long as he and Harper’s
son, Charles Carroll Harper, learned the legal profession together under the General. It was
under Harper’s tutelage that Latrobe’s interest in colonization developed.
John Latrobe left Baltimore in January of 1818 to study engineering as a cadet at West
Point. Benjamin Latrobe wanted his son to develop his skills as an engineer and the United
States Military Academy was an ideal place. John excelled at his training in the academy,
consistently scoring in the top of his class in every subject. Unfortunately, his career in the army
was cut short; Latrobe never graduated due to his father’s premature death in 1821. Benjamin
Latrobe died from malaria while working on a project in New Orleans. This left the family in
dire straights financially, especially given the lifestyle their social position demanded. The
situation of the family was all the more tenuous as John, the oldest of all the children, was only
eighteen. Thus, he left the academy early to help support his mother and siblings by apprenticing
himself to Robert G. Harper. In January of 1822, Latrobe began his training to become a lawyer.
Two years and four months later John Latrobe was admitted to the bar at the ripe old age of
twenty-one. 50
John Latrobe soon distinguished himself in the field of law and as a leading citizen of
Baltimore. By 1825 he had won a number of cases in the city court and joined several
organizations, including the local chapter of the Masons, the Delphian Club, and been made
chairman of the Baltimore auxiliary of the ACS. His reputation continued to grow until the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company hired him as one of its lead legal advisors in 1828. In
1832 he became a director and lead counsel for the Union Bank in Baltimore, a post he held until
1837. Latrobe’s affiliation with such enterprises would also later shape his vision for the United
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States, which he applied to colonization as well. Thus, Latrobe’s early life was instrumental
formulating many of the ideas he later implemented in the African colonization movement. 51
Latrobe’s return to Baltimore was a turning point in his life in other ways too. Baltimore
had been a republican stronghold since its incorporation as a city in 1796. The fact that
republicans dominated Baltimore’s governing bodies and its economic growth gave the city both
an interest in national matters and a conservative flavor. Furthermore, Baltimore’s development
flourished through industrialization and the emergence of the market economy, which made the
city grow rapidly, but it also remained vulnerable to economic depressions. This was most
evident after the War of 1812. 52 Baltimore’s political economy synthesized existing republican
values and an emerging market economy creating a new sociopolitical culture when Latrobe
arrived. Historian Gary Browne has argued that this “sociopolitical framework” growing out of
Baltimore’s cultural conservatism allowed new men like John Latrobe and Charles C. Harper to
gain power in the state. 53
General Harper illustrated the current attitude of most white Americans regarding not
only slavery but also on the question of the fate of African Americans in the United States. He
recognized that many differences existed between slavery and free societies and instilled them in
Latrobe during his apprenticeship. John Latrobe later applied these beliefs to colonization.
General Harper traveled the states making many observations that led him to support
colonization when the ACS formed. His observations exemplified nineteenth century
republicanism while expressing a clear desire to continue toward a free labor, industrialized
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society. 54 Clearly, abolishing slavery had political, economic, and social consequences for the
United States, but Harper and those like him believed that continuing the system did as well.
Harper plainly asserted his contention that, in states where slavery did not exist, none could fail
“to be struck with the vast difference…in the general diffusion of wealth and comfort; in public
and private improvements; in the education manners and mode of life, among the middle and
labouring classes; in the face of the country; in roads bridges and inns; in schools and churches;
in the general advancement of improvement and prosperity there is no comparison.” The
change, maintained Harper, was evident “the instant you cross the line, which separates the
country where there are slaves, from that where there are none.” 55 In fact, this division existed
in Maryland as clearly as any place in America. The northern and western counties seemed to be
flourishing without slavery while those in southern Maryland were in decline. This reality
provided a powerful argument, which found its way into the convictions of John Latrobe when
he became a leader in the colonization movement.
To further illustrate his point, Harper used his home state of Maryland as an example,
comparing a western county, Frederick, where slavery was not wide spread, to a southern county,
Charles, where slavery was the dominant labor system. 56 The change in population of these two
regions illustrated the point Harper sought to make to his fellow citizens about areas where
slavery predominated. The city of Baltimore, with its strong connection to the west, only
magnified the differences. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Baltimore and
Western Maryland were the fastest growing areas in the state, whereas southern Maryland, where
slavery thrived, was losing population. While declining soil production accounted for some of
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the population loss in Charles County as planters moved west, the presence of slavery explained
much as well. From 1810 to 1820, the population of Western Maryland grew by 10,986 or nine
percent. The population of the city of Baltimore grew by 27,155 or forty-three percent in the
same period. Southern Maryland, as a region, experienced a population loss of nearly five
thousand, or five percent. 57 Two sets of numbers are particularly striking in each region. In both
Western Maryland and Baltimore, the slave populations grew by just 658 (3 percent) and 713 (16
percent) respectively. Comparatively, Southern Maryland saw a loss of more than three
thousand slaves and two thousand free blacks. Where free blacks moved to is difficult to
ascertain, but one can almost certainly assume that many of the slaves found their way into the
Deep South. The data on the white population is perhaps more telling and supportive of
Harper’s arguments. Both Western Maryland and Baltimore saw double-digit growth in their
respective white populations with Baltimore seeing an increase of thirty-nine percent in a tenyear period. The southern counties of Maryland saw its white population barely grow at only 1.8
percent in ten years. 58 Critical to the growth of Maryland’s northern and western counties was
immigration. Clearly, white immigrants coming into the state, a large number of whom were of
German ancestry, chose areas where slavery and the plantation complex were less important
economically and politically.
Yet compared to other states, slave states were not growing nearly as rapidly as Free
states. New York, for example, was well behind Virginia in total population in 1790 and nearly
even with Maryland. By 1820, when the push for colonization and the debate over slavery first
intensified, New York had surpassed Virginia, the South’s most populous state. In thirty years,
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New York’s population grew from 340,120 to 1,372,812 while Virginia grew from 748,308 to
1,065,379. 59 Furthermore, by 1820 Pennsylvania’s population was less than 15,000 behind
Virginia. The ramifications of these statistics were significant in antebellum America, especially
when it came to the fate of slavery and national politics. The populations of New York and
Pennsylvania in 1820 approximately equaled that of Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina, and
Virginia combined. One Marylander brought this to the attention of his fellow citizens
indicating the real significance of how slavery affected the growth of America’s population. He
asserted that “[i]n the first Congress,” Maryland “had six out of 65” members, but in 1820 only
“nine out of 215.” Unless slavery ended, that trend would continue with serious consequences
for the South. 60
The problems associated with slavery and economic development were not the only ones
that weighed on the minds of men like Harper. Where would free blacks fit in American
society? Most accepted that amalgamation was not a solution. Thus, the push for colonization
became national in 1816. Through colonization slavery could be eliminated safely, but more
importantly, the final disposition of blacks in American society would be laid to rest without
harming the republic or causing further conflict. The benefits multiplied for the South as
immigrants would then come after slavery disappeared. Latrobe matured during the debates over
such issues. Robert Harper guided Latrobe in such matters and as John later acknowledged,
“General Harper made it a point to introduce me to all his friends, and in that way I became
acquainted, sooner than I might otherwise have done, with leading men in Baltimore,” allowing
him access to the political structure and leadership roles. 61 The teachings of the revolutionary
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generation and the connections provided to Latrobe as a young man proved valuable in making
him a man of influence in Maryland. As a result, the issues that concerned the revolutionary
generation also became those, which most concerned Latrobe.
Slavery, fear of large masses of newly freed people, and an emerging republican
democracy combined to give birth to the American Colonization Society and the movement it
led. Espoused by some of the most prominent men of the nineteenth century, Latrobe adopted
many of the arguments in favor of colonization while seeing the first cracks in the republic,
which emerged from the controversy over Missouri in 1819. While the heated debate over
whether or not Missouri would be free or slave was eventually calmed by the Compromise of
1820, Latrobe recognized that the issue of slavery would not stay buried long. Under the
guidance of General Harper, John Latrobe threw his support into the movement as the one and
only solution that could solve all the problems Americans feared emancipation would cause
while ending the biggest reason for sectional conflict in the United States, slavery. The
expansion of the 1820s, however, cemented his vision for America ultimately leading him on a
different path than the one blazed by his early mentors.

33

Chapter Two: “The Only True and Efficient Plan”

By the time John Latrobe joined the colonization movement the ACS had already faced
and survived its first major crisis. Slavery in Missouri elevated the tensions between the North
and the South, but also forced the ACS to define more clearly its position and goals. The
Missouri controversy only served to reinforce the beliefs Latrobe internalized from his mentors
that two free races could not exist together. However, support for and against slavery and
colonization was not so simplistic. Eventually, the colonization movement faced a rigid division
among its supporters in the different sections of the United States, directly due to the emerging
conflict over slavery. As the two sides engaged in the conflict, Latrobe worked himself into
roles of increasing responsibility in colonization during the 1820s believing that it was the only
plan that could end the debate. By 1831, when sectional conflicts over slavery exploded at the
ACS’ annual meeting, Latrobe was ready to assume a new leadership role in Maryland’s
colonization efforts. The ACS auxiliary in Maryland declared its independence from the national
society in Washington to pursue a program that better addressed the concerns of Marylanders.
This chapter examines Latrobe’s growing importance and his role in the emergence of
Maryland’s colonization efforts, which sought to avoid the conflict over slavery and solve the
problems arising out of the debate over the institution’s future. 1
The formation of the ACS reflected the republican concerns that many Americans had
regarding the future of slavery and African Americans in the United States. The organization
drew support from throughout the nation. Its list of eminent members—including Henry Clay
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(Kentucky), John Eager Howard (Maryland), Francis Scott Key (Maryland), William Phillips
(Massachusetts), John Randolph (Virginia), and Richard Rush (Pennsylvania)—illustrated
colonization’s national appeal. More significant, however, was the fact that all were prominent
figures in American politics. Their connections and influence no doubt gave weight to their
request for assistance from the national government in establishing a colony in Africa. 2 State
legislatures joined in requesting this assistance. Maryland was one such state that strongly
supported colonization. Demonstrating its support, the Maryland House of Delegates passed a
resolution on January 26, 1818 directing the Governor to:
communicate to the President of the United States, and to our Senators and
Representatives in Congress, the opinion of this General Assembly, that a wise and
provident policy suggests the expediency, on the part of our national government, of
procuring, through negotiation, by cession or purchase, a tract of country on the western
coast of Africa for the colonization of the free people of colour of the United States. 3

Such a request seems indicative of motivations beyond racism, particularly because they chose to
focus initially on the free black population. Latrobe concluded as much himself when he stated
that no movement of any sort “existed without motives of various kinds being involved—some
high, some low.” 4 Despite such overt support from elected government officials, the petition to
Congress failed to materialize in any direct pecuniary aid, in part because of challenges to the
legality of such proposals.
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Jefferson, as noted in the last chapter, believed that the Constitution must be changed
before Congress gained the authority to act on colonization. John Latrobe felt this way as well,
stating that the constitutions of both the United States and Maryland prohibited government
sponsored colonization. Nevertheless, some indirect aid was forthcoming from the national
government when Congress passed the Slave Trade Act of 1819, which appropriated $100,000 of
federal money to repatriate African slaves captured on the high seas by the U.S. Navy. President
Monroe, who supported colonization, used this act to assist the ACS in establishing its first
colony in Africa in 1822. Yet even this limited action by the president was a bold move, as not
all of his cabinet members supported the interpretation. Secretary of State John Q. Adams,
however, was first among those who rejected the colonization plan and Monroe’s interpretation
of the 1819 act on constitutional grounds. 5 Nevertheless, Monroe interpreted the slave trade act
in a way that benefited colonization and stationed a government official in the colony. When
General Harper and John Latrobe drew a map of the Liberian coast they decided to honor
President Monroe for his assistance by naming the capital of the new settlement Monrovia. 6
The debate about constitutionality continued even after Adams succeeded Monroe in the
nation’s highest office. Many of the early objections stemmed from constitutional scruples
regarding property as they suspected that any legislation regarding the free black population
would eventually encompass the portion held as chattels. Most accepted that the Constitution
recognized slaves as a form of protected property. One supporter of government aid argued in a
written debate with an opponent of colonization that the removal of African Americans was
constitutional because it contributed to “the common defense and general welfare” of the United
5
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States. Therefore, Congress had the power to assist the ACS. 7 Still many southerners feared the
ultimate outcome of the effort. Would colonizationists seek to end slavery? If so, would
slaveholders be compensated? Such questions became more important to ACS members as
tensions over slavery escalated after 1819 when Missouri applied for statehood and the abolition
movement became more active in the North.
By 1819, Missouri contained a significant slave population and it was assumed, at least
by southerners, that slavery would be permitted in the new state. In 1810, there were just over
3,000 slaves in the Missouri territory. By 1820, that number had grown to over 10,000. 8 The
entry of Missouri as a free or slave state was a critical issue in several ways. Southern states
were consistently losing seats in Congress because of the North’s rapidly growing population.
But in 1819 the number of free and slave states were equal, maintaining a political balance in the
U.S. Senate. Missouri threatened to tip the balance in favor of one or the other in the Senate
while either bringing the House of Representatives closer to equity or pushing the balance more
in favor of the North. For most southern slaveholders this equated to certain abolition.
The stakes were high and the ACS had to define its position within this debate, as did
Latrobe and the Maryland colonization effort. Many felt that the course chosen by the ACS on
this subject would ultimately decide if the movement was to succeed. Some recognized that the
indirect impact of colonization would be to lessen the political power of the South, at least in the
short term. If the ACS pursued colonization for the purposes of emancipation or the complete
abolition of slavery, it would be advocating the loss of a population that, while prohibited from
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enjoying the political benefits of citizenship, nonetheless counted as three-fifths of a citizen for
the purposes of national representation. As such, colonization could significantly affect the
power of the South at the national level. 9 Colonizationists argued this would only temporarily
affect the South as white immigration would rise and swell the ranks of the working class as the
black population fell. 10 Nevertheless, the stakes were high enough to cause conflict. The
Missouri controversy escalated even further when New York’s James Tallmadge introduced an
amendment to Missouri’s statehood prohibiting slavery in the state and furthermore, slowly
emancipating those slaves already residing there. A compromise ended the controversy by
bringing Maine into the Union with Missouri thus maintaining the balance between the free and
slave states nationally. Although a compromise was successfully achieved this time, the
underlying issues remained, rising to the surface again in the 1830s.
The Missouri controversy had a lasting impact on the ACS because it intensified
opposition to the movement in both the North and South. It remained most popular in the border
states of Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky. One colonizationist defended the society seven
years after the conclusion of the compromise, but acknowledged the impact the controversy had
on the ACS. The subject of slavery was “indeed, to be deplored,” but cannot be mentioned in the
South without initiating “feelings which all men must find unpleasant, and which, unhappily, the
best men are not always without.” Continuing, the author plainly asserted, that the “fatal
Missouri question has so irritated this sensibility, that it has not yet recovered its healthy tone.” 11
Some northerners, on the other hand, suggested that colonization was yet another scheme to
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strengthen the bonds of slavery in the southern states. The Missouri controversy sparked the
feelings in men that caused division and they carried these feelings into the colonization
movement, forcing the ACS to declare its position relative to the fate of slavery. Many felt that
colonization would only strengthen or end slavery. There was no middle ground or room to
straddle the fence after 1820. The battle lines were forming.
The membership of the ACS partly explains the stance taken on slavery, especially as
many of the society’s members held slaves. Because slavery emerged as such a divisive issue in
1819 and remained one afterwards, many colonizationists resigned themselves not to discuss the
subject. Henry Clay instructed members early and frequently in the history of the ACS on the
need to avoid “the question of emancipation” because of its effects on men’s feelings. 12 Clay,
himself a slaveholder, repeated this often because many slaveholders supported the organization
as well as northerners who wanted to abolish or confine slavery to the states in which it already
existed. Avoiding the issue of emancipation reduced opportunities for conflict while maintaining
the vital private financial donations that the ACS depended on for its operation. Other than
church collections, individual supporters were the largest source of funding. Clay recognized the
varied membership of the organization in 1818 when he said that colonization appealed to the
Christian as well as the “philanthropist; the statesman who looks only to the safety and happiness
of his own country; in short, all good men will find motives for engaging their co-operation or
their wishes in behalf of the Society.” 13 Others in the ACS expressed similar opinions. One
member said that “[i]t has ever been the desire of this Institution to conciliate the favour and
support of the whole American nation. To the people of the North it has endeavored to exhibit
12
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itself as most humane and disinterested [in slavery], and to those of the South, as utterly opposed
to any measures which might infringe upon the rights of property or disturb the peace of
society.” 14 Unfortunately, the ACS position led only to conflict among its supporters. It was
inconsistent with opinions held by Maryland colonizationists like Latrobe, and they acted
accordingly in 1831 when the movement finally splintered over the issue of slavery.
While the ACS did offer something to all these interests, the ACS members nevertheless
chose to focus their efforts on removing free blacks. This clearly reflected the recognition that
slaves were a constitutionally protected form of property. Moreover, the institution of slavery
was not subject to federal control, but instead fell to the states. In addition, members believed
that by concentrating on free blacks, the movement would be more appealing in the North. To
that end, the ACS publicly announced that the organization would not interfere “with the legal
rights and obligations of slavery,” on the one hand, nor perpetuate “its existence within the limits
of the country.” 15 Such resolutions were designed specifically to “conciliate, by every method
consistent with the promulgation of the truth, the favour and aid of the whole American people.
The assumption of a common ground by this Society…has been deemed by us its peculiar
recommendation.” 16 Ironically, the attempts of the ACS to enter a course of action that appealed
to the largest and widest possible base of support exposed its weakness and led to attacks from
opposition groups, mainly free African Americans and abolitionists. Eventually, this led to a
formal break in the movement.
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Although opposition slowly increased during the 1820s, Marylanders like Latrobe
continued to support colonization as the best solution to the whole debate over slavery.
Marylanders organized one of the first auxiliary societies of the ACS in 1817, and the state
legislature also lent assistance to the movement. Yet Latrobe, who by 1825 had completed his
training and become a member of the bar, used his influence to bring other organizations to
support the cause. For example, in 1825, he joined the Baltimore lodge of the Masons. Within a
year, Latrobe, Richard Stewart, and Charles Carroll Harper convinced Baltimore’s Masons to
support colonization as directed by the ACS. Furthermore, the three formed a committee to
correspond with other Masons in the state “on this important subject” in an effort to multiply the
support and financial resources for the cause.17
Despite the efforts of Latrobe and his fellow colonizationists in Maryland, the ACS and
colonization were losing support by 1827. The loss of support stemmed from a number of
factors. The slow pace at which colonists left the United States for Africa disillusioned many
supporters. So too did the repeated reports of difficulties in Liberia, particularly the high death
rate among colonists who died from, more often than not, diseases. Near constant fighting with
indigenous peoples also contributed to the cool reception of the subject. Further, these factors
hindered the recruiting of colonists. More detrimental though for the movement was the
increasing opposition from free African Americans and abolitionists in the North, men such as
Benjamin Lundy and William Lloyd Garrison. Free African Americans in Philadelphia
denounced the scheme for a number of reasons almost immediately after hearing of the
formation of the ACS. Their opposition only increased following rumors of what happened to
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the settlers of Liberia in the 1820s. One of the more alarming rumors was that colonists were
returned to slavery. 18 Furthermore, because the ACS sought only free African Americans who
would volunteer for colonization critics charged the organization with strengthening the
institution of slavery in the United States by removing its strongest opponents. James Forten, a
prominent black Philadelphian, condemned the ACS in a letter to William Lloyd Garrison,
claiming it was “as dark as death and [without] one redeeming virtue in it.” 19 Forten’s
arguments helped persuade Garrison to leave the movement and condemn it as well. Garrison
had spent some time as a printer in Baltimore, Maryland and was even jailed for his outspoken
opposition to slavery. Garrison expressed his disillusionment with colonization in 1832 in his
Thoughts on African Colonization. Garrison described the ACS as “the most compendious and
best adapted scheme to uphold the slave system that human ingenuity can invent.” 20 While this
was a very serious charge against the colonization movement, it did not halt the effort,
particularly in border-states such as Maryland where the contradictions between freedom and
slavery were the most apparent.
Maryland colonizationists noticed that African colonization had lost some of its
momentum in the state as early as 1827. This was particularly true of Latrobe who became
chairman of the Baltimore colonization committee for the ACS that year. Nevertheless, in that
year two things happened in Maryland that ensured the colonization auxiliary would still exist
when the movement split in 1831. No doubt, the first had much to do with Robert G. Harper’s
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son and Latrobe’s friend, Charles C. Harper. Seeking an elected office in 1826, Harper urged
colonization on his fellow citizens as the plan best able to stop what he saw as “a mockery of
freedom,” when emancipated slaves became freemen separated from whites and without the full
privileges of citizenship. 21 This was nowhere more apparent than in Maryland, which had the
largest free black population in the United States. The state legislature, while still sympathetic to
the cause, responded to such requests and approved an annual appropriation of $1,000 for the
ACS, provided that the funds were applied specifically to removing African Americans from
Maryland. 22 This was a significant step in reviving colonization, which many saw as stagnating
in Maryland. The second event surrounded the reorganization of the Maryland auxiliary in the
fall of 1827. John Latrobe, Charles C. Harper, and Roger B. Taney led the charge to accelerate
colonization by more efficiently recruiting colonists and collecting donations in Maryland. In
the short term, their efforts paid off. The sailing of the brig Doris from Baltimore in November
of 1827 highlighted their renewed efforts. One hundred and five colonists boarded the Doris;
sixty-six were former slaves. In addition sixty-five of the new settlers were from Maryland,
primarily Baltimore and Anne Arundel County. 23 These events seemed to breathe new life into
colonization and create new momentum going into 1828. It was in 1828 that John Latrobe truly
began asserting himself as a young leader in the movement foreshadowing his vision for African
Americans, Africa, and the United States.
At the annual meeting of the ACS in January of 1828, John Latrobe proposed a resolution
that reflected his desire to address the problems within the movement while advancing the cause
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of colonization throughout the United States. For the ACS to keep support in America it had to
demonstrate substantive progress in removing free African Americans while maintaining the
growth of the colony in Africa. Simply stated, if Americans did not see that the ACS was
meeting its objectives, then support would fall. This was, in fact, happening. Up to 1827, the
ACS had settled a scant 802 colonists, some of who were recaptured Africans intercepted at sea
by the United States Navy. 24 This concerned many, including Latrobe, due to the rapid increase
in the free black population. Excepting European immigration, this was the fastest growing
segment of America’s population. At the rate that ACS efforts up to 1828 had progressed, the
number of African Americans removed from the United States did not make a noticeable dent in
the overall black population, thus some whites saw colonization as a failure.
This, argued Latrobe, could be reversed if the ACS expanded the number of settlements
on Africa’s western coast. Specifically, Latrobe urged the members present to pursue the
purchase of two areas, Cape Palmas and an island called Bulama. His reasons for doing so were
twofold. First, “by possessing Cape Palmas, we would hold the commercial key of all the South
Coast of Africa, and the countries immediately in the interior” that would, “like Monrovia, soon
become the resort of the surrounding nations.” From such settlements, a “great and prosperous
trade would be the consequence; and the facilities of gain would soon fill the new settlement
with industrious inhabitants.” 25 Latrobe suggested this because he believed that economic
development would assist the colonization effort financially, and that it would also attract
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prospective settlers seeking better economic opportunities than those available in the United
States. Latrobe counted on the economic draw of the colonies to fuel emigration.
The second reason for his proposal directly addressed the rate of immigration, which he
hoped would increase with the establishment of more settlements. Furthermore, his method of
increasing the number of settlements reflected what he saw as a goal of the ACS in America—
social order. Latrobe argued that the success of colonization not only depended on some
association with commerce but the capacity of the colonies to receive new immigrants. This
capacity rested on the ability of the colonies to produce their own sustenance, the availability of
vacant land, employment opportunities, and property rights. Latrobe’s inclinations reflected his
immersion in Jeffersonian republican values. Such values, he argued, would preserve order and
prevent settlers from becoming the destitute poor, which Americans like him feared because of
the potential for social chaos. Success would be measured through the increasing numbers of
African Americans leaving for Africa. 26
Despite Maryland colonizationists’ attempts to make the movement more efficient,
conflict within the ACS continued among opposing interests. As Latrobe reflected a few years
later, he concluded that the ACS was “distracted within itself.” The distraction caused by the
debate over slavery inhibited the progress many expected of the organization and no action was
taken on Latrobe’s proposal. 27 Frankly, the movement was stagnant due to division between
northerners and southerners over the goals of colonization and its role in ending slavery. As
such, the ACS, according to its secretary Ralph R. Gurley, was as “unexceptionable as was its
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purpose, adapted to conciliate the citizens both of the south and north, it met, at its
commencement, the views of neither.” He continued saying that the South regarded colonization
“as disguised in character and dangerous in tendency, seeking to effect a speedy and general
emancipation; while those of the north had little confidence in its benevolence, and thought it
designed rather to perpetuate than remove the system of slavery.” 28 As a result, colonization
could do neither and fell victim to the America’s divisiveness on the issue of slavery.
Illustrating how some southerners viewed colonization were proslavery advocates like
Thomas R. Dew of Virginia and James Blair of South Carolina. Dew argued that the ACS’s
focus on free African Americans would only drive the price of slaves higher. This, in turn,
would renew the slave trade. Colonization, as far as Dew was concerned, was a “stupendous
piece of folly.” 29 While such arguments did persuade some, the expansion of slavery into the
western frontier did as much to raise prices as any other scheme would have done. Furthermore,
most southerners saw free African Americans as the instigators of slave rebellions. As such, one
would think removing them would appeal to slaveholders. This was not necessarily the case as
James Blair condemned colonization as the first step in abolishing the institution of slavery. This
seems much more convincing than Dew’s argument because removing free African Americans
would eliminate one of the objections slaveholders used to justify their determination not to
emancipate slaves. Several state emancipation laws illustrated a “not in my backyard” mentality
too by requiring all freed slaves to leave the state. Yet other issues plagued the logic of such
reasoning. Upper South colonizationists wanted to rid their states of slavery because they saw
the institution as prohibitive to white immigration and the progress that northern states seemed to
28
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be enjoying. At the same time, however, if colonization targeted slavery destruction as its
ultimate aim, it further eroded the South’s political power since slaves counted as three-fifths of
a person for Congressional representation. Once southerners realized this, they began to
interpret colonization as another arm of abolition, as well as an attack on their way of life. 30
These arguments could not be ignored for long, nor could the ACS conciliate the two
interests. Francis Scott Key addressed both sides at the January 1828 annual meeting. Key
suggested that it was impractical to ignore the debate over slavery as the ACS had tried to do in
the past. It was a simple fact, Key argued, “that the subject of slavery, in some way or other, will
come into [the] thoughts, feelings, and plans of men situated as we are.” There was no escaping
the subject because slavery did exist in America. Clearly, Key intended to highlight the ACS’
common appeal while recognizing that consequent attempts to reconcile opposing groups on the
question of slavery was unrealistic. Instead, he suggested that colonizationists “act discreetly—
with a just regard to the rights and feelings of others,” and opposition to the cause would be best
overcome “with patience, and…the fruits that a favouring Providence, to which we look, may
enable us to present from our labours.” Just as Latrobe had suggested, Key’s point was that
removing African Americans, whether free or slave, would best mute any opposition from
abolitionists and slaveholders alike. 31
Unfortunately, for Key, most were unwilling to wait, particularly given the rapid increase
of free blacks in states like Maryland and Virginia. Furthermore, the efforts of ACS officials to
occupy a middle ground on slavery in the 1820s, despite opposition from increasingly militant
groups, served only to slow the progress of the movement. Northern abolitionists, led by the
30
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likes of William Lloyd Garrison, abandoned colonization as a means of ending slavery, choosing
more direct and immediate methods rather than the gradual plans proposed under the program.
Southerners, particularly in Deep South states such as South Carolina, became more defensive
and denounced the ACS and colonizationists in the Border States as traitors. 32 As the positions
taken in the North and South became more rigid, colonization became more difficult. The
strongest support for the movement remained in the border states of Maryland and Virginia.
Unable to reconcile the two opposing sides within the movement, a dispute finally erupted at the
ACS annual meeting in 1831. The members of the ACS had reached an impasse, which both
allowed and motivated John Latrobe and his fellow colonizationists in Maryland to diverge from
the national organization to pursue their own agenda, one that resolved these conflicts by
removing the plan from national debate and politics.
The colonization movement was stagnating in Maryland in 1831 despite the
reorganization of the ACS auxiliary and increasing legislative support. However, it was the
January 1831 meeting that tipped the scales in favor of Maryland forming an independent state
colonization society and eventually breaking from the ACS completely. John Latrobe recounted
that meeting to Courtlandt Van Rensellaer, who had inquired about Maryland’s actions. In
explaining his and other colonizationists’ actions, Latrobe stated that the ACS had publicly
mooted the debate over slavery for years, but “the explosion came at last” from the “discussions
of the last winter in Washington.” Specifically what discussions he meant, Latrobe did not
relate, possibly due to the fact that the new organization in Maryland was still trying to cooperate
with the national society. What is clear about the events in January of 1831 is that supporters of
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colonization were becoming impatient and many, including Latrobe, were unhappy with the
speed at which the ACS colonized African Americans in Liberia. Tensions were heating up and
endangering the republic. Furthermore, some on each side of the slavery issue were pressing for
colonization to take a more definitive stand. Would colonization end slavery or not? Rather
than wait for the ACS to decide this issue, Latrobe and his fellow Marylanders, specifically
Moses Sheppard, took action themselves. 33
Feeling that colonization under the ACS had failed at the “object for which they had
originally united,” Latrobe “suggested the appointment of a committee in Baltimore to take
charge of the interests of the society there.” 34 With the assistance of a well-recognized
colonizationist, Robert S. Finley, Latrobe addressed a meeting on February 21, 1831 in
Baltimore. The meeting revived colonization in Maryland through a new, independent state
colonization society. The formation of the Maryland State Colonization Society, or MSCS,
changed the course of colonization in the state and the nation. Further, it reflected the outlook of
Latrobe that America’s future was one in which slavery did not exist.
Unlike the national society, the Maryland society, from the beginning, chose to seek an
end to slavery through colonization. After the initial meeting in February of 1831, Latrobe, Peter
Hoffman, and Dr. Samuel Baker were elected by the other attendees to draw up a constitution for
the MSCS. Latrobe saw fit to make “the extirpation of slavery in Maryland…as the peculiar
object of their labors.” 35 The resolutions he proposed continued arguing that the end of slavery
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“can best be accomplished, under existing circumstances, by advocating and assisting the cause
of colonization.” 36 With such objectives in mind, the committee submitted the constitution of
the Maryland society to the other members who unanimously approved it. The easy
confirmation grew out of the attitudes that men like Latrobe held toward slavery. Many
colonizationists in Maryland felt slavery hindered the economic growth of America—its true
destiny. Economic growth figured prominently in the course adopted by Latrobe and the MSCS
board members all of whom were businessmen, a fact which he believed prejudiced the clergy
against assisting the organization at its founding because they were excluded from leadership
positions in the society. This fact did, however, greatly affect the direction of MSCS policy after
it founded the colony of Maryland in Liberia in 1834. 37 These men also considered slavery’s
impact on white workers, especially in light of Baltimore’s large African American population,
when adopting a new course of action.
The consideration of white workers in their actions, however, was not completely
altruistic. One study suggests that Baltimore’s business owners acted against slavery and in
favor of free labor because there was no clear advantage to using slave labor. David and Richard
McKim experimented with both labor systems at their Baltimore based chemical works in the
1820s. Using both wage and slave laborers, David McKim determined that slave labor was at
best equal to free labor in productivity; that slaves took just as many sick days as wage workers,
and finally that the use of slaves in manufacturing increased production only when extra
incentives such as overtime pay were offered to them. Naturally, slaves then used the extra
money to eventually purchase their freedom. The study of the McKims and their chemical works
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did show, however, that even though using slave laborers entailed the initial cost of purchase as
well as the expense of food, clothing and shelter, slave labor cost less annually than using free
workers, but it was no more productive. Furthermore, slave laborers apparently did not suit their
needs as they phased out most of their slave workers in favor of wage labor by the early 1830s. 38
James Raymond of Frederick, Maryland reached similar conclusions in an essay he wrote in
1827. Raymond, in comparing free and slave labor, argued that freemen were more productive
because they supported themselves. The conclusion was that self-supporting free workers
ultimately advanced the interests of the property or business owner because free workers aspired
to improve their own economic security through increased productivity. 39 Slaves gained little
from maximizing their productivity. Consequently, at least some businessmen began to believe
that ending slavery might serve their economic interests.
Economic interest only partly explains the Maryland colonizationists’ activities though,
as these men considered themselves philanthropists too. Several members were involved in
organizations designed to promote the public good as well as humanity. Latrobe, for one,
insisted that the MSCS pursue a plan of action reflecting this fact. After all, as he explained in a
letter to Dr. James Hall, a fellow colonizationist and the future governor of Maryland’s colony,
“we are dealing now, also, in human life, and in human happiness, and our feelings and motives
should be as pure as our experiments are important.” 40 Colonization would benefit all those who
emigrated by giving them what they could not expect to gain in the United States.
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While Marylanders hoped to end slavery through colonization in the spring of 1831, they
did not believe their actions were inconsistent with the national movement nor did it warrant a
complete separation from the society in Washington. 41 Maryland colonizationists were
embarking on a plan of independent state action, but the society’s leadership sought to cooperate
with the ACS in removing black Americans. Another reason Latrobe and the others supporting
the movement in Maryland acted as they did in 1831 was due to the slow pace of removal of
emigrants from the state. Years earlier the state legislature contributed state funds to the cause,
but the ACS failed to collect the allocation because it never removed the required number of
black Marylanders. Furthermore, Latrobe noted in his account of the affair between Maryland
and the ACS that Baltimoreans raised nearly $3,000 for colonization in addition to the state
appropriation in 1829. Unfortunately for Maryland colonizationists, those who contributed the
money later reacted with some hostility toward the movement, as they believed that the number
of African Americans the ACS took from the state was not proportionate to their contributions.
As such, Latrobe stated, “all interest in colonization seemed to die out for the time.” 42 The
primary purpose behind Marylanders’ bold move in 1831 was to more effectively carry out
colonization within the state. It was the perceived lack of progress then that weighed most
heavily on the minds of Baltimoreans like Latrobe.
The MSCS members determined as early as March of 1831 that they would work toward
the faster removal of Maryland’s black population and they planned an expedition to leave
Baltimore in June of that year. The plan of concentrated state action would, they thought, put
Maryland on the path to becoming a free state and establish the model for ridding the South of
41
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slavery. The managers of the MSCS assumed that their colonists would go to the Liberian
colonies controlled by the ACS from the very beginning regardless of any rift with the national
organization. Yet the actions of the MSCS suggest that all was not well between the national
society and its Maryland auxiliary. The board directed Secretary Latrobe to first seek written
permission from the ACS for its emigrants to reside at Monrovia, and then to ask that the ACS
guarantee the same legal rights and privileges to the colonists that the ACS settlers received.
The parent board, as Latrobe later acknowledged, disapproved of the course of action Maryland
colonizationists took because it curtailed the ACS’s ability to collect donations and emigrants
from a state in which the movement previously enjoyed strong support. As colonization was
strongest in the Chesapeake region, the loss of funds in particular had potentially devastating
consequences for the ACS. 43
The discord between Maryland colonizationists and the board of the ACS prompted quick
responses from both organizations in an effort to close the divide. The desire to present a united
front led to a meeting between committees representing each body, with Latrobe representing the
MSCS. After that meeting Latrobe presented a set of resolutions from the ACS managers to the
governing body of the MSCS on March 26, 1831. The resolutions illustrated the ACS’s
acceptance of the Maryland society’s autonomy within the borders of Maryland, but made it
clear that they still considered the Maryland society an auxiliary body. Furthermore, the ACS all
but demanded that Maryland colonizationists surrender any and all funds collected by them, and
finally, that it would determine not only when and from where emigrants left the United States,
but how many would leave Baltimore. 44 The response from MSCS members, while not
43
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belligerent, indicated their determination to be a financially autonomous body within Maryland.
Money was crucial to the goals of the MSCS. Toward that end, the MSCS was willing only to
make periodic reports about its finances to the ACS and to reimburse the ACS only for expenses
it incurred in transporting Maryland’s emigrants to Liberia. Under no conditions, however,
would Marylanders continue to blindly release funds to the ACS. 45
Before adjourning the meeting, the MSCS committee made one final statement. Any
attempt by the ACS to gain the funds rightly belonging to the Maryland society would end
colonization in Maryland. Leading the MSCS committee, Latrobe asserted that if “control of the
funds or any part thereof is required by the Parent Society_: if, indeed, the unrestricted
management of the funds is in any way interfered with not only does the constitution of this
Society become impossible of accomplishment, and the Society necessarily and of consequence
dissolved;_ but the principles that united its members will cease to exist.” Latrobe and the rest of
the committee felt that “the past justifies this anticipation,” a clear reference to what had
happened in 1829. Ultimately, ACS demands for control of MSCS monies, the committee
argued would “vitally injure the great cause in which the parent society is engaged, and by
preventing the success of the scheme in Maryland destroy the most striking and irresistible
argument in favour of the practicability of African colonization.” 46 Latrobe in particular saw this
course of action as necessary because of the growing sectional rift between the North and South.
Maryland’s actions could alleviate the tensions that tore open the ACS meeting in January.
Thus, the MSCS and independent state action was the best hope for saving the movement and the
Union.
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Unable to resolve the dispute with the ACS in March, the MSCS continued implementing
its plans, which included sending an expedition of emigrants to Liberia in June of 1831. The
ACS welcomed the settlers but requested that the MSCS pay twenty dollars for each emigrant
transported to the colony. The board of managers directed that the committee representing the
MSCS take up the matter and report to the members in May. At its May meeting, the MSCS
appointed committee reported its findings, which showed the influence of John Latrobe. The
committee once again noted its willingness to reimburse the full costs incurred by the parent
society in transporting Maryland emigrants to Liberia, but that a twenty-dollar fee per emigrant
demanded by the ACS was nothing more than a tax. Latrobe drew on arguments reminiscent of
the American Revolution, stating to MSCS members that “Your Committee consider the tax in
question to be unjust.” 47 The report suggested that the constitution of the ACS did not directly
give or imply the power of the board of managers to tax its auxiliaries. As such, the ACS had no
right to demand anything from the MSCS except that which was necessary to cover the
legitimate expenses incurred in settling Maryland’s colonists. To Latrobe, the ACS was
attempting to control the entire movement. That day, however, was past. “The Maryland State
Colonization Society was organized when, after the experience of fifteen years, it became
satisfied that the course which it has now taken was the only one that was left to it and that to
look to the Parent Society acting from Maine to Florida to remove the free people of color of
Maryland, was to look for the performance of an impossibility.” The actions of the ACS proved
only “that the principle upon which the State Society was established was wholly disapproved by
the Society in Washington.” 48
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As the months passed from spring into summer, the vision of Maryland colonizationists
and the importance of the movement to Baltimoreans in particular, became clearer. The
committee on which Latrobe served advocated independent state action as:
the only true and efficient plan for securing the final success of African
Colonization…because the citizens of each state will contribute in proportion
to the immediate benefit that is to be derived from such contributions, or where
the contributions, or the contributors, are from a non Slave holding State, or
one from which no Emigrants can be sent they will be increased by the admitted
& exercised right of the contributors to direct the manner of their immediate
application; and it is in the amount of such voluntary contributions that the cause
must for a very long time at least rely for success. 49
The events in the colonization movement since January of 1831 showed Latrobe, at least, that the
ACS could not continue to reconcile the differences over slavery in the cause. Certainly,
sectional jealousies were rising and Marylanders, on the border between the two, felt this
increasing tension. Continuing this line of argument, the MSCS members concluded that both
northerners and southerners were equally zealous in their support of colonization, just for
different reasons. The difficulty the ACS faced in dealing with both would end through state
action because each state could pursue “its own peculiar motives upon the subject and that
sectional jealousy which is now daily exhibiting itself to impede the progress of the Society,
would at once, cease to exist.” 50 State action would work because it would allow local motives
to further the movement. Latrobe recognized the reality of the movement and that the honest
motives of colonizationists were both high and low in nature. Nevertheless, state action would
minimize the opportunity for conflict. Latrobe thought that unless this happened, colonization
would fail, and if colonization failed, the American republic was in peril. As it stood in May,
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then, the impasse between the MSCS and ACS seemed irreconcilable until events late in the
summer drastically changed the minds of many white Americans, particularly in the South. This
change also gave the MSCS the means to carry out its agenda without interference from the
parent society.
In August of 1831, Southampton, Virginia experienced a devastating revolt led by the
slave Nat Turner. Characterized as a slave preacher, Turner began a slave rebellion on August
21, 1831 that lasted five days and killed at least fifty-one white men, women, and children before
being suppressed. Whites responded immediately by rounding up and executing several of
Turner’s accomplices. Turner was himself captured weeks later and hung. 51 The white backlash
spread quickly as southerners moved to prevent future rebellions and alleviate the fears Turner’s
Rebellion exposed. Latrobe admitted that the “Southampton Massacre had created a great
excitement,” which ultimately helped colonization efforts in Maryland. 52
The rebellion of August 1831 caused a surge in emigration to Liberia, so much that the
ACS could not carry all who applied for passage to its colony. Capitalizing on the momentum
created by Turner’s Rebellion, ACS secretary Ralph Gurley issued a call to action and unity from
the state auxiliary societies. He addressed all Americans regarding the “crisis deeply momentous
to the colonization of free people of colour in Africa…Recent events have presented these points
in their true lights, and an almost universal conviction now presents, that, without the most
strenuous efforts, the late afflicting scenes, flagrant + calamitous as they are, will be followed by
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evils still more appalling.” 53 The ACS literally had more free blacks asking to go to Liberia than
it could send despite arranging for expeditions to sail from New York, Baltimore, Norfolk, and
New Orleans.
The realities of the rebellion and the plea for cooperation from the ACS affected its
relationship with the Maryland society. Turner’s Rebellion temporarily closed the schism
between the MSCS and the ACS. In the spring of 1831 a compromise could not be reached on
the issue of how much compensation the Maryland society should pay the ACS for removing
Maryland’s emigrants. Turner’s Rebellion, too close to home, changed this as the MSCS agreed
to reimburse the parent society for the costs associated with colonizing its settlers. The amount
was to be determined by the man on the spot, the colonial agent in Liberia. This compromise
was only temporary, however, as the fall expedition, which left Baltimore in October of 1831,
proved far costlier than the MSCS anticipated. The MSCS sent thirty-one emigrants out on the
Orion, which cost the society $3,200. 54 In their zealousness, the MSCS booked the vessel
prematurely and had to pay several months worth of fees because the colonists were not ready
when the society chartered the ship. At more than $100 per emigrant, the original proposal of
twenty dollars per colonist looked much better, but it was too late. The second key impact of
Turner’s revolt was the passage of legislative acts in several states, including Maryland. Many
states responded to the massacre with new, stricter laws prohibiting the emancipation of slaves
without their removal, bans on the importation of slaves into states and other similar laws.
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However, Maryland went farther than most other states by endorsing colonization to a degree
unmatched by any other state. 55
The rebellion spurred Maryland legislators to incorporate the MSCS in 1832. Delegate
Brawner of Charles County proposed the legislation endorsing MSCS efforts to remove free
African Americans in the state and then end slavery, a bold move considering that he hailed from
a county with one of the larger slave populations. 56 Latrobe and other colonizationists lobbied
for this as well. Maryland’s legislature endorsed the colonization society and established a fund
of $200,000 for its use in removing the state’s black population. John Latrobe drew up the
charter and by-laws for the incorporation of the MSCS passed by the legislature during its
December 1831 session. The law went into effect March 14, 1832. 57
This proved a critical juncture for Maryland colonizationists as their organization was
deeply in debt after the October expedition of the Orion. The appropriation of $200,000, spread
over ten years, provided a significant degree of financial independence for the MSCS. The act
also contained provisions regulating the transportation of slaves into the state; their movement in
the state, and the wish of the legislature that the society removes all slaves freed after the law
went into effect. Most important, though, was the condition that the Board of Managers for the
state fund be members of the MSCS. This gave the MSCS a significant degree of influence over
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how the funds would be allocated by the state. 58 Members anticipated that this would ensure the
success of Maryland’s colonization efforts. Latrobe expressed his sentiments on the state’s zeal
at a public meeting held April 30, 1832 by the board of the MSCS in an “Address of the Board of
Managers of the Maryland State Colonization Society to the People of Maryland.” He stated:
the end to be accomplished by colonization has become the device of
humanity, the prayer of the Christian, and the hope of the Patriot. In a
word, the scheme stands now wholly divested of the doubt and misgiving
which once impeded its progress…all that is required to ensure its
complete success is an effort in its behalf that shall be commensurate
with its importance. The Legislature of Maryland upon this subject has
marked a new epoch in her history; and teems with consequences of the
deepest importance, not only to herself, but to the whole Southern section
of this country. 59

Latrobe made two things clear in the address: first, the problems experienced by the ACS would
no longer delay or stop Maryland’s colonization efforts; and second, that the ultimate objective
was ridding the South of slavery one state at a time in a peaceful, gradual way.
In spite of the strong position the MSCS took in 1832, the organization was not yet ready
to abandon the national society. The relationship between the two societies had been strained
since Maryland colonizationists reorganized and claimed their financial independence in 1831.
Yet, there remained some level of cooperation as the two came to an agreement of $30 for each
emigrant taken from Maryland. 60 The sailing of the Lafayette from Baltimore on December 9,
1832 was arranged under these terms. This, however, would be the only expedition in which the
two societies cooperated under the agreement. The Lafayette left Baltimore with 150 emigrants;
147 were from Maryland. Seventeen were slaves freed on condition that they migrate to Liberia,
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as mandated by the legislature in December of 1831. All arrived safely in Liberia except one
child who died en route, but the news reported to the MSCS board once reaching the colony was
less than encouraging. 61
A number of colonists wrote Latrobe about the Lafayette emigrants. The mixed reports
about how the settlers were treated by the ACS agent caused considerable distress for the MSCS
members. A former resident of Baltimore who had moved to Liberia in 1827, George R. McGill,
informed Latrobe in July of 1832 that few of the emigrants were well. He further accused
Governor Joseph Mechlin of starving the colonists, confirming the suspicions of Latrobe about
how Maryland’s emigrants were treated by ACS officials. Furthermore, McGill described
Monrovia as an “infertile Red Gravelly Mountain.” 62 Clearly, he was not satisfied with the
colony under the administration of the ACS and did not believe that the newest arrivals would
fare well there either. Incensed by this news, Latrobe and Charles C. Harper insisted that the
board of managers of the ACS begin an investigation and also wrote the governor of the colony
demanding an explanation of the charges the settlers made against him. Such reports, as Charles
Harper pointed out “are such as to have I fear, a most injurious effect, whether true or false, upon
the cause of Colonization, and perhaps even to necessitate a pause in the operations of this
Board.” 63 The reports of Maryland’s settlers carried considerable influence when it came to
recruiting emigrants, a fact both Latrobe and Harper had in mind when taking action.
A number of other colonists wrote to the board members of the MSCS after their arrival.
Only one of those who wrote to the MSCS between February and April consistently stated that
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all was well. Jacob W. Prout, ironically a special agent for the MSCS, wrote that the immigrants
were well on at least three occasions during that time span. Not all felt as Prout did, however,
and one must suspect that his role as the leader of the Lafayette colonists biased the accounts he
sent to Baltimore. 64 Another immigrant from Snow Hill, Maryland sent word through the MSCS
to his former master about Liberia. Identified only as W. Dennis, the settler complained that the
provisions Governor Mechlin distributed to the colonists were barely enough to survive on, but
he did feel that “this country presents great prospects for laboring men.” Clearly, Dennis thought
the opportunities available to him in the colony better than those he left behind in Maryland and
worth temporary suffering. 65 Not all forgave so easily. Six of the MSCS colonists joined to
write the MSCS immediately after arriving in Liberia. While they acknowledged their safe
arrival, they were “very much disappointed in [their] expectations…as soon as we got up here
[Caldwell, one of the ACS settlements] our provisions were cut short by the citizens of
Monrovia.” They continued that their rations consisted of rotten meat and fish, accusing the
governor of keeping “our good provisions that came out in the Ship. We all wish ourselves back
again.” The men who authored the letter levied more charges too regarding the older settlers,
describing their behavior as roguishness, which the Captain of the Lafayette confirmed on his
return to Baltimore. 66
The Maryland society wasted little time before acting on these reports. In addition to the
concerns raised by the letters from the Lafayette colonists, members of the MSCS grew
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concerned about the mortality rate in Liberia too. In May of 1832 a Dr. Henderson issued a
report on mortality in the colony for the ACS. The author assessed the rate of death among
immigrants at one in six. He recommended that colonists should leave in November in order to
give themselves the best chance of survival as they would arrive well before the worst tropical
weather began. 67 Maryland colonizationists knew the dangers of their efforts and the potential
lethalness of the Liberian climate. But if the ACS agent compounded the problems, action
needed to be taken. The managers of the MSCS, Latrobe, Charles C. Harper, and society
President Moses Sheppard immediately began their own investigation. Latrobe and Sheppard
both journeyed to Washington to meet with the board of the ACS about the treatment of
Maryland’s colonists, specifically the most recent arrivals. Latrobe noted in his private journal
that to the ACS managers, “it was not a business concern…from this Board Mr. Sheppard and I
agreed there was no hope of amelioration of the condition of things in Africa for some time.” 68
Latrobe described the meeting as bitter, which led him and Sheppard to begin discussing possible
alternatives open to the MSCS in its relationship to the ACS.
The board of the ACS did act on the charges made by the MSCS, but not to the
satisfaction of either Latrobe or Sheppard. ACS secretary Ralph R. Gurley wrote the Maryland
society on April 12, 1833 that the national society would waste no time in “correcting the evil
complained of in the letter addressed by the emigrants from your state to Mr. Sheppard.” While
he recognized the potential damage the suffering of the colonists could have on the movement,
Gurley asserted that he, at least, doubted
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the accuracy of the statements in that letter. I cannot imagine how the
Colonial Agent…should allow the abuses stated to exist. He was told
by me, that every thing in regard to the success of future operations in
Maryland would depend upon the Report of the emigrants by the Layfayette,
& it would be marvelous indeed should they be left in misery & without
adequate supplies while all the recent expeditions have been well furnished
with the best stores. 69

Short of calling the colonists liars, Gurley refused to accept the charges made against his society.
Tenaciously, Harper responded on the thirteenth that he had the testimony of Captain Hardie and
the first and second mates of the Lafayette to corroborate the charges leveled by the emigrants.
The captain described the colony as totally neglecting “agricultural pursuits_ the affections
already of artificial distinctions in Society, & the indifference and even unkindness with which
the new Emigrants were received by almost all the settlers there.” Further, the colonists showed
the crew the food Governor Mechlin gave them; “they were allowed per week a pound of meat, a
pound of fish, Cassada + a gill of molasses; that the beef they exhibited to him was so spoilt, as
to be literally green, and the Fish so rotten that it would scarcely hang together. Captain Hardie
states that he remonstrated with Gov. Mechlin on this subject, and that the Governor replied that
the bad provisions must be used first.” 70 Harper enumerated further on the other charges made
against the ACS and its agent proving the case to Gurley. Nevertheless, the outcome of the
correspondence between the two societies was clear. There was no choice on the part of the
Maryland society given the mandate from the Legislature to carry out colonization. The society
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must “address the evil complained of by said Emigrants [before it produced] an entire stop to
Colonization in this state.” 71
Privately, Latrobe began acting on what he discussed with Sheppard after the meeting in
Washington, a league of all the states north of the Potomac River to promote independent state
action for the purpose of making Maryland a free state. 72 From the ACS, the managers of
Maryland’s society demanded a place in Liberia for provisions for Maryland separate from those
of the ACS. The MSCS also requested written authority to send its own agent to Liberia to
oversee the administration of those provisions and to set up accommodations for colonists away
from those of the ACS. 73 The ACS acquiesced in these demands made by the Maryland society
for the time being due to national crises occurring at the same time. The two societies sought a
mutual compromise, but Latrobe and his fellow colonizationists were brewing other plans too.
Latrobe would have his way as the Board of the MSCS approved his plan to establish a new
colony at its June 1833 meeting. The MSCS would now be completely independent of the ACS
and could carry out its agenda at its own pace under Latrobe’s guiding hand, the only true and
efficient plan. 74
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Chapter Three: Friends of your Country, Can You Stand Idly By?

As the divide between the ACS and Maryland colonizationists widened after 1831,
national events came to bear on the decisions of the MSCS. In February of 1833, South
Carolinians stood poised to leave the Union if Andrew Jackson attempted to enforce the duties
levied by the 1832 tariff. Soldiers had taken their positions in Charleston and waited for federal
troops to arrive. Pushed to the breaking point, it looked as though the young American republic
had reached the end. Fortunately, protectionist Congressmen, led by Henry Clay, hammered out
a compromise that ended the Nullification Crisis before shots were fired. While the issue of the
tariff and South Carolina’s effort to nullify it had little to do with slavery and colonization, it
nonetheless had a significant impact on both issues, which MSCS actions highlighted. 1
The hostility that emerged in April of 1833 over the treatment of colonists by ACS agents
showed the division within the colonization movement, just as nullification reflected the division
emerging nationally over slavery and states’ rights. Such moments of peril added all the more
pressure for colonization to succeed. Events occurring during the period from 1831 to 1834,
within the colonization movement and on the national stage, influenced the direction of the
MSCS and led to the organization’s decision to found its own colony, Maryland in Liberia, in
June of 1834. John Latrobe interpreted these national events and the situation in Liberia as a
powder keg just waiting for a spark to ignite it. Something had to be done to prevent the loss of
the Union. Much like the protectionist Henry Clay, he presented a compromise that he believed
would solve all the problems surfacing in the early 1830s. The decision to push independent
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state action in the colonization movement was not reached easily by the society, but its members
recognized the utility of Latrobe’s plans especially given the national tensions of early 1833.
However, they also recognized the need to portray the society in a way that would not alienate its
base of support within the state. As such, the organization resorted to moral attacks on the ACS
to justify its separation from the national society. The founding of Maryland in Liberia allowed
the MSCS to carry out its colonization agenda in Maryland without any interference from the
ACS, and without further agitating an already tense national feud over slavery and states’ rights.
This chapter examines how and why the Maryland State Colonization Society achieved its final
separation from the American Colonization Society. The MSCS’ separations further illustrated
how a transnational perspective informed Latrobe. He directed the organization’s efforts in an
attempt to create the colony he envisioned while protecting the Union he loved from division.
It was clear by 1833 that the MSCS had no intention of continuing its relationship with
the national society regardless of its public cordiality. The members perceived that colonization,
administered nationally, would only become more difficult as sectional tensions multiplied. The
nullification crises demonstrated this to Latrobe. The dispute over the treatment of the Lafayette
emigrants served as a convenient opportunity for the MSCS to diverge from the national
movement and pursue its own agenda. While many of the members of the MSCS recognized
that their actions grew out of “the most serious sense of our responsibility in thus cutting loose
from the Parent Society and setting up for ourselves,” it also reflected Latrobe’s influence on the
society. 2 Latrobe had contemplated a separate colony even before the MSCS formed in 1831,
and he continued to express his interest in the idea. Within months of the Maryland society’s
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formation, Latrobe began gathering information on establishing a new settlement away from
those established by the ACS.
Initially, Latrobe asked a few of the ACS settlers with whom he corresponded regularly
for their feelings about founding a new settlement on the coast of Africa. One settler, George R.
McGill, who left Baltimore for Liberia in 1827, often reported to Latrobe about conditions in the
colony and possible trading opportunities there, a subject about which Latrobe expressed much
interest. Latrobe suggested that McGill explore the possibility of a new settlement in Africa not
subject to ACS control. McGill not only recommended two possible locations for such a colony,
but sounded the idea among other settlers for Latrobe. He even offered to negotiate the purchase
of the island of Bulama, the spot he felt most suitable for Maryland to establish a colony, if
Latrobe wished. 3
Several other settlers responded to Latrobe’s query, holding a meeting on July 2, 1831 in
Monrovia to discuss the subject of a new settlement under the Maryland society’s administration.
The seriousness of the colonists was demonstrated by their forming a committee to answer the
questions Latrobe posed to them: what would be the best mode of establishing a new colony and
who would be willing to engage in the same? Should a new colony be settled by colonists
already acclimated to Africa? McGill, Frederic James, James Bensin, Henry P. Spriggs, and
Remus Harvey comprised the committee and reported a favorable response from those attending
the meeting. They were interested in assisting the Maryland society in creating a new settlement
in 1831, apparently because they were dissatisfied with the settlements controlled by the ACS.
Fortunately for Latrobe, these settlers only expressed their interest in his proposal, taking no
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other action during that summer. Had they attempted more, the MSCS was not prepared to help
them in any case because of the domestic situation in the United States. The MSCS still worked
with the ACS and Latrobe did not want to drive supporters away from the movement as many
colonizationists still placed their loyalty with the national society. Nonetheless, Latrobe
continued to exchange letters with McGill in particular until the MSCS was in a position to
found a new settlement. The experience of older colonists like George McGill would prove
helpful to the MSCS when the time came to cease its cooperation with the ACS. 4
Although Latrobe initially worked to foster cooperation with the ACS, he also prepared
the MSCS for more independent operations. Always cautious, he worried about acting too
hastily and without sufficient justification because he did not want to injure the movement. The
years from 1831 to 1833 were critical as national issues informed the decisions and the final
plans of the MSCS to found its own colony. Nat Turner’s Rebellion in August of 1831, the
resulting debate over slavery in the Virginia legislature, and the Nullification Crisis of 1832-3
marked an intense period in antebellum America. These events made it necessary for the MSCS
to continue cooperating with the ACS as colonization seemed to be of growing importance. Yet
these events also convinced John Latrobe and colonizationists generally in the Upper South that
colonization was the only solution to the mounting national tensions surrounding the issue of
slavery. The plan Latrobe developed and advocated was designed to achieve this goal.
The ACS had attempted to restore the Maryland society as a full auxiliary member, but
Latrobe and others in the organization, Moses Sheppard and Charles C. Harper, refused because
of the conditions placed on them by the parent society. However, a public and messy break
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would not do either organization much good. Then in the summer of 1831, the hysteria created
by Nat Turner’s revolt in neighboring Virginia, prevented the formal division between the
societies for a short time as colonization received renewed support and the ACS sent out some of
its largest expeditions. Large numbers of free African Americans applied for transportation to
Liberia. Emigration to Liberia jumped from 165 for the whole year of 1831 to 676 in 1832, a
direct consequence of Turner’s Rebellion and the white backlash. In fact, the ACS had more
African Americans willing to leave the United States for Liberia than it could afford to carry.
The numbers for 1833 were even larger. Due to the rapid growth in the numbers of blacks
willing to go to Liberia, the Maryland leaders felt that a split between the societies would waste
the sudden progress of the movement. 5
Turner’s Rebellion also led to a two-week long, heated debate in the Virginia legislature
over slavery. This debate and its outcome demonstrated a marked change in the defense of
slavery. Prior to this debate, many defenders of slavery argued that the institution was a
necessary evil. 6 After the debate, Deep South defenders, such as John C. Calhoun, claimed that
it was time slaveholders stop apologizing for slavery and recognize the “positive good” of the
institution. While the debate itself reflected the internal dynamics of Virginia politics, especially
the tensions between non-slaveholders west of the Blue Ridge Mountains and the planters of the
Piedmont, the debate illustrated the growing rigidity of positions too, which in reality extended
far beyond Virginia. In the end, the legislature of Virginia forecast the end of slavery, but not
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until the public overwhelmingly supported it. 7 In a larger sense the decision that slavery would
eventually end further divided the country. The South had been united in its necessary evil
defense of slavery. Now, in 1832, the South had split over slavery, with Maryland and Virginia
both declaring slavery’s eventual end. South Carolinians, especially Calhoun, viewed Americans
in the Upper South, those in Virginia and Maryland especially, as traitors because they conceded
slavery’s ultimate end and endorsed colonization as the solution most likely to remove the last
impediment to abolition, free African Americans. 8
Within a year, the slavery controversy reappeared in the Nullification Crisis in 1832.
While the issue originated out of southerners’ hatred of tariffs, which they believed hurt them
more than any others in the United States; it quickly took on larger significance as the debate
turned on the issue of questions such as states’ rights. The push for the right of nullification and
possible secession by South Carolinians further exacerbated the tensions between North and
South as well as between the Deep South and Upper South. Nullification, if accepted, would
have allowed any one of the southern states to repeal any law they deemed injurious. Ultimately,
President Andrew Jackson settled the matter through compromise and threats, getting Congress
to reduce the tariff, while presenting a show of force authorized by Congress’s Force Bill. The
power of the states to decide issues within its borders, however, was a critical issue as most
southerners maintained that slavery was an issue belonging to them alone. Even here Latrobe
agreed. These potentially explosive events not only threatened to destroy the Union, they also
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showed John Latrobe that a change in colonization led by a slave state could solve these issues
without conflict. 9
The importance of state action in colonization could not be denied. For years, Latrobe
pushed colonization in Maryland as the one program that could solve the ills he believed two free
races caused in a republic, while removing the primary source of tension between the sections of
the Union. Nevertheless, many supporters of slavery in the Deep South were not convinced by
his arguments, however. Founding a new settlement under an independent state society, he
thought would prove colonization’s usefulness in resolving the debate because the fate of slavery
within the state was a concern of Maryland alone. Separate state action, he later explained,
prevented outside interference, which caused the conflict over slavery in the first place. 10 If his
ideas succeeded, Maryland would be the model for slave states to become free-states. In
addition, Latrobe desired to maintain the goodwill of the clergy and political leaders believing
their aid essential for success. The sailing of the Lafayette colonists from Maryland, the largest
single expedition by the state society, provided the point of attack that would allow the MSCS to
keep the support of the clergy while avoiding the divisiveness found in the ACS effort. The
controversy surrounding the Lafayette emigrants illustrated why a national movement controlled
by the ACS could not end slavery in the United States.
The Maryland society attacked the ACS colony for its failure to reflect the moral,
religious and social values that would benefit the movement. The ACS colony, however, was
not necessarily administered in a way to control such aspects. The ACS controlled all
government aspects such as appointing governors for example. Executive and judicial powers
9
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were combined under the governor’s authority. But the ACS did not control the colony to the
extent that moral and religious values were predetermined nor was the spread of western
concepts of those values an immediate objective of the national society’s efforts. Civilizing and
Christianizing Africa were long touted as two of the goals of colonization, which also
contributed to its broad support. Yet the ACS did not directly undertake those aspects; under the
ACS these were indirect byproducts of colonization. The MSCS members felt that the history of
Liberia up to 1833 did not reflect these goals. The focus on spreading Christianity and western
civilization reflected the changed attitudes of Maryland colonizationists too, especially as some
reform movements, temperance for example, won over men such as Latrobe. Essentially,
Maryland colonizationists suggested that the frequent warfare that characterized the relationship
between the colonists and indigenous Africans was a result of ill-behaved settlers, excessive
alcohol use, and the failure of ACS officials to enforce critical policies. These failures ultimately
doomed the effort. Latrobe charged that “there was no civil government [in Liberia]; what stood
in the place of one, was a pure despotism of an agent, resting on no legal basis and possessing no
physical force to compel obedience” from the settlers. 11 The system created under the ACS
failed to achieve its goals because of this fact. Independent state action, Latrobe maintained,
could not only solve America’s problems, it could also establish a colonial system that avoided
the problems plaguing the ACS colonies. 12 Furthermore, given the growing tensions in the
United States, it seemed the only safe means to make slave states free without causing another
secession crisis. The problems the ACS had in its colonies became, for Maryland
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colonizationists, the point of attack and a blueprint for what not to do when implementing a new
settlement.
John Latrobe used these criticisms to bolster his other reasons for the development of a
new colony by the Maryland society, namely, the fact that the colonies of Liberia still did not
fully support themselves through agriculture even after eleven years. Colonizationists expected
that the settlers of Liberia would be self-sufficient within a six-month period. 13 This assumption
that the colony would be independent depended on settlers practicing husbandry for their
livelihood and producing enough to feed the colony and its newly arriving immigrants. The
failure of Americo-Liberians to do this arose largely from their desire to earn a living in ways
other than farming. Latrobe’s friend in Monrovia, George R. McGill, made it clear that he
wished to take advantage of the opportunities for trade in Liberia rather than be a yeoman
farmer. 14 Other well-known colonists such as Joseph J. Roberts, who became Liberia’s first
president in 1847, also wanted to make a living through trade. This was clear even at the time of
his departure from America in the 1820s. Latrobe did not condemn McGill for his enterprises,
perhaps because he himself thought much about the trading opportunities Liberia presented,
especially if profits from trade could be used to accelerate the program. Yet, very few
colonizationists took into consideration the fact that many of the Liberian colonists were not
content with being simple farmers raising cash crops to be taken to the United States. Most
colonizationists were more concerned with the speedy settlement than the entrepreneurial
interests of the settlers. Nonetheless, many of the settlers sought an occupation other than
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farming to earn a living in part because they had already experienced the hard life of farm work.
Furthermore, many colonists, while being excluded from much of America’s economic life,
possessed American values nonetheless. They had grown up in the emerging market; once
colonists had a chance to choose their occupations, many hoped to become merchants or traders
rather than pursue a profession they detested or that reminded them of their past condition. 15
Low agricultural productivity, however, raised several issues affecting the pace of
resettling African Americans. Latrobe focused on these issues, arguing that certain things must
be done for colonization to be successful. Without sufficient agricultural production, the
colonists were dependent on native production for basic foodstuffs. This often led to conflict
between the two groups, especially over the price of food. Other difficulties arose over settlers
employing Africans as workers on their farms. Most important for Latrobe was the fact that
some settlers still relied on the ACS for support, which reduced the resources available to
transport others to the colony. 16 This point was critical for colonization and for Latrobe’s plans.
Agricultural independence not only secured personal liberty in Latrobe’s understanding of
Jeffersonian republicanism, it also determined the rate of immigration to Liberia. The
independence known by yeoman farmers, he believed, would draw African Americans to the
colony because it was generally beyond their reach in America.
For Latrobe and the MSCS, the failure of the ACS to make Liberia self-sufficient slowed
progress toward colonization’s ultimate goal of removing African Americans and ending slavery
in the United States. This was the reason so many white Americans lost interest in the
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movement; they saw no immediate or noticeable benefit to the program, something Latrobe
hoped to change with his plan of separate state action. 17 Marylanders thought that the
commercial character of Liberia under the ACS needed to be restrained so that colonizationists
could make good progress in removing black Americans. “An agricultural community spreading
itself to the interior,” said Latrobe, “would not only present better examples to the surrounding
Heathen…but would afford greater facilities for a rapidly increasing emigration from this
country than could be afforded by trading towns, however prosperous they might be.” 18
Agricultural development, the MSCS argued, ultimately determined the success of the
movement.
In addition to inadequate agricultural self-sufficiency, Maryland colonizationists attacked
the ACS for what they interpreted as rampant abuse of alcohol by the settlers. While the use of
alcohol genuinely concerned members, Latrobe in particular, the charges against the ACS
stemmed more from the general mood created by the rapidly growing temperance movement
than from direct evidence. The Second Great Awakening and resulting social reform movements
of the nineteenth century sought to improve America, and no doubt he considered colonization as
reforming society too. Latrobe supported such reform efforts, especially temperance, because
alcohol was one of the vices of the laboring classes. No doubt, he observed this at events such as
horseracing. 19 Nonetheless, attacking the ACS on the issue of alcohol provided a convenient

17

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. April 30, 1833, June 28, 1833, October 2, 1833; III. Correspondence
Sent, Secretary’s Letter Books, reel 16. John Latrobe to Governor Mechlin, October 5, 1832, John Latrobe to James
Hall, October 11, 1832; Edward Lama Wonkeryor, “America’s African Colonization Movement: Implications for
New Jersey and Liberia,” in Liberian Studies Journal Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (2002), 38.
18

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. October 2, 1833.

19

Latrobe, Diaries, 1824-1840, October 20, 1834; for reform movements, see David Brion Davis, Antebellum Reform. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Barbara Cutter, Domestic Devils, Battlefield Angels: The
Radicalism of American Womanhood, 1830-1865. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); David M.

76

justification while maintaining the support of the clergy and temperance advocates such as John
Tappan. 20 Many charged that alcohol led to the poor behavior of some colonists. Furthermore,
critics alleged that the abuse of alcohol in the colony undermined the missionary effort among
indigenous Africans. Although some of these charges could be sustained, the prevalence of
alcohol on the coast of Africa was not a new phenomenon associated only with the settlement of
Liberia. Rum in particular was a staple in the trade between Africans and Europeans for
centuries, so much so that it became common to include it in most trading arrangements. The
charges nonetheless provided an opportunity for the MSCS to differentiate itself from the ACS
and to justify its actions. The strong position of Latrobe and the MSCS on alcohol also led them
to make its consumption and the trading of liquor illegal in Maryland in Liberia. 21
Coupled with the charges of ACS officials mistreating colonists in Liberia, these
allegations gave the Maryland society a reason to act as it did in April of 1833. The charges
levied against the ACS also gave the MSCS a moral underpinning that virtually ensured the
support of the clergy, even more so after the society encouraged missionaries to establish posts
and schools in Maryland in Liberia. Through its leadership, especially Latrobe’s, the MSCS
developed a plan for its colony that would address all the concerns expressed up to 1833 while
finally claiming direct control and responsibility for emigrants from Maryland.
The series of traumatic events from Turner’s Rebellion to the sailing of the Lafayette,
finally won for Latrobe the backing of his fellow colonizationists for establishing a colony
administered solely by Maryland’s society. His persistence, however, was not without minor
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consequences of inconvenience. Latrobe pushed so often for the MSCS to found its own colony
at Cape Palmas that the organization’s members began referring to him by that name, making
him the butt of their jokes. Nevertheless, he had achieved his objective, which was most dear to
him. 22 Despite a unanimous approval of Latrobe’s project by the managers, the members
achieved little progress toward making the colony a reality after the meeting in April of 1833.
Latrobe admitted in his journal that he thought little about the proposed colony as he presumed
that the ranking members of the Board of Managers would now take charge of the project he
initiated. By June, however, he disappointingly realized that the managers of the MSCS had not
taken “a single step” toward founding a colony. 23
Frustrated with the lack of enthusiasm shown by his friends in the cause, Latrobe once
again set his mind to establishing a colony at Cape Palmas and creating a government. Latrobe
worked to create a temporary government, a criminal and civil legal code, and a constitution that
protected the rights of the colonists. He also arranged the purchase of supplies and prepared a
vessel to take the initial group of settlers to Africa. Latrobe proposed several resolutions at the
June meeting to further this process and spur the other members to action. These resolutions
addressed many of the complaints colonists and critics had made against the ACS colonies and
comprised key parts of the laws and government of Maryland in Liberia. They also reflected the
direction that the state of Maryland was heading as social reform movements gained support.
The resolutions sought to move Maryland a step closer to being a free state. By
guaranteeing specific rights to the colonists, Latrobe hoped to draw more emigrants to the
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colony. And if free blacks willingly left the state, it stood to reason that slaveholders would have
one less reason not to emancipate their chattels. Furthermore, a provision eliminating slavery in
the colony should gain the support of anti-slavery and abolition societies in America. The social
pressure to make America a temperate society influenced Latrobe’s resolutions too. Latrobe
clearly thought alcohol a destructive indulgence of Americans and that it should be used
sparingly. Yet, temperance also could prove useful in gaining the support of clergy for the
cause. Latrobe used such reasoning to appeal to varied interests within Maryland and the rest of
the states, asking very simply, “friends of the temperance cause can you be lukewarm in this
work? Friends of your country can you stand idly by? Friends of Africa, will you let pass the
opportunity…of planting another fortress against the slave trade, of erecting another Altar to
civilization and the Gospel?” His plans reflected his commitment to the social reform that
appealed to many Americans’ patriotism in the 1830s. 24
His resolutions also addressed the goals he held for Maryland in Liberia. By ensuring
that slavery would never be allowed in the colony, Maryland in Liberia could help to end the
illegal Atlantic slave trade that continued despite being abolished by European nations before the
United States and Great Britain followed in 1807 and 1808 respectively. Latrobe assumed that
the colony would make it more difficult for the slave trade to be carried out along that part of the
coast. Latrobe’s emphasis on religion, a facet emphasized in America’s Constitution, was clearly
reflected in the Bill of Rights included in the colony’s constitution. Latrobe meant to guarantee
“a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God…and no one shall be hurt, molested or
restrained in his person liberty or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most
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agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.” 25 A strong Christian presence, he assumed,
would discourage the trade in slaves as well. Other resolutions included in Maryland in Liberia’s
constitution originated from Latrobe’s frequent discussions with Robert S. Finely, Jr. who was
working for the Colonization Society of New York in the 1830s. Both supported temperance and
Latrobe felt that the temperance principal was “a fundamental one” because the “sad experience
of this country has shown the demoralizing effects of the use of ardent spirit.” 26 Thus, he
required that all Maryland colonists take an oath of temperance before they left the United States
for Africa. 27 Such resolutions addressed the specific concerns of Latrobe, the MSCS, and
American society, but also were part of a plan designed to address the problems the ACS
colonies experienced. The MSCS tried to use the lessons learned through the ACS and its
colony to maximize the chances for success with its own colony.
In addition to his efforts to shape the government of the colony and prepare the founding
expedition, Latrobe led the effort to create a northern league of states committed to making
Maryland a free state through colonization. The idea originated when he and Moses Sheppard
discussed the options the Maryland society should pursue after meeting with the ACS in April of
1833. Latrobe thought much about Sheppard’s idea to enlist the help of states north of the
Potomac River in ridding Maryland of slavery—the first goal listed by the MSCS in June of
1833 especially after the turbulence of the previous two years. Opposition from slaveholders in
the state of Maryland would also require help from northerners supportive of emancipation.

25

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. November 22, 1833.

26

Latrobe, Diaries, 1824-1840, November 27, 1833; MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. June 28, 1833.

27

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. June 28, 1833.

80

Latrobe hoped that the plan of independent state action would remove all the objections northern
states presented against colonization. Maryland, he wrote,
now stands before the American public, pledged to the extirpation of slavery…it
has undertaken to illustrate Colonization, to prove that all its tendencies are
toward liberty. Our mode of reasoning when we confidently anticipate aid from
the north of the Potomac is this. Our northern friends support Colonization on
account of its supposed tendencies toward liberty. The extirpation of slavery is
then their sole object, or at all events their chief object. Now Maryland is the only
slave state of the Union, which is prepared to act, has indeed avowed its intention
of acting upon this principle. 28
Such a declaration by Latrobe and the endorsement of the MSCS was a radical shift in thought
and not accepted by everyone in Maryland. Some supported only the removal of free blacks.
Ending slavery would destroy the economy of the state, especially that of the southern counties,
which relied on slave labor. 29 In a larger sense, the actions of he MSCS violated an unspoken
rule established when the movement began in 1816 not to discuss the fate of slavery. Further,
the decision was a clear break from the slaveholding faction in the national colonization
movement. Henry Clay, the protectionist politician who worked to preserve the Union in
February 1833, stated early in his career that “colonization must avoid the question of
emancipation.” 30 Latrobe and the MSCS not only took the emancipation question on, but also
made it a goal in their efforts. The MSCS embodied an attempt to end slavery and provide the
solution to the tension that the politicization of abolition caused nationally.
The emergence of abolition in national politics threatened national unity and Maryland’s
plan offered a way to end slavery without destroying the Union. This was a particular concern in
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Maryland considering that many southern slaveholders viewed colonization as another
abolitionist attack on the South. 31 Yet, even though Latrobe intended the plan of state action
Maryland followed to alleviate the tensions over slavery, the removal of black Americans created
objections to colonization for different reasons. As William Freehling has shown in his studies
of America’s road to disunion, the closing of the slave trade and then the efforts to colonize
African Americans outside the United States upset the balance of power because slaves counted
in determining representation at the national level. 32 What Marylanders had done in endorsing
colonization with the purpose of ending slavery was to illustrate their willingness to accept
political losses that came with a decreasing population. But then there was no reason they
should not accept it as Maryland’s share of representation in the national house declined long
before the 1830s. They were already losing power. Further, the decision to seek an end to
slavery through colonization grew out of the realization by Latrobe that no compromise could be
affected between the two sides. Colonization was the only way to protect the Union from a
repeat of the events of 1833. 33
Latrobe thus took a side in the debate and began an active, public campaign to gain the
support and pecuniary aid of the North for Maryland’s plan. During the month of July, Latrobe
began corresponding with prominent northerners as well as agents of colonization societies in
Pennsylvania, New York and throughout New England, explaining the MSCS’ plan and
requesting their aid for the project. 34 He followed up on his correspondence by making a
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whirlwind tour of the North, particularly New England during the month of August. During his
visit in the North, Latrobe called on Courtlandt Van Rensellaer who inquired about the plan
earlier in 1833. He also visited Reverend Thomas Gallaudet of Hartford, Connecticut, and then
John Tappan. Tappan, well known for his support of abolition and temperance, seemed a likely,
and Latrobe hoped, influential candidate to help his cause. While Tappan did not make any
commitment to assist the MSCS, he did introduce Latrobe to many others in the Boston area
interested in colonization, including former president John Q. Adams who opposed the
movement. Tappan also encouraged Latrobe to visit Andover, Massachusetts, where he gave a
speech on colonization at the Andover Theological Seminary. Finally, Tappan introduced the
MSCS representative to Dr. B.B. Wisner, the secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions in
Boston, an organization looking to start a missionary program in Africa. This chance meeting
later bloomed into a partnership that resulted in Maryland in Liberia hosting missionaries from
that organization. 35 Everywhere Latrobe went he spoke about Maryland’s colonization plans so
much that he remarked privately that he “literally preached on the subject as may be inferred by
looking back at my journal for August.” 36 After nearly a month of traveling for the cause of
colonization, Latrobe returned to Baltimore satisfied that he had made many friends for the
Maryland society who would aid him in making Maryland a free state.
Continuing to push his agenda after returning to Baltimore, Latrobe proposed an
additional set of resolutions at the next MSCS gathering on September 6, 1833 only to find his
colleagues dragging their feet again. Inaction by his fellow members and the fact that the
managers left his resolutions on the table until the next meeting left him “disappointed in the
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lukewarmness of many of those with whom I am acting in the matter of colonization.” 37 Latrobe
appeared ready to abandon the movement due to the apathy of his colleagues, stating his wish
that “someone else would take the active lead.” 38 Certainly, he felt frustrated with the whole
plan since he was doing much of the work in planning the colony, while also handling the affairs
of the society, including corresponding with its associates throughout the country. Latrobe’s
dedication in regard to founding a new colony took on an almost religious significance for him.
Feeling that the project had significant implications for humanity, particularly African
Americans in Maryland, Latrobe described himself as a “humble agent whom he [God] has
permitted to be active in the work that has yet been performed.” He hoped “that it may be for the
benefit of the cause of freedom and religion” that colonization succeeds. 39
It was not surprising that Latrobe felt so disappointed, given the pace of activity in the
movement. It was now October and there was still much to do as the MSCS expected the first
settlers of its new colony to leave Baltimore during the month of November. Yet all seemed
increasingly difficult. Nearly all those Latrobe met or requested assistance from during July and
August failed to help. John Tappan declined to assist the MSCS, choosing to focus on the cause
of temperance instead. 40 Colonization auxiliaries in Connecticut, Pennsylvania and New York
responded similarly. The societies in Connecticut and Pennsylvania refused to aid the Maryland
society because they had already pledged their funds to the ACS. 41 The Colonization Society of
New York responded similarly, but for different reasons. That society’s agent, Robert Finley,
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explained to Latrobe that the New York organization planned to pursue its own independent
action, making assistance to other organizations impossible. 42 The decision of the New York
society no doubt incensed Latrobe. New York had a sizable black population to be sure, but a
goal of the plan Latrobe advocated was to prove that slave states could become free through
colonization. The members of the New York society missed the point of his plans. The lack of
support for Maryland’s colonization efforts in the North went farther, however, as Latrobe
attempted to hire a general agent to represent the MSCS and solicit aid designed to remove
Maryland’s black population. None that he approached in 1833 was willing to accept the job
despite the society offering a salary of $1,000 annually.43
The lack of support outside of Maryland would have doomed the plans of the MSCS
were it not for the state fund established by the legislature in 1832. Moses Sheppard, Charles
Howard, and Charles C. Harper were selected as the first managers of the state fund. Sheppard
and Harper were particularly close friends of Latrobe. Supporters and members of the
colonization society, they naturally looked to aid the MSCS through their power to allocate the
funds contributed by the state for colonization. Since little aid from outside Maryland was
expected, the MSCS president, George Hoffman, Francis Anderson, and John Latrobe formed a
committee to oversee the financial arrangements to fund the colony’s founding expedition. They
determined that the cost to place a settlement at Cape Palmas or near there was approximately
$8,000, which they sought to borrow from the state. 44 The managers of the state fund easily
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approved a loan to the MSCS. “The board will pay $30 for every emigrant taken to Africa by the
MSCS during that year and advance the difference not to exceed $8,000 as a loan.” 45 The
society would repay the advance by transporting emigrants to Maryland in Liberia. Interestingly,
the amount set by the managers of the state fund for transporting colonists was the same rate the
MSCS had refused to pay the ACS in 1831.
With the funding secured, the MSCS focused on finding a governor for the colony,
finalizing the government, and readying a small but organized group of colonists to sail in
November. As governor the MSCS members chose Dr. James Hall. Well qualified, Hall had
served previously in Liberia as the colonial physician for the ACS. He also had considerable
experience negotiating with Africans and was well familiar with the region around Cape Palmas.
In fact, Hall had personally recommended that spot to Latrobe for Maryland in Liberia. All these
factors plus his medical training made him very desirable to the MSCS. The timing was
convenient as well as Hall had just returned to Baltimore from Liberia in the summer of 1833.
Before Hall left Baltimore to visit his family, Latrobe contacted him, explained the MSCS plan,
and offered him the governorship with an annual salary of $2,000. Hall accepted immediately
requesting only a short time to visit his family before returning to Africa. 46
With a governor in place, Latrobe turned his attention to writing the constitution and
laws, which formed the basis of Maryland in Liberia’s government. Certainly, the laws written
by Latrobe reflected his understanding of American history, but more important, they were
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designed to create a pull factor—hopefully creating a desire among Maryland’s free black
population to go to Africa. He also assumed that the system would create an orderly, productive
society. The American influence was clear in the constitution and charter for a temporary
government as it borrowed heavily from the United States Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, and even Maryland’s constitution. 47 The Bill of Rights and the constitution reflected
the American experience and the values of the MSCS members. The first article, for example,
granted the settlers many of the same privileges guaranteed to white Americans while reserving a
role for the MSCS as the highest political authority. Article Two prohibited the use of ardent
spirits, except for cases of sickness. Latrobe was directly responsible for this provision and
made the trafficking or use of alcohol a punishable crime. The society illustrated its seriousness
with this particular issue by requiring emigrants to sign a written oath before embarking for the
colony. Settlers who broke the provision lost the right to participate in the political process and
were barred from holding any elected office in the colony. The fourth article reflected Latrobe’s
fears about the potentially disastrous interactions between the settlers and indigenous Africans.
The colonists of Liberia frequently clashed with the indigenous people throughout their history.
Latrobe attempted to prevent this from happening through the constitution, which provided that
all natives be part of the colony. This also implied that the Greboes would be subject to the
colonial government’s authority. 48 The constitution further illustrated Americans’ distaste for
taxes by specifically defining what types of taxes could be imposed by the government of the
colony. One aspect that differed from the United States was in education. From its beginning,
Latrobe emphasized education in the colony and sought to support it with tax money. The
47
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creation of a public education system funded by taxes was more difficult than he anticipated and
the missionaries actually became the primary educators in the colony. Still, the attempt was
certainly influenced by the educational changes taking place in the United States as state funded
schools were established. 49
Like the United States’ system of government, Maryland in Liberia’s government
protected the individual rights of the colonists. The bill of rights for Maryland in Liberia
guaranteed the right to practice any Christian religion, to free speech, to be secure in one’s
property, and it gave every individual access to the legal system as outlined in amendments four
through eight in the United States Constitution. There were important distinctions, however.
While the colonists’ rights to worship were protected, this first amendment to Maryland in
Liberia’s constitution did not include the religions practiced by many of the indigenous peoples,
specifically the Grebo who still participated in rituals and ceremonies that Americans considered
pagan superstitions and witchcraft. Latrobe and the others sponsoring the undertaking naturally
presumed that the indigenous people would convert just as Europeans assumed when they
colonized the Americas, but the presumption ignored the realities of African society. Many West
Africans had been exposed to Christianity long before Americans settled there and had not
converted. Missionaries often exaggerated the willingness of Africans to convert, partly because
they misconstrued African adoption of some aspects of Christianity when they were in reality
combining it with their traditional beliefs.
Interestingly, Latrobe’s convictions in guaranteeing religious freedom in the colony were
not as strong when it came to other legal rights, such as jury trials. The settlers, just like white
Americans, could not be unlawfully detained nor subjected to double jeopardy or face cruel and
49
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unusual punishment. Yet Latrobe “would have done away with the trial by jury in civil cases,
but was deterred by a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.” 50 Apparently he had some
concerns that the colonists, many generally uneducated, would make the wrong decision in cases
where jury trials were commonly used, not to mention that it would make a good argument for
those opposed to colonization to use in attacking the movement. While he never stated his
reasoning for this opinion clearly, he certainly worried that the colonists would take advantage of
the natives in the same way whites had used the law to exploit racial groups in the United States.
Latrobe witnessed such incidents recording in his journal about cases in which the guilty went
free and the innocent were punished. He evidently had doubts about jury trials generally. 51
Much of Latrobe’s legal experience factored into the constitution as did his desire to bring about
social order in America. He hoped that the government of Maryland in Liberia would be a
peaceful one that would allow the colony to prosper and draw African Americans; ultimately
alleviating the conflict threatening the Union.
As the time for the departure of Maryland’s pioneers approached, a final problem caused
dissension among the MSCS board members. The MSCS still needed to prepare the necessary
items to purchase land at Cape Palmas. The board members decided months earlier that
Maryland in Liberia would be a temperate community, and that the use and trade of ardent spirits
would not be tolerated except for medical purposes. At the same time, the MSCS board
members all knew the realities of trade on the west coast of Africa. Dr. James Hall assured the
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members that he knew of no instance in which land was purchased in Africa without rum. 52 This
posed a substantial dilemma for the MSCS. Would they hold to the temperance principle even if
it meant dooming the efforts of the society by preventing the purchase of land for the settlement?
Faced with no easy resolution to this problem, society members voted on whether or not to use
rum in the purchase of land if the mission depended on that single factor. This was the only
occasion on which an issue of policy went to vote in the society as action had always been
unanimous. Some members insisted that the society not diverge from the constitution which
made ardent spirits in the colony illegal. Others denied the proposition that article two of the
constitution extended to purchasing land for the colony. The board decided by an eight-to-four
vote that rum could be used to purchase Cape Palmas if no other deal produced the desired end.
Latrobe instructed Governor Hall to take a “quantity of rum among other articles intended for the
purchase of territory. This you are not to use, unless you should be satisfied that the object of the
expedition will be frustrated without it. One of the most gratifying pieces of intelligence which
you could give to the State Society is your despatch announcing the purchase of the territory
would be the fact that it had been purchased without Rum.” 53
The willingness of some to sacrifice everything to uphold the temperance principle on
this occasion illustrates the strength of the values that shaped the ideas of Maryland
colonizationists. The MSCS wanted to hold to the values proclaimed by its members, but when
faced with failure on account of temperance, the society’s actions suggest that colonization was
more important. Ultimately, it was better to sacrifice this one principle if it was the only means
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of ensuring colonization’s success. Latrobe’s vision was more important to him than losing
everything for the want of a place to plant the colony.
Although the MSCS compromised its position on temperance, its members still desired a
colony that reflected their religious zeal. An emphasis on religion in the colony, Latrobe
believed, increased the chances for success. A cooperative effort with the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), an organization Latrobe encountered during his
tour of New England in August of 1833, further reflected the goal of Christianizing Africa.
Latrobe thought the presence of missionaries guaranteed that colonists would behave as the
MSCS hoped. The MSCS could create a strong Christian presence in its colony by offering the
ABCFM every resource available to the organization. 54 As the ultimate objective of the
ABCFM missionaries in Africa was the “moral improvement of the native tribes in connection
with promoting the spiritual and intellectual interests of the colonists,” the partnership seemed
well suited to the goals of both bodies. 55 After a brief courting period, it was agreed that two
mission representatives would accompany Governor Hall and the colonists to Africa in
November of 1833 to scout the area, and if suitable, choose a mission site.
The ABCFM initially searched for African-American missionaries for its new West
African initiative as its members believed that they would exert a greater influence on Africans
than would white missionaries. This proved more difficult than the ABCFM assumed, since
most African-Americans did not wish to go to Africa. Many considered it a certain death
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sentence. 56 Unable to obtain sufficient numbers of black missionaries for Maryland in Liberia,
the ABCFM, therefore, appealed to white clergymen from the South to serve as missionaries
thinking that they would withstand Africa’s climate better than ministers from northern states. 57
Reverend John Leighton Wilson, a white South Carolinian, answered the call of the ABCFM for
African missionaries in 1833. Newly ordained, Wilson volunteered along with Stephen R.
Wynkoop, chosen by the ABCFM to be Wilson’s assistant, to accompany the first group of
emigrants in the fall of 1833 and to assess the potential for promoting the gospel in Africa. 58
The agreement between the MSCS and ABCFM was the final piece of the puzzle Latrobe
thought necessary to settle a colony and make the movement a success. In November of 1833,
the MSCS was finally ready to establish Maryland in Liberia. The colonists left Baltimore on
November 28, 1833, aboard the brig Ann. Latrobe was there to see the Ann depart with
Governor James Hall, his assistant agent Reverend John Hersey, ABCFM missionaries J.
Leighton Wilson and Stephen R. Wynkoop, and nineteen emigrants from Maryland. Latrobe
commented that it was “a bleak November day” with “clouded skies and the misty rain, and the
fact that the agent had to be carried from a sick bed to his berth in the cabin would have been
ominous of failure.” 59 The fact that it was a miserable day when the Ann sailed from Baltimore
was just the beginning. Hall had taken extremely ill shortly before they were to leave Baltimore.
There were doubts as to whether or not he would even live to see the settlers reach Africa.
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Despite his extensive preparations and the acknowledgement by MSCS officials that the entire
venture would not be easy, unexpected difficulties began almost immediately for MSCS officials
making it seem as though Maryland in Liberia would be plagued by the same problems of the
ACS colonies. The situation appeared very serious to Latrobe and the beginning of the venture
left him wondering if his efforts would benefit his fellow man as he seemed to be the only
dedicated member. 60
Latrobe expressed his feelings about the matter to his friend Robert S. Finley, Jr., on
numerous occasions. “We put ourselves on this venture as you well know,” Latrobe told him,
“in confident reliance upon the North, and we had your voucher, in some manner for doing so,
although the thing spoke pretty much for itself.” Yet, exclaimed Latrobe, “not a dollar have we
yet—saving $100 from John Tappan out of the state—and we find but little warmth nowhere we
want it the most…Such labor is worse than that of Sisyphus.” 61 Referring to his efforts during
the summer of 1833 to gain the aid and support of the North, Latrobe showed his disappointment
with those he believed would be most sympathetic to the cause. However, he was not simply
tired of the work, rolling the stone of colonization up a hill only to have it come back down. The
following month, in another letter to Finley, Latrobe complained that the “truth is, that I am
somewhat disappointed with the result of our Maryland scheme so far as its effect northward is
concerned.” No doubt he was disappointed seeing as he could not even enlist the help of a good
friend. 62
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Already depressed over the lukewarm reception and slow progress of Maryland’s
colonization plans, Latrobe’s plan faced further setbacks. Bad weather had slowed the vessel
immediately after it left the harbor, and at one point left the Ann simply floating at sea with no
wind. This endangered the expedition, as the MSCS planned the trip based on the
recommendation of Dr. Henderson, an ACS official, so as to allow the settlers as much
acclimation time as possible. However, the weather seemed only a minor problem after fighting
broke out on the vessel between Captain W. C. Langdon and Maryland in Liberia’s vice-agent,
John Hersey. Governor Hall reported the incident in a letter dated December 2, 1833. Hall said
that the “captain is a regular rum drinker, which was a source of great annoyance to Brother
Hersey.” Furthermore, “some considerable sparring took place between them, both threatened to
quit the Cabin for the storage, but I finally succeeded…in restoring the peace.” 63
Reverend Hersey’s own letter on the subject indicated that it was not only the captain’s
drinking that bothered him. The voyage was a lengthy one of sixty-one days, which he described
as “boisterous, tedious, and most unpleasant.” Hersey reported that the captain became
intoxicated soon after setting sail and “poured out a ... volley of ... blasphemies... in the most
vulgar and uncouth manner.” Apparently, the captain regularly became intoxicated on rum and
once drunk, cursed and behaved violently and vulgarly toward all those on board the ship,
especially Rev. Hersey. The reverend attempted to speak to the captain, stating that he as well as
some others would consider it “a peculiar favour if he could refrain from such excesses.” 64
Hersey adopted this course of action at the behest of Governor Hall, who reminded his assistant
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that while at sea they were quite dependent on the captain. Unfortunately, this did little good as
Hersey continued to describe how the captain, “in the midnight hour…would rave and
swear…He would beat his poor old cook in the most cruel manner...” Later when this cook tried
to “mix” with the emigrants, the roles played by the assistant agent and ship’s captain reversed.
Hersey demanded that the captain do something about his cook while Capt. Langdon defended
the man. 65 Hersey obviously objected to the captain’s behavior, but also seemed to be fighting
with him for power on the vessel, particularly over control of the passengers. Dr. Hall
intervened in time to prevent any fisticuffs between the captain and the reverend. Nonetheless,
Hersey believed that the whole incident had tarnished his reputation, and more importantly to
him, destroyed his authority with the colonists, particularly after Hall forced him to back off.
Thus, after a lengthy voyage and many difficulties, Hersey resigned his position as vice-agent
when they reached Africa. 66
Once Hall and company arrived at Monrovia they were joined by a small number of
colonists residing there who wished to go to the new colony. Most of those who had written
John Latrobe in response to his previous inquiries about a new settlement in 1831 joined Hall’s
expedition. Among them were George R. McGill, James Benson, and James Thompson. Both
McGill and Thompson would later serve in important positions in Maryland in Liberia. The
others who joined the expedition arrived at Monrovia in the Lafayette the previous year. This
brought the total number of emigrants going to Cape Palmas with Governor Hall to thirty-five. 67
Hall contended that many others wanted to go, but personal debt prevented their leaving the ACS
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colony. Four of the newest members of the venture came from the settlement of Bassa, alleging
their reasons for leaving stemmed from their disappointment with the amount of rations received
and their severe suffering at the hands of ACS officials. 68 Regardless of the reasons for leaving
the ACS colonies, Hall desperately needed the manpower for the expedition, as nearly half of his
settlers were women and children, and the most difficult tasks still lay ahead. Thus, this tiny
band set off for Cape Palmas in the hopes that the Maryland colony would be more to their liking
than those managed by the ACS and with them were the hopes of Latrobe that his Union would
endure because of the MSCS. 69
On February 13, 1834, the Maryland colonization society’s settlers arrived at Cape
Palmas where Hall made arrangements for a palaver (a meeting in which gifts are exchanged
before negotiating) on the following day. The meeting took place the next morning at which
Hall met with King Freeman, alias Parmah (Pah Niemah), the leader of the Cape Palmas Grebo;
Joe Holland, alias Pahfluer (Baphro) of Grand Cavally; and King Will, alias Weah Bolio of
Grahway, leaders of neighboring Grebo peoples. 70 Other important African leaders attending
were William Davis (Tudi Mah), Bill Williams (Simlah Ballah), and William Hall (Yellow
Will). The meeting is telling in that it should have shown the MSCS and its officials that their
intelligence regarding the Cape Palmas inhabitants was not as accurate as they thought. Further,
it proved difficult to convert the Grebo over to the cultural and social values that Latrobe wished
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primarily because the MSCS assumed that they would willingly adopt American practices
because they were the same race as the colonists. In reality, the intelligence was inaccurate
because it was reported in a manner designed to please superiors and hopefully drum up support
for the cause of colony and mission. In addition, the demands made on Hall suggest that the
Greboes were really interested in only what they believed would benefit them.
A brief history of the indigenous Africans in the Cape Palmas region in the 1830s helps
suggest the complexities facing Maryland in Liberia. An obvious starting point is the names of
these kings. All had both European and African names, indicating that the Grebo had adopted at
least some European culture when it served their purposes. The Grebo had, in fact, been in
contact with Europeans since the fifteenth century. 71 King Freeman and many other leaders used
their people’s position along the coast to fill the middleman role between Africans farther inland
and European traders to establish themselves in positions of power. In fact, King Freeman was
the only Grebo leader attending the palaver who did not already speak English fluently,
demonstrating that the Greboes had adopted those cultural attributes which benefited them. The
adoption of westernized names and a willingness to speak English, however, did not mean that
the Grebo or other Africans living in the vicinity had adopted western culture wholesale or that
they wished to. James Hall, and of course the MSCS, incorrectly interpreted these signs as an
understanding and acceptance of concepts practiced by Americans, such as individual ownership
of land.
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The synthesized culture of the Grebo also allowed the three kings, specifically King
Freeman who controlled Cape Palmas, to exchange land for the trade goods sent by the MSCS.
Hall testified that all three readily signed the deed giving up “all the possessions of the above
named kings in this country generally penetrating about twenty miles in the interior & to the
same extent sea board.” 72 This was a strange exchange to say the least, since Hall took
possession of the land cheaply, claiming it cost him only $1,000 in goods. Among the items
Governor Hall provided in the transaction were a small number of guns with ammunition, cloth,
tobacco, and glassware. Land ownership, however, among many African groups had been, and
still was, communal. More likely King Freeman thought the exchange gave the MSCS the right
to use the land, but it was not a permanent title to the territory. Yet Hall claimed a large territory
totaling nearly 400 square miles for the society and defined the boundaries as Latrobe instructed
him—vaguely. Using descriptions such as a “palm tree” to mark the corners of the claim, Hall
clearly intended the land to belong to the MSCS permanently regardless of the Grebo’s
understanding of land ownership, but he also sought to enlarge the territory if the opportunity
presented itself. Again, this was per Latrobe’s orders. Latrobe wanted Hall to obtain as much
territory as possible as well as pre-emption rights to as much land as he could to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the French or British. Both countries maintained a strong presence on
the coast, especially the British as they attempted to enforce the ban on slave trading and also
administered Liberia’s neighbor, Sierra Leone. If the Greboes decided to sell more land, Hall
was to exercise the colony’s rights as first buyer. This was an important detail to Latrobe who
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hoped the colony would grow into much more than a settlement for African Americans. 73 These
concepts were western in origin and had little actual meaning to the Greboes, however.
Regardless of the Greboes’ understanding, Hall felt satisfied with the exchange and believed that
it gave the MSCS what he termed “legitimate” possession of Cape Palmas and a proper footing
to grow into the core of a new republic. 74
Further pleasing the MSCS, Hall made the property arrangements without giving up the
rum he carried on the Ann. The Grebo leaders made several demands for rum in exchange for
the colonists using the territory, but Hall claimed the territory without meeting most of them.
Hall even succeeded in getting the Grebo leaders to agree that their people would be considered
citizens of the colony, remaining sovereign people only in their towns and keeping the right to
hold only those lands currently under cultivation. 75
Although Governor Hall achieved all he was directed to do by the board, he did obligate
the MSCS to provide other services to the Greboes. One condition that they insisted on was free
schools for their children, a demand that the missionaries agreed to meet. The ABCFM
eventually opened three schools in Maryland in Liberia after Secretary Rufus Anderson insisted
that the missionaries control these schools; the colony had no say in their operations. This
condition met no resistance from the MSCS since it lessened the responsibility of the
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government and promoted the goal of spreading Christianity. 76 In addition, Hall arranged for
one son of each of the Grebo signatories to be sent to the United States under the care of the
MSCS. While the MSCS accepted this condition with full intentions to educate the sons of the
Grebo kings, Hall had other motives in agreeing to send these young men to America. Governor
Hall, ever cautious, remained fearful about the relationship between the fledgling colony and the
Grebo despite the cordial meetings. In the event that things turned sour between the natives and
the settlers, Hall wrote Latrobe that the boys could be used as leverage against the Grebo in any
dispute. 77 This concluded the purchase of Cape Palmas.
The actual settlement of Maryland’s colony had only just begun with the signing of the
deed by Grebo leaders. Yet John Latrobe had spent nearly five years getting to that point. It
took considerable planning and effort on his part along with internal developments in Maryland
and the United States to make it successful. The initial group of settlers had overcome the
logistical problems as well as those arising from nature delaying them at sea to finally start
Maryland’s colony. Maryland officials also had several problems that they worked through
during the voyage, but the real challenge still lay ahead of them all. The difficulties faced by
officials and colonists during the fall of 1833 and the spring of 1834 were minor ones when
compared to the tasks of actually building a settlement on the coast of Africa, the job Hall turned
to during the summer of 1834.
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Chapter 4: “You are no longer the friend of our Colonization Cause:” The Challenges and
Realities of Colonization in Africa.

During the first few months that James Hall and his little band of colonists lived at Cape
Palmas they built houses and government buildings all the while hoping that they would survive.
On the surface it appeared that the peaceful negotiations between the Greboes and the Maryland
State Colonization Society’s settlers were indicative of a good relationship. However, Hall never
assumed that all would be well between the two and he was right to believe so as the colonists
quickly came into conflict with the Greboes at Cape Palmas. Yet the conflicts with the Greboes
made up only some of the troubles facing John Latrobe and the colonists of Maryland in Liberia.
The settlers of Maryland’s colony also confronted American missionaries who intervened in the
colonists’ relationship with the indigenous peoples, acted as the moral police of the colony, and
were usurpers of the colony’s executive authority. This chapter examines the numerous
problems faced by MSCS officials and how those problems shaped the actions and policies of
the society. Many of the problems experienced in the colony stemmed from Latrobe’s faulty
assumptions about Africa and his belief that colonization could be carried out easily under the
right system. This chapter illustrates how the reality of colonization challenged the ideals, goals,
and beliefs outlined in the previous chapter. It further explains the failures of the MSCS to cope
with these realities. At times, the resolution of these problems required unorthodox actions and
depended on outside forces, even including the United States Navy. The colonists, however,
almost always looked to John Latrobe who had to accept the fact that many of his objectives
were unrealistic in part because he could not ensure their being carried out in Africa.
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The colony began with high hopes for Africa and the United States. Latrobe had
advocated Cape Palmas as the site for the colony for its perceived benefits, one of which was that
it appeared to be a healthier spot than any of the locations picked by the American Colonization
Society. The ABCFM missionary, John Leighton Wilson, praised the project, first because it
was achieved without using rum to buy the land and second, because he believed that Cape
Palmas and its people were favorably disposed to the objects of his missionary agenda. 1 On the
surface, everything appeared promising.
The cracks in the façade of colonization soon appeared. By May of 1834 Governor Hall
reported conditions contradicting his initial assessments as well as those of the missionaries and
colonists. One colonist, Joshua Stewart, wrote to his mother admitting that the place was
agreeable at first, but now all the colonists were ill. Worse still, nothing was being done to
advance the colony because all were “very sick with this fatal disease.” Illness was not the only
reason for the suffering of the colonists. Stewart claimed that he and his family had no clothes to
wear. Finally, he charged that all the colonists had “been badly treated by the Governor of this
place that Dr. Hall.” 2 The allegations of the governor’s poor treatment of the colonists stemmed
from disagreements over the amount of rations he gave out to the settlers. The governor noted
that the colonists had consumed more at sea than he anticipated due to the extended time taken to
cross the Atlantic Ocean. Availability of provisions was a serious issue for the colony because it
had to procure them from the Grebo people until they established their own farms and provided
basic necessities themselves. Hall was consequently forced to ration food until the next ship

1

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 2. J. Leighton Wilson to John Latrobe, April 15, 1834;
African Repository Vol. 8. August, 1834, 178.
2

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 2. Joshua Stewart to Charlotte Stewart, May 5, 1834.

102

arrived with supplies from Maryland. 3 Nevertheless, Stewart lamented the fact that he had not
listened to his mother and stayed in the United States. Stewart at first presumed that Liberia
offered more than he could ever expect in Maryland, even as a free man. He soon found that he
hated the colony and Africa so much that he pleaded with her to help him and his family return
to the states. He even promised to “serve any way or at any time” for whomever was willing to
advance him the cost of transportation. If necessary he would make the ultimate sacrifice and
“sell myself for a slave for the sake of getting home once more.” 4
Such serious grumbling aggravated Latrobe. He dismissed Stewart, and others who
complained as people who seemed “very evidently to be disappointed at having to work hard and
bear the difficulties of new settlers.” 5 Petty complaints incensed Latrobe because he knew that
reports from the settlers influenced those in America more than any other arguments in favor of
colonization, particularly in the black community. Assessments contrary to the portrayal offered
by the society’s agents only made the task more difficult and further jeopardized the effort in the
United States by slowing the rate of emigration, which was the ultimate marker of success in
white eyes. To achieve the goals of colonization, the MSCS could afford neither disturbances
within the colony nor any serious conflicts to arise with the Greboes. Unfortunately, the MSCS
had overestimated the prosperity of the region. All had mistaken the health of Cape Palmas
based on the appearance of the Greboes, who had achieved a balance in what was actually a
delicate environment subject to famines. As such, conflict quickly became pervasive in the
colony.
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Fearing that difficulties between the Greboes and the colonists might occur, Hall chose to
make the settlement on the point of Cape Palmas. Hall’s assumption rested on the history of the
ACS colony’s relations with indigenous Africans. Moving the settlers inland offered more
material benefits by enabling the Governor to assign farms and lay out the town lots
immediately, but Hall instead focused on the cape for its strategic advantages, a wise choice
considering the illnesses of Hall and the colonists. Furthermore, he concluded that inland
settlements also would have left the colonists vulnerable, isolated, and starved if the Greboes
chose to dispose of the settlement. The cape, in contrast, afforded the colony easy access to the
sea and allowed the few artillery pieces they possessed to be placed in a central vantage point for
use against the Greboes should things turn for the worse.6 Establishing the settlement on the
cape also gave the colony an advantage that was overlooked at first. By controlling the cape,
Hall could control trade with the interior. The Greboes dominated this trade in addition to
supplying European trading vessels with food, water, and wood. Hall failed to realize that the
colony threatened the economic dominance of the Greboes’ coastal trading towns, and that
Grebo leaders objected to American interference once the colonists began siphoning trade away
from their people.
Governor Hall’s fears that the Greboes might assault the colony were realized shortly
after establishing the settlement on the cape. The natives, he told Latrobe, appear “to wish that
we would sit down with them + become one people,” as they fully understood the benefits that
the colony offered. Nevertheless, he asserted that the Greboes “are so fickle + capricious that we
are obliged to be ever upon the look out. They have twice called their people from our town +
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forbid all trade or intercourse of any kind with us + the aspect of affairs was so threatening that
we were obliged to be all night upon our arms.” 7 The situation neared desperation, particularly
as the settlers were dependent on trading with Africans for food. After the Ann left the colonists,
King Freeman ordered an embargo against the colony as he moved to reassert control over trade
in the region. Freeman recognized the settlers’ reliance on his people for food once the supplies
they brought were gone. Hall hoped to remedy this by opening trade with the Greboes at
Rocktown, a few miles to the northwest. Competitors with the Cape Palmas Greboes, they
willingly supplied Hall with staples such as rice. The Rocktown Greboes were not under the
direct control of King Freeman and Hall made good use of the classic strategy of dividing and
conquering, but such a strategy was bound to generate conflict.
In April, King Freeman attempted to take control of the situation by prohibiting all
Greboes from trading with the colonists. This was a direct challenge to Maryland in Liberia and
Governor Hall’s authority as well as an obvious ploy to get better terms of trade through
intimidation. King Freeman made it clear to Governor Hall that he “would do as he pleased,” he
was after all a king. 8 Hall responded to the situation telling King Freeman that any effort by him
or his people to interfere with trade in Maryland in Liberia would be considered an act of war. If
war broke out, Hall warned Freeman, “I will not stop as long as one American lives or until I had
destroyed every native town within gunshot of the cape town.” 9 Even though the colonists were
severely outnumbered, they maintained a small military advantage by mounting their only
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cannon to face Freeman’s town, which Hall masterfully exploited. The incident vindicated
Hall’s decision to settle at the coast rather than move inland. Having a native town within range
of his only cannon allowed him to use the threat of force in his negotiations with the Greboes.
Freeman conceded the issue, confirming Hall’s suspicion that the king sought a more profitable
trading arrangement or the restoration of the trade lost to Americans, rather than to exterminate
the settlement. Hall continued trading with others along the coast further weakening the position
of the Cape Palmas Greboes in their attempts to charge higher prices. 10 The incident also
motivated Latrobe to request that the squadron of United States naval vessels patrolling the
African coast periodically visit Cape Palmas as a show of military force. While the United
States and its vessels of war had no direct connection with the colony, Latrobe encouraged visits
by United States warships in the hopes that their presence would convince the natives of
American military superiority. In essence, it became a policy of the MSCS to foster the idea
among the Greboes at Cape Palmas that the colonists were under the protection of the American
navy; an idea aimed at curtailing Grebo attempts to gain a material advantage over the
colonists. 11
While Hall forced King Freeman into submission on the issue of trade in the colony,
problems between the Greboes and settlers continued as the groups came into conflict. Hall
charged some Greboes with stealing from the colonists. In a report sent to Latrobe, Hall said the
Greboes literally reached through the thatched walls of the colonists’ shelters and stole the
clothes off the sick as they lay in their beds. He promised that as soon as the colonists were
strong enough, he would “make the king responsible for all thefts committed by his people…and
10
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demand restitution.” Hall even suggested that the king himself supported the crimes against the
settlers because the booty was divided among the headmen of the Grebo village. 12

Since King

Freeman “suffered it to exist as a custom of his people, he was himself responsible.” 13 If Hall
could make Freeman accept responsibility, it would establish the Governor as a higher authority
in the area while lessening the importance of the king. If successful, it would also establish a
precedent that would allow Governor Hall to apply the colony’s laws to all Greboes in the
territory of Maryland in Liberia. True to his word, Hall approached King Freeman regarding the
thefts and demanded that he pay for every item stolen from the colonists.
Incidents of theft, however, were not limited to the Greboes. While Hall sought to assert
his dominance over Freeman, the king’s people captured a colonist who was trying to steal
cassava from a native farm. Yet in a clear double standard, Hall did not demand that the colonist
pay for the damages, nor did Hall offer to pay restitution for losses suffered by individual
Greboes. Instead, Hall punished the colonist according to Latrobe’s legal code, but demanded
restitution in cases involving Grebo people. The king bluntly asked why he had to pay for the
losses of the colonists when his people stole from them, while Hall was not liable when the
reverse occurred. 14 Hall paternalistically explained that the colonists would be punished
according to the principals of western law, thus no monetary compensation was forthcoming to
Grebo victims. However, if the Greboes would submit to such laws, they would be applied
equally. King Freeman agreed and arranged to send Simleh Ballah to Baltimore to see Latrobe.
There Latrobe wrote a set of laws for the Greboes similar to the code governing the colony. This
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unforeseen occurrence provided a perfect opportunity for Latrobe to proselytize American values
among indigenous Africans, a significant step in making the inhabitants of Maryland in Liberia
one people and in creating an African republic. 15
Although Hall had a clear double standard when it came to crimes committed in the
colony, partly due to military necessity and a need to keep the colony unified, others were not
bound by such constraints. Both missionaries accompanying the pioneers of Maryland in
Liberia, J. Leighton Wilson and Stephen R. Wynkoop, as well as former colonial agent Rev.
John Hersey, condemned the behavior of the colonists. Wilson submitted multiple reports on the
Cape Palmas settlement to his superiors and to the ACS, which published them in its journal, The
African Repository. His assessment of Cape Palmas was very positive and he portrayed the
Greboes magnanimously. 16 In private correspondence with both his superiors and John Latrobe,
however, he indicated his disapproval of the settlers and his desire that the missionaries be a
separate entity within Maryland in Liberia. The longer Wilson lived in the colony the stronger
was his conviction that the colonists actually harmed missionary efforts. Thus he worked “to
impress the mind of the king and his people with the fact, that the mission is to be entirely
distinct from the colony, and will be identified with the interests of the natives.” 17 Wilson’s
attitude reflected both his observations of the relationship between the colonists and Greboes and
his familiarity with the other Liberian settlements. He feared that a close association with the
15
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colonists could threaten the mission station if relations between the colonists and the natives
deteriorated. He wanted the Greboes to understand that the missionaries and colonists were
different groups of Americans.
Other reports echoed the doubts expressed by Wilson. Reverend John Hersey went to the
colony as Hall’s assistant, but quickly became disillusioned by the whole scheme of
colonization. He too challenged the wisdom in settling Maryland’s blacks among the Greboes.
On “our arrival at Cape Palmas the emigrants discovered not only an indisposition to work, but
they manifested an unkind and hostile feeling towards the natives, and a wrangling spirit among
themselves.” Furthermore, they showed little respect to Governor Hall and on more than one
occasion “insulted and injured the natives.” Hersey noted that “one time a native who was
working in our employment [for the governor] was refused a drink of water by one of the
colonists…a scuffle ensued_the native was too strong for the colonist, and drew blood in several
places from his face.” At this point, the humiliated settler declared that he would “kill all the
natives_to exterminate them from the land, and burn their town.” 18
The attitude displayed by some of the colonists was only part of the problem according to
Hersey. He noted that settlers frequently hired local Africans to work on their farms with no
“reasonable prospect of making them any remuneration for their services.” 19 This no doubt
contributed to the thieving in the colony and causing more problems between Hall and King
Freeman. Finally, Hersey was critical of the democratic process in the colony. When the
colonists held elections in February of 1834, they voted for a man Hersey thought wholly
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unqualified to be Hall’s assistant. Hersey therefore suggested that the MSCS curb the colonists’
uncouth manners by suspending the elective franchise until they were properly prepared for the
duties of citizenship. 20
Like many white Americans, Hersey had doubts that African Americans were capable of
exercising the rights of free people, and the settlers’ selection proved it as far as he was
concerned. Such a report concerned Latrobe, yet he was reluctant to accept such accusations
without hard evidence. Nor was he ready to disenfranchise the settlers. Latrobe understood that
democratic participation was an important factor in getting African Americans to migrate to
Maryland in Liberia. Furthermore, as a supporter of President Andrew Jackson, he endorsed the
expansion of the elective franchise for white males. To take the right to vote away from the
colonists would have violated the strong democratic feelings Latrobe held, even though he
himself intimated that white men in the United States were sometimes too ignorant to exercise
good voting sense. 21 Ultimately, Latrobe ignored Hersey’s recommendation. Instead, he
emphasized to Governor Hall his desire that the colonists and Greboes “should be as one
people.” Peace between the two groups in the colony was more important because it affected the
speed of settlement, the potential for growth, and Latrobe’s long-term vision for both
continents. 22
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In the colonization of Africa, conflict between the colonizers and the colonized was not
unusual. Maryland in Liberia differed from the later European takeover primarily because the
colonizers were of African descent. Latrobe and the MSCS assumed that race would be a
unifying factor between the two groups at Cape Palmas. This attitude was more a product of
American racism than anything else. Perhaps nowhere was race more important than in the
United States. 23 Being of the same race, however, did not unify the colonists with the Greboes.
Cultural differences often prevented unity. Likewise, in the history of African colonization
missionaries often defended the indigenous peoples against the colonizers. This was also true in
Maryland’s colony since Reverend Wilson believed the opportunities for spreading Christianity
among the Greboes were promising and conflict would only hurt his efforts. Several prominent
Grebo leaders already exhibited aspects of Christian influence; Wilson assumed that they would
help him spread his faith to Africa’s interior peoples and suggested as much in his reports
home. 24 But Wilson’s criticisms of the colonists did not sit well with Latrobe, who intended the
two causes to be mutually supportive.
Wilson’s insistence that the missionaries be separate from the colony ran counter to his
repeated interference in the affairs of the colony, supporting the Greboes in their conflicts with
the colonists. Because Governor Hall was often in poor health, he actually encouraged the
missionary’s involvement in colonial affairs. Furthermore, the missionaries acted as mediators
23

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. January 10, 1835; Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters, (New York: The
New Press, 1974); Freehling, The Road to Disunion, 60-67;Bruce Levine, Half Slave and Half Free, (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1992); Peter Kent Opper, “The Mind of the White Participant in the African Colonization
Movement, 1816-1840.” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972); Kenneth M. Stampp, The
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), Chapter eight; David M.
Streifford, “The American Colonization Society: An Application of Republican Ideology to Early Antebellum
Reform,” in The Journal of Southern History Vol. 45, Iss. 2 (May 1979), 212.
24

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 2. B.B. Wisner to John Latrobe, October 5, 1833;
African Repository, Vol. 8. August, 1834, 178-185.

111

almost from the beginning when disputes occurred between the two groups. Certainly Wilson’s
southern paternalism contributed to this attitude, as did the fact that King Freeman had
developed a strong relationship with Wilson. When he wanted to address Latrobe, he almost
always sought Wilson out to act as a translator, indicating Freeman trusted the missionaries
enough to handle his negotiations with the MSCS. Hall did little to discourage this, and he found
Wilson’s assistance, more often than not, benefited the colony by more quickly settling disputes
with the Greboes. 25
Latrobe, like Hall and the other MSCS members, initially envisioned the missionary
presence as a beneficial one, especially after the ABCFM agreed to operate the three schools in
the colony the Greboes demanded as a condition of the original land purchase. Such cooperation
lightened the load for the colonization society. Education was an important issue to Latrobe and
he pushed it from the beginning. Education of the colonists and native inhabitants would
contribute to the prosperity of the colony as well as accelerate the westernization of the Greboes,
he believed. Education also provided another point on which to draw support, as public
education was growing in the reformist climate of the United States. Additionally, an
educational system in Maryland in Liberia involved women in the cause of colonization; the
ladies of Baltimore extended regular financial support for schools in the colony beginning in the
mid-1830s. 26 Therefore, the MSCS gratefully accepted the assistance of the missionaries in
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establishing the colony’s education system. What Latrobe did not anticipate was that the colony
would be so reliant on the missionaries for negotiations with the Grebo leaders.
Making the situation all the more dire for Latrobe was Governor James Hall’s extremely
poor health, which raised doubts about his continuing as the head of Maryland in Liberia.
Latrobe valued Hall for his ability to further the agenda of the MSCS but recognized that another
agent would be needed and he began the search for a replacement in 1835. Latrobe proposed
that someone be sent to the colony in November of 1835 as a special agent to assist Governor
Hall or take over completely if his health failed. Latrobe’s original choice for the job was J. C.
F. Finley, a relative of his friend Robert Finley. He apparently had no interest in going back to
Africa (he had just recently returned) and declined the offer made by the MSCS. Latrobe then
nominated a young dentist from Baltimore, Oliver Holmes, to be the society’s special agent.
Holmes accepted the position and left for Maryland in Liberia with the November expedition.
Holmes’s arrival in the colony was timely as Hall’s poor health forced him to leave, making
Holmes the interim governor. 27
Latrobe endorsed Holmes as the temporary governor because of the young man’s
dedication to the cause of colonization. Latrobe praised Holmes for leaving “a lucrative business
here for the sake of it. He is a most respectable young Gentleman_a member of the Episcopal
Church and is entitled to consideration for his personal good qualities.” 28 Latrobe, nevertheless,
made it perfectly clear that Holmes was to follow the precedent set by Hall in governing the
fledgling colony. When it came to the Grebo, Holmes was to avoid open hostilities. 29 Latrobe
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soon found that good qualities or intentions did not make him a good administrator, nor did it
keep him from conflicts with Wilson or the colonists. By the time he left the colony, the only
ones Holmes seemed to be getting along with were the Greboes.
Joining Holmes in running the colony for the MSCS was Charles Snetter. Snetter had
only recently moved to Maryland in Liberia. At Hall’s request he emigrated from the ACS
colony. Latrobe was uncertain of the propriety of Hall’s actions in stealing Snetter away from
the older colony, but the governor soon won approval for the move by asserting that “I know
Snetter to be a capable enterprising popular fellow + feel that I could entrust the colony with him
in case of accident with more confidence than any other coloured man in Liberia.” 30 Not all
those in the MSCS shared Hall’s optimism in suggesting that a colonist was ready to govern the
colony so early in its history. Charles Howard, one of the state fund managers and future
president of the MSCS wrote Hall in the spring of 1835 expressing his disapproval. No matter
how “confident [you] might be in the abilities of a coloured person as your representative in your
absence yet some years must elapse before such an one will be viewed with the respect that is
accorded to a white man.” 31 Knowing that a significant portion of the settlers had been slaves,
many white colonizationists believed that it would take a generation before they were ready—
trained as it were—in the art of self-governance. Such attitudes reflected a central tension in the
colonization movement.
Despite the rough start with the Greboes, Governor Hall had achieved relatively peaceful
relations by the end of 1835. That all changed when he prepared to leave the colony in the hands
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of Oliver Holmes and Charles Snetter. Accusations of theft again escalated the tensions between
the colonists and Greboes. Retaliating against King Freeman’s people for stealing crops from
the farms of settlers, the colonists began killing the livestock of Grebo villagers. Tensions rose
until the missionaries joined the fracas. 32 Both sides agreed to a palaver to stop the conflict
before it turned more violent. The palaver highlighted cultural differences regarding property as
well as the struggle for economic dominance in the colony. King Freeman blamed the whole
situation on the colonists, stating that his people stole from the farms only after bullocks
belonging to his people were slaughtered. Certainly, given the propensity for poor agricultural
yields in the settlement’s early history, the colonists would not have hesitated to turn to animals
for sustenance. Hall well knew that the Greboes took slaughter of their livestock very seriously
because livestock were critical to their economy. Hall also understood that sometimes theft was
a means of gaining compensation from an offending party. 33 Holmes, with no experience in
Africa and little knowledge of the Greboes, did not fully recognize the seriousness of the
situation. Settlers, on the other hand, blamed Governor Hall for the conflict, claiming that his
refusal to give gifts to the headmen before leaving had insulted them, thus bringing hostility on
the colonists. They suggested that Africans perpetrated the thefts to compensate for Hall’s
shortcomings and not their actions. Equally important, several of Freeman’s people owed debts
to settlers, and the colonists realized that they stood to lose any chance of collecting those debts
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if a settlement occurred too quickly. Missionaries eventually helped both sides reach an
agreement, although peace between the two groups was only temporary. 34
Latrobe responded to the lingering problems by devising a new legal framework modeled
after American law. He hoped that these changes would stop vigilante justice, promote unity in
the colony, and more fairly administer justice to both parties. Latrobe sent a revised law code to
the colony in 1836, which included ordinances creating native magistrate positions. This was the
first significant change initiated by the MSCS in response to the realities of colonization.
Latrobe and MSCS officials acknowledged that race alone was not sufficient to create common
accord between the settlers and Greboes. There were obviously significant cultural differences
and King Freeman in particular publicly objected to the clear legal double standard applied in
Maryland in Liberia. Native magistrates addressed these concerns. The new constables
specifically served the Grebo community at Cape Palmas, but were vested with the powers
associated with such officials in western law. They collected evidence and enforced
punishments, which Latrobe assumed would make rule by Americans more palatable to the
Greboes. 35 The degree to which this system succeeded is difficult to determine. Most of the
Greboes under King Freeman’s control accepted this change, but certainly not all of them.
Furthermore, the legal changes did not truly address the problems behind the petty thefts:
economics, cultural rifts, and tense trading relations often created by environmental factors.
Despite changes in the colony’s legal code, the problems for Holmes and Snetter went
beyond controlling relations with the Greboes. Both the missionaries and colonists alleged that
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Holmes was an alcoholic, and that his government was corrupt. While the charges of alcoholism
were Holmes’s alone to bear, Snetter bore some of the responsibility for charges of corruption.
As the assistant agent, Snetter was responsible for keeping the financial books in the colony,
specifically for the colonial store. As it turned out, the ledgers had been neglected for several
months and the colonists complained about the mark-up on goods sold in the colonial store by
the MSCS. Neither accepted responsibility for the problems of the colony. Instead they blamed
each other. The charges against Holmes came directly from two missionaries who claimed that
he brewed his own wine from water, molasses, and rum. According to Wilson, this drink caused
Holmes to make a spectacle of himself. Furthermore, the drink violated the laws of the colony as
well as the oath demanded of every colonist before embarking from Baltimore. Even more
disturbing to the missionaries and Latrobe was the fact that Holmes supplied his Grebo laborers
with the wine. 36
Wilson objected even more strongly when Holmes verbally attacked Charles Snetter in an
attempt to shift the blame for the charges leveled at his administration. In a move
uncharacteristic of Wilson, he informed Latrobe of Holmes’s transgressions, while making
certain he defended Snetter before the board of the MSCS. Wilson began by boldly declaring to
Latrobe that “You are aware that I do not meddle with colonial affairs, + those who are witnesses
of daily actions will testify that I confine myself to the proper duties of a missionary of Jesus xt.”
Far from the truth, Wilson often meddled in colonial affairs, but this case was exceptional
because it was one of the very few occasions that he actually defended a colonist. Wilson
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asserted that the man was the “crown of the American population in Africa,” and hoped that
Holmes’s accusations against Snetter would not be given any credence by the MSCS. 37
Latrobe and the MSCS hoped to end such problems by appointing a new governor, one
who would enforce the laws of the colony, manage the affairs of the store, and keep the
missionaries from extending their influence into secular matters. Latrobe was also convinced
that the colonists themselves needed to be in control of their government. Therefore, he was
looking for a settler who could do all that the society desired. Latrobe differed from his
colleagues in that he believed white rule must cease sooner rather than later; however, his
motives were not entirely altruistic. Latrobe was extremely sensitive to criticism of the MSCS in
the United States. Critics, mainly abolitionists, charged that the colonists were nothing more
than servants under a white governor; a notion he rejected entirely. Still, Latrobe recognized the
potential propaganda value if his colony could tout the first and only African American
governor. After all, abolitionists were successfully using the press to politicize emancipation;
why could he not do the same for colonization. As such, he suggested that the governorship be
offered to a man of color, John B. Russwurm. 38
By June of 1836, Latrobe had convinced his colleagues that his choice for governor was
the correct one. John B. Russwurm, a man of mixed descent, was the second African American
to graduate from college in the United States. After graduating from Bowdoin College,
Russwurm started an abolitionist newspaper in New England, Freedom’s Journal. Russwurm
denounced colonization early in his journalistic career; however, by 1829 his sentiments on the
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future of American blacks had changed and he volunteered to immigrate to Liberia. At
Monrovia he became editor of the Liberia Herald and a school teacher. Although many African
Americans and abolitionists considered his departure for Africa the worst kind of betrayal,
Latrobe interpreted his change of heart toward colonization as that of an enlightened man who
realized where his real future lay. Latrobe further felt that Russwurm’s education and service to
the colony at Monrovia qualified him to be Maryland in Liberia’s governor, and he offered him
the position in June of 1836. 39 In appointing Russwurm, Latrobe’s position became clearer. The
MSCS was departing from “the custom which has prescribed that Agents and Governors in
Africa should be white men…The Board cannot believe that their authority in force or duration,
will be less in Africa because it is wielded by other than a white man, they cannot think that the
colonists and natives will pay less respect to the representative of the law and head of the civil
and military government because he is of the same race with themselves.” 40 If anything, the
appointment of Russwurm should, Latrobe thought, create more peaceable relations between the
groups residing at Cape Palmas. Russwurm accepted the position as governor and left Monrovia
for Cape Palmas in the fall of 1836. Wilson, although having no official authority, expressed his
approval of the Maryland society’s selection of Russwurm, happy that Holmes was leaving the
colony. He hoped that now things could settle down between everyone in the settlement. 41
Restoring the peace between all the groups in Maryland in Liberia was the primary task
Latrobe demanded from his new governor. Latrobe instructed Russwurm that board members
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“do not wish the History of the United States of America to be repeated in Africa so far as it is
connected with the fate of the Aborigines.” 42 Latrobe’s instructions reflected the history of
relations with Native Americans as well as the events then taking place in the United States.
President Andrew Jackson had backed the removal of the Cherokee from Georgia in defiance of
a Supreme Court ruling in a case that sought to revoke the Indian Removal Bill passed by
Congress and signed into law May 28, 1830. The bill authorized force in removing Indians west
of the Mississippi River, with which Jackson agreed. 43 Although Latrobe strongly supported the
President in 1828 and was one of the founding members of the Democratic Party in Maryland, he
did not agree with the process of removal. In fact, he looked at Native Americans
sympathetically. His viewpoint was much influenced by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson, at one
point hoped that Native Americans could be assimilated rather than exterminated. Though
Jefferson eventually abandoned this view, Latrobe was nevertheless swayed by the idea. 44 He
even represented the Choctaw in treaty negotiations with the U.S. government. Consequently,
Latrobe hoped that relations between the settlers and Greboes in Africa did not mirror the history
of America and its native peoples. He specifically instructed Russwurm to incorporate them into
the colony, not drive them away. 45
Russwurm arrived just in time to witness another round of hostility with the Greboes.
Stealing remained a problem; however, now the thefts had spread to include the colonial store
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run by the MSCS. The importance of the store cannot be overestimated. The store was the
primary supplier of American manufactures to the colonists as well as the primary market for
their produce. Latrobe had ordered Governor Hall to purchase whatever “articles they raise, to a
limited extent, to be regulated by your best judgment.” 46 This was partly intended as a policy to
motivate agricultural production in the colony, but the program also worked to the advantage of
the MSCS because there was no circulating specie in the colony. The government often paid
wages in trade goods from the MSCS’ store, and then applied the profits toward reducing the
financial burden on the state’s costs. This was the primary reason the MSCS sought to control
trade within the colony. Russwurm recognized the importance of commerce in accelerating the
plans of the MSCS and acted to increase security at the store and pressure the newly appointed
native magistrates to identify the perpetrators. 47
Within days, Russwurm’s actions produced results as the magistrates secured some of the
stolen items as well as the identity of one thief, a relative of King Freeman. They further
suggested that King Freeman was the one who had been hindering the efforts of the magistrates
in bringing the culprits to justice. The magistrates eventually apprehended the prime suspect in
December of 1836 only to have Grebo allies forcibly break him out of jail and block the primary
road between the Cape and the newest Maryland settlement four miles inland called Harper.
Fearing for their lives, the settlers near Harper sought refuge at Wilson’s Fair Hope mission. 48

46

MSCS Papers, III. Correspondence Sent, Latrobe Letter Book, reel 16. John Latrobe to James Hall,
February 21, 1835.
47

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 2. John Russwurm to John Latrobe, February 10, 12,

1837.
48

The native magistrates arrested the father of the accused to force his surrender. They were successful,
but only temporarily held the man before he was set free by a mob. MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received,
reel 2. John Russwurm to John Latrobe, February 10, 12, 1837; J. Leighton Wilson to John Latrobe, March 18,
1837; J. L. Wilson (writing for Simlah Ballah) to John Latrobe, June 6, 1837.

121

Wilson worked to calm the hysteria relaying the Greboes’ message that they intended no harm to
the settlers. Rather they sought only to scare them into freeing the man accused of robbing the
store. 49
The fact that the settlers sought refuge at Wilson’s Fair Hope mission must have given
him some satisfaction as it implied that his presumptions about them had been correct. If the
colonists behaved as good Christians then they had nothing to fear from the Greboes. For
Wilson, the colonists’ appeal for protection from him was nothing less than an indictment of
wrongdoing on their part. This incident also demonstrated another facet of the relationship
between the missionaries and the Grebo people; because the colonists sought shelter at the
mission it justified Wilson’s persistence in arguing that the missionaries were separate from the
colony. More detrimental, however, Russwurm’s handling of the incident led Wilson to become
increasingly critical of Liberia’s first African American governor. 50
While the colonists prompted involvement by the missionaries this time, Wilson had few
qualms about using his influence to resolve the situation. Wilson arranged a palaver between
Russwurm and Freeman. There, Freeman insisted that the settlers had started the most recent
troubles, but Russwurm would hear none of it. The governor reported to Latrobe that the charges
against the colonists were “quite imaginary, leaving out of view others which were utterly
false.” 51 Russwurm attributed the recent round of thefts to two factors: first that the king failed
to punish petty thefts by his people and second, the older colonists’ refusal to farm. Instead,
some settlers chose to pursue activities promising higher income and more rapid prosperity, such
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as producing lumber and shingles or performing carpentry work for the missionaries. These
individuals often hired native laborers to work their farms, but they were not always consistent
about paying for that labor. 52
Wilson disapproved of Russwurm’s handling of the situation in part because the governor
pressed the magistrates into acting. Their efforts produced results, but only through questionable
means. The constables seized the elderly father of one of the thieves and refused to release him
until his son, one of the suspects came forward to answer for the crimes. This was the cause of
the riot at the jailhouse. But Wilson’s real feelings stemmed as much from his feelings of racial
superiority as from the handling of the events. The whole incident, Wilson informed Latrobe,
was because “Mr. Russwurm’s complexion was a disadvantage so far as it was necessary for him
to have an influence over the natives.” 53 Wilson felt that even a light-skinned African American,
as Russwurm was, did not have the same authority with the Greboes that a white man had. In
short, Wilson suggested that under white rule none of these problems would have existed. This,
of course, was an exaggeration, as Hall suffered through several difficulties with the Greboes.
Even Wilson’s superior, Rufus Anderson, confirmed that the source of Wilson’s disapproval lay
in his racism. Writing Latrobe, Anderson urged that “You will understand me, however, when I
suggest, in respect to the whole matter of jurisdiction while the governors of your colony are
colored men + our missionaries are Southern men, that while all necessary care is taken to
preserve the principles of rights (which ought not to be conceded by your agent) difficulties
which may arise, and which threaten to be serious as far as may be, be referred for settlement to
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the Societies at home.” 54 Complicating this relationship was the fact that Russwurm did not seek
Wilson’s advice as the former governor had, nor would he allow the missionary any official
authority in the colony. This cut Wilson to the quick; such behavior would never have been
tolerated in his native South Carolina.
Latrobe tried to defuse the potentially explosive situation between Russwurm and
Wilson. He instructed Russwurm “to avoid all interference with them in their spiritual effort and
allow them no interference in your temporal affairs.” The two were not competitors, but rather
cooperating agents working in the grand design. If it failed, it meant disaster for the United
States. This message apparently never reached the reverend. 55 Wilson asserted that Russwurm’s
attempts to establish his authority over the Greboes would lead to an African ‘trail of tears,’ a
reference to Latrobe’s greatest fears.56 But Latrobe attached greater importance to Russwurm’s
success, a clear impact of the experience gained during the previous two years and the growing
sectionalism in the states. Latrobe counted on the fact that Maryland in Liberia was administered
by a black American to be a significant emigration pull factor. He hoped that Russwurm’s
appointment would silence charges by abolitionists that immigrants in Liberia were nothing more
than another group of slaves serving a white master in the form of the governor. Finally, his
strong support of Russwurm illustrated what was most important to him, the success of
colonization. Latrobe would not allow problems with the missionaries to hinder colonization. 57
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Russwurm reciprocated the critique of Wilson, asserting that the missionaries obstructed
his duties. An astute man, Russwurm always immediately appealed to Latrobe in his disputes
with Wilson in ways that ensured his sympathy. Russwurm asserted that one of the biggest
reasons the colony was not meeting Latrobe’s goals was the missionary presence; nowhere was
this more apparent than in the area of agriculture. The colony repeatedly felt the pinch of
hunger. 58 It was established policy that the governors promote farming and the production of
cash crops to give the colony self-sufficiency and boost the economy. Latrobe had often
criticized the ACS colonies for their lack of production because output indirectly determined the
rate of migration to the colony. In fact, Latrobe authorized Russwurm to sell land to any
emigrant who wanted to farm on a large scale. The only condition was that one-fourth of the
acreage be under cultivation within the first year. 59 Such policies were ineffective, Russwurm
explained, because several settlers worked for the missionaries rather than on their own farms. 60
Ultimately, much of the blame for the colony’s shortcomings lay with Latrobe’s
inexperience, presumptions, and high ideals about colonization. He instructed Hall to push cash
crops, in particular cotton and tobacco, which were labor intensive and not necessarily suited to
the environment of this part of tropical Africa. The colony also encouraged the planting of
58
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coffee trees, which did not produce any fruit for several years. In addition, the colony restricted
the trading rights of the colonists, more or less forcing them to sell to the colonial store and
accept material goods at inflated prices in payment for their produce. Farmers could not take full
advantage of the market nor were they permitted to trade freely with the Greboes, thus there was
little incentive for settlers to pursue agriculture on the scale Latrobe wished. Finally, Latrobe
encouraged experimentation, especially through Russwurm and the colonial farm. At the
government farm he tried several different cash crops (varieties of tobacco, coffee, and cotton for
example), seeking those that promised high yields, rapid growth, or profitable sales. None of
these types of crops, however, facilitated population growth in the colony. Furthermore,
experimentation was a time-consuming process. Such policies combined to inhibit agriculture
rather than promote it in Maryland in Liberia. It was, then, little wonder most of the colonists
did not respond enthusiastically to farming. 61
The handling of the dispute between Governor Russwurm and John Wilson also
illustrated Latrobe’s misconceptions about the ease of colonizing and the role of the missionaries
in the movement. Latrobe asked Wilson not to hire settlers, particularly those who had some
education, as their talents were desperately needed by the colony. Yet missionary work required
educated people, and Wilson hired several Marylanders to be teachers in the three schools
established in the colony. 62 Wilson defended himself by reminding Latrobe that Hall had
insisted that colonists be employed in the schools run by the missionaries. Initially, the
arrangement seemed to suit everyone involved as the missionaries could not obtain enough
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workers from the United States to staff the schools. In any event, Wilson refused to accept any
blame for the colony’s poor agricultural development. That rested entirely on the shoulders of
the colonists and the MSCS. 63
Latrobe’s intervention did little to ease tensions. In fact, relations with the missionaries
deteriorated further in April of 1837 when Russwurm aided one Don Pedro Blanco. Blanco
claimed to be a Spanish explorer, but he was, in fact, a slave trader who had two slave factories
along the coast near the Liberian settlements. Blanco’s vessel needed repair and Russwurm
allowed him to dock at Cape Palmas to do the work. Wilson exploded when he discovered that
the governor had aided Blanco. 64 He charged Russwurm with making the colony (and by
implication the missionaries) an accessory to the slave trade, a violation of one of the avowed
purposes of placing the American colonies on the coast of Africa. Their presence was to aid
British and American forces in suppressing the trade in African slaves. Russwurm’s actions
were a potential public relations catastrophe for Latrobe, should the American people, and more
important, the Maryland public hear about it. Abolitionists were already critical of the colony;
news of involvement with a known slave trader could destroy Maryland’s colonization efforts
completely. 65
Latrobe’s correspondence with Russwurm revealed that the governor acted on the
assumption that most nations generally aided vessels in distress as an act of humanitarianism.
Still, Latrobe stressed, “such a waiver has never been construed to extend to the vessels of
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pirates, who…are entitled neither to succour nor protection.” Latrobe warned that the colony,
“cannot recognise those nice distinctions, that national pride and jealousy have drawn, so far as
permit a vessel belonging to a Slave dealer; and engaged in the performance of duties incident to
his nefarious traffic, to enjoy wither its jurisdiction, the comfort and assistance, under any
circumstances that the fair and honest trade, would demand and receive as a matter of
right…This course is now marked out for you, as one which the Board will never permit a
departure from.” 66 The connection of Maryland in Liberia in any way with such characters,
Latrobe knew, would destroy the credibility of colonization. Russwurm, however, blanched at
Wilson’s criticisms. He asked Latrobe to keep Wilson from interfering in the colony. 67
The controversy over assisting Blanco’s vessel foreshadowed the coming battle between
Russwurm and Wilson for supremacy in the colony, a battle which Latrobe would have to
mediate. Wilson’s job, in Latrobe’s estimation, was the spiritual and moral improvement of the
people of Maryland in Liberia in the hopes of spreading the word of God. Born in South
Carolina, Wilson shared the views of many slaveholders and he treated the settlers, including the
governor, paternalistically. 68 He felt a responsibility to police the settlers’ conduct. The
missionaries also hoped to convert the Greboes to Christianity. By contrast, Russwurm and the
settlers had emigrated so that they could control their destiny. They sought the right to govern
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the colony as outlined in the constitution, and even though the highest authority rested in the
MSCS; the colonists saw missionary interference as an attempt to curtail their liberties. 69
The conflicting objectives of each group became apparent in two incidents that followed
the Pedro Blanco crisis. The first involved a settler named James Thompson who began working
for the missionaries when James Hall ran Maryland in Liberia. By 1837, he was working under
Dr. Thomas Savage at the Mount Vaughan Mission. One day Savage overheard two young
women discussing how Thompson had made sexual advances toward them. Savage questioned
Thompson about the allegations, after which he admitted to adultery with one of the women, but
denied any other wrongdoing or misconduct. The matter caused considerable controversy
because Thompson was an employee of the missionaries and his behavior clearly violated
acceptable Christian behavior. In addition, Thompson’s actions proved unacceptable to many
colonists who frowned upon sexual relations with natives. After the investigation, Savage
expelled Thompson from Mount Vaughan and reported the affair to the Court of Inquiry, the
judicial body of Maryland in Liberia, for review. Although the court acquitted him, Thompson’s
case illustrated the conflicting agendas of each group. 70 The missionaries believed they were
responsible for the moral and spiritual welfare of the colony. They preached monogamy to the
Greboes, but such behavior by a colonist made it even more difficult to convince members of a
society that accepted polygamy. Thus, Thompson’s expulsion represented the desire to remove
examples contrary to Christian teachings. Thompson’s unanimous acquittal, on the other hand,
illustrated the colonists’ desire to handle their own affairs. The court found Thompson not guilty
69

African Repository, Vol. 1 (April 1825), 35; Gurley, Life of Ashmun, 111; Latrobe, History of Maryland
in Liberia, 21; Sigler, “Attitudes of Free Blacks,” Chapter 4; Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 19,
39.
70

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 2. Thomas Savage to Charles Snetter, September 15,
1837; George R. McGill to John Latrobe, December 25, 1837.

129

due to lack of evidence, even though the charges against him violated an informal moré of the
community. 71
The second, and more ominous, illustration of missionary-settler differences grew out of
disputes over property, theft and attempted embargos by the Greboes. Fearing an escalation of
tensions with the Greboes to the point of military conflict, the board of managers concluded that
the formation of a militia would curtail the aggressiveness of the Greboes at Cape Palmas. In
arriving at this decision, Latrobe and the MSCS relied on the advice of Americans visiting the
colony. Peace was still the objective, but Russwurm prepared for the worst. 72 Latrobe, however,
had determined by 1838 that there would never be peace between the two peoples, and the
MSCS needed to change its actions regarding the Greboes. Latrobe convinced the board of
managers to approve a proposal to buy out King Freeman and relocate the Greboes farther
inland. “The Board have determined,” he told Russwurm, “that it is best to get King Freeman to
move his town from off the Cape: and you are authorized to expend five hundred dollars in trade
goods at invoice price to accomplish this…this is now a most important matter. We want King
Freeman bought out and removed.” 73
The reality of colonization, the continuing conflict with the Greboes, and growing
criticism of the missionaries had forced Latrobe to abandon his initial agenda in the colony. To
him, colonization was becoming more important in the United States as abolitionists pushed
Congress to abolish the internal slave trade operating in the nation’s capital. Thus, he needed to
71
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expedite the growth of the colony. Removing the Greboes from Maryland territory would
remove a critical barrier. Repeated troubles with the Greboes had proved to Latrobe that he
could no longer hold onto notions that the colonists and indigenous Africans could become one
people, and it appeared that their fate was to become that of the Cherokee. Removal or
extermination seemed to be the only choices; Latrobe decided on removal. When asked about
the new policy with the Cape Palmas Grebo, Latrobe asserted that in the treaties of 1834, Grebo
leaders renounced their sovereignty as well as that of their people. Indeed, he noted, “the power
was given to the American governor to set all palavers, by which I understand in this connection,
to decide all questions.” 74 Removal would also have the benefit of curtailing the missionary
influence, if not the missionaries themselves, who he expected to follow the Greboes.
The missionaries were not aware of the change in policy although Wilson already
predicted that the colonists would eventually force the Greboes from Cape Palmas. The MSCS
authorized Governor Russwurm and his council to write new laws regulating military service in
the colony. Latrobe, himself a former commander of a militia unit in Baltimore, supported
Russwurm’s decision to require militia service from all male settlers aged sixteen to sixty,
including missionary employees. The governor stood firmly behind this decision even though he
was to “accord special solicitude to the missionary group” and their spiritual efforts. 75 Only then
did missionaries learn of the new policy, triggering yet another power struggle between
Russwurm and Wilson. Several settlers worked at the Fair Hope mission as well as two African
American missionaries who came to the colony with Wilson in 1834. When these two men
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failed to muster with the other settlers for military drills, Russwurm immediately fined them in
accordance with the regulations. Wilson appealed the penalty directly to the governor as well as
to his superiors and Latrobe. 76 Wilson argued that because the two men in question were
missionaries only, they were not subject to the laws of the colony, nor were they required to
perform military duty. 77 Russwurm countered that an exemption for these two individuals, who
in fact came not only as missionaries but as settlers, would encourage other colonists to seek
similar exemptions by working at the mission stations. Neither would concede, and the issue
was left to their superiors for resolution.
John Latrobe and Rufus Anderson presented the case to their respective governing
bodies. Wilson suggested that representatives in the mission stations in Africa carried the status
of foreign diplomats because of their independence from the MSCS and because they were not
legally associated with Maryland in Liberia. The real issue, as Latrobe saw it, was a challenge to
the authority of the colonial government. Wilson essentially suggested that anyone employed at
his mission was no longer subject to the laws of the colony. Latrobe agreed with Wilson’s
interpretation, except that these two missionaries were colonists. Furthermore, full diplomatic
immunity did not apply because the government of Maryland in Liberia owned the land where
the mission stations stood; this cession did not extend sovereignty to the missionaries within the
colony. Such a construction of immunity as Wilson urged failed as well because missionaries
were not representatives of a foreign government. The conclusion reached by Latrobe was that
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the two individuals did have to serve in the militia, but, more important, even employees who
left the United States specifically for missionary purposes in Africa were subject to the laws of
the colony. There was no immunity from the authority vested in Russwurm. 78 With this
decision, Latrobe hoped he would have no more difficulties with the missionaries, as their role in
the colony should be clear from this point forward.
Relations between the missionaries and colony officials remained tense throughout 1838
even though Latrobe assumed he had settled the issues. Latrobe’s desire for a colonial militia
and the removal of the Greboes, however, backfired after a violent incident involving the militia
and a small Grebo contingent. On the night of July 25, 1838 most of King Freeman’s town was
incinerated in a fire. The blaze drew people from miles around. Russwurm ordered guards
posted nearby as he presumed looting would occur if he was not vigilant. Early the next morning
the guards halted a small “body of armed Bush natives from the towns of Barroway,” near the
newest Maryland settlement of Mount Tubman. The guards allowed them to pass; believing
them harmless. Shortly thereafter, however, according to Russwurm, “they commenced a
murderous attack on the house of Ebin Parker who had been so rash as to shoot one, wounding
him in the shoulder, two or three days previously. Before any assistance could be rendered they
had succeeded in killing Parker and three of his children.” The attack was an act of revenge
against Parker for the altercation a few days earlier, and the fire provided an opportunity to exact
it. Unfortunately for Parker, the magistrate had failed to arrest him before the natives inflicted
their own justice. 79
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Through poor luck or just sheer coincidence, a small band of Grebo youths not connected
with the events at Ebin Parker’s home ran into a squad of militia after the assault. The
commander of the unit, none other than the former colony secretary, Charles Snetter, ordered the
young men to return to their towns. Snetter was unaware of what had happened at the Parker
residence. But before the youths could obey Snetter’s commands, another militia unit
approached at which point the young men fled. Snetter, alarmed by the suspicious behavior,
ordered his men to fire and three were hit. Two of the three died from their wounds
immediately. Russwurm, after his investigation, concluded that the entire incident could have
been avoided had the local magistrate carried out his orders. 80
The entire incident raised many unanswered questions. It was not clear why the three
young men ran when faced with two militia units. Nor did the inquiry resolve why Snetter gave
the order to fire so quickly, especially in light of the fact that he had no knowledge of the events
at the Parker home. Furthermore, the victims had not threatened physical confrontation with him
or his men. Instead, the evidence suggests that tensions between the colonists and Greboes
remained high, and that the colonists exhibited a negative attitude towards the natives.
Nevertheless, Charles Snetter found himself on trial for murder, perhaps to avoid any further
escalation in violence. The trial itself proved quite interesting. Snetter had served as secretary
under James Hall and he was also well liked by Wilson. When Russwurm arrived, he made
Snetter an offer to work in his administration managing the colonial store. Snetter declined in
favor of a position teaching at the Fair Hope mission under Wilson. Russwurm resented
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Snetter’s decision, particularly after he learned that the salary Wilson gave him was less than the
pay to manage the store. Despite Russwurm’s personal animosity toward Charles Snetter, he did
not excuse himself from the investigation. Instead, he ultimately concluded that the incident was
not an accident and that the officer in charge should be held accountable.
The trial divided the colony. Normally, the colonists were reluctant to convict their own,
but in this case Russwurm exacted a heavy punishment. Found guilty, Russwurm banished
Snetter from the colony, demanding that he leave on the next available vessel. Perhaps
Russwurm felt this was the only way to appease angry Greboes, but his decision most certainly
subjected him to the wrath of the settlers. Several colonists voiced their opposition to the ruling;
approximately fifty appealed the decision in a written statement to Latrobe. They even
petitioned the board of the MSCS to overturn the ruling. 81 The governor denounced them all,
particularly Snetter and his friends as nothing more than demagogues. “All are ignorant,” he
declared, “but these whose lives have been spent on plantations are deplorably so: they know
nothing_ + have to learn their social + political alphabet, as much as a child does his A.B.C.” 82
Russwurm’s decision mixed both personal feelings and politics. The conviction of the man in
charge of the soldiers that killed the Grebo youths most certainly appeased those demanding
justice. Russwurm also needed to resolve the situation as quickly as possible because the
destruction of King Freeman’s town provided just the opportunity for him to “buy out” the
Greboes. Unfortunately for Russwurm, he failed to achieve any of these objectives.
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This entire incident brought the sharpest criticism yet from the missionaries. Wilson had
already begun his public denunciation of colonization in the American press after losing his bout
with Russwurm over military service by mission employees. The killing of Africans only
reinforced his belief that colonization could not achieve its goals because the settlers were too
hostile to coexist with the indigenous people. Latrobe defended Russwurm’s decisions on all
fronts. Latrobe wrote the missionaries that Wilson had no authority in the colony and that he
was there only by the acquiescence of the MSCS. He also chastised the missionaries for their
careless and negative correspondence sent to the United States. Colonization had “unfriend
enough” without adding the missionaries within our borders. 83
Latrobe next appealed directly to the ABCFM to stop Wilson’s charges that colonization
was actually a friend of the slave trade. Wilson wrote that there were still at least two slave
“factories” operated by Pedro Blanco and Theodore Canot, near the Liberian colonies. 84 He also
suggested that the United States government end the façade of colonization and take over the
colonies just as the British government had done with Sierra Leone to the north of Liberia.
Latrobe scoffed at Wilson’s assertions knowing that the United States Constitution prohibited
America from holding colonies. Maryland in Liberia would remain under the direction of the
MSCS “so long as it is the interest of the colonies to be submissive to the societies here.” 85
As for the settlers challenging Russwurm, Latrobe devised a plan to deal with them too.
In a confidential letter to Russwurm, Latrobe wrote of his desire to make the executive of
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Maryland in Liberia “very strong.” Latrobe had hoped that the republican institutions designed
for the colony, the method of settlement, and missionary cooperation would avoid the very
problems then plaguing the colony. In short, the MSCS was solidifying its position against all
opposition from within the colony. Because the colonists refused to obey the decisions of the
court and “the constitutional decrees of the Executive_ there must be a power to make [them]
obeyed and respected_ otherwise instead of a government of laws we will have anarchy ruling
the colony.” Latrobe proposed the formation of “a force in the colony paid by the colony, under
the control of the executive and dependant upon it, whose duty it shall be the preservation of
order,_ the custody of the public property…and the carrying into effect when the civil force is
insufficient the laws of the colony and the mandates of the executive.” 86 But the society’s
financial problems delayed implementation for a year. Latrobe finally acted on these ideas in
November of 1839. He wanted to create a separate force, independent of all power except that of
the governor, because the settlers were already members of the militia. The government could
not rely on the militia to quell a rebellion by settlers. American experience, specifically the
different outcomes of the Whiskey Rebellion and Shay Rebellion, had demonstrated the value of
such a force as he intended to create. Further, he wanted to prevent any more bloodshed between
the Greboes and colonists. “Our object is not to affect the civil rights we have granted in the
charter, but to ensure the peaceable enjoyment of them, by putting it out of the power of evil
designed men to create disturbances by imposing upon the ignorant.” 87 The problem here for
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Latrobe and Russwurm was that the society did not have the resources to carry out such a plan at
that moment.
Wilson’s disapproval of Maryland in Liberia led him to begin searching for a new site for
his operations by 1839. The Fair Hope mission, however, continued at Cape Palmas until 1843
and so did the conflicts between the missionaries and colonial authorities. During that four-year
period the issue of military service resurfaced when Russwurm attempted to make Grebo males
at the missionary station serve in the militia. Wilson argued that the governor’s authority did not
extend to the Grebo at his mission, who were not residents of the colony. Moreover, it was
immoral to call on them to fight against their own people. 88 Latrobe moved to halt this
controversy immediately. Writing to both Wilson and Russwurm, he cited the original treaty
with the Greboes, which showed that the natives, regardless of circumstances, were subject to
military service because they were residents within the limits of Maryland in Liberia. Survival
of the colony depended on its defensive capabilities, and its numbers were only about five
hundred. Those Greboes within the limits of the colony were indeed subject to the laws
regulating military duty as an obligation of all citizens. However, the benefits of citizenship did
not extend the right to those subjects to vote for elected officials or hold government offices. 89
Latrobe’s clearly contradictory arguments only exacerbated the problems between Wilson and
Russwurm. Nevertheless, Wilson lost this argument too.
The final episode between the missionaries and colonists came in 1842, after which the
missionaries under J. Leighton Wilson left the colony for a location along the Gabon River.
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During July, about $350 of trade goods were stolen from the Fair Hope mission. The whole
situation was handled poorly, most likely because Wilson was absent during the incident.
Wilson’s assistant, A.E. Griswold, accused the Grebo residents of a nearby town of pilfering the
goods. Rather than seek the governor’s help in apprehending the perpetrators, Griswold
appealed directly to the captain of the U.S.S. Vandalia. 90 Why exactly Griswold did so is
unclear, but it was due perhaps to the mission’s strained relationship with Governor Russwurm.
Past experience left the missionaries bitter, and Griswold concluded that no justice would be
achieved by appealing to Russwurm. Since the missionaries were foreigners still claiming the
status of diplomats, they could legally appeal to the Navy for help as United States citizens. The
African Squadron, as it was known, was authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to assist
Americans in Africa, but was prohibited from interfering in the relations of the colonists and the
indigenous population. 91 This case did not conform to those guidelines; the missionaries were
not colonists.
Latrobe, the MSCS, and the colonists had long desired a relationship with the United
States Navy. As in the case of the missionaries and the relationship with the Greboes, Latrobe
and the others presumed that protection of Americans by the navy was beneficial to the colony.
This was yet another ironic twist. African Americans colonizing Africa were worthy of military
protection, a protection they could not rely on in America. Latrobe and Russwurm encouraged
the connection believing that the presence of vessels of war would have a salutary influence on
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the natives. 92 The captain of the Vandalia sent forces ashore where they issued an ultimatum to
King Freeman declaring that if the offenders were not delivered along with the goods he would
fire on the town. This action was surprising considering that the mission had previously been on
good terms with Freeman. Things continued to escalate as Russwurm intervened. The governor
argued that the missionaries had acted rashly; they should have appealed to him and not
American servicemen. What he really objected to was outside interference by naval forces. 93
The incident was eventually resolved without the use of force by the navy, although the
threat of force was a major factor in extracting restitution from King Freeman. The peaceful
outcome, however, was not the most important point illustrated by this tussle in Maryland in
Liberia. The whole history of problems with the missionaries led to a change in policy by the
MSCS regarding the Fair Hope missionaries. Latrobe issued an ultimatum demanding that the
missionaries conform to all MSCS authorities or leave the colony. Wilson, after returning to Fair
Hope, made it clear that he would not remain in the colony as he saw no way for achieving his
goals alongside those of the MSCS. In fact he had concluded, “that the colored people of the
U. S. can never be raised to any considerable morals or intellectual worth unless they are
colonized to themselves.” 94 In the end, Wilson and the Fair Hope missionaries left the colony in
1843 pushing Maryland in Liberia into a new phase of its history.
The whole episode greatly upset Latrobe but served to illustrate how Latrobe’s
presumptions about colonization in Africa and his conflicting policies for the colony contributed
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to the problems and forced him to reassess and change his goals. Writing to Rufus Anderson of
the ABCFM, Latrobe lodged his protest over the missionaries’ failure to ask “protection from the
government under which they lived…avowing a determination not to ask such protection, the aid
of strangers to our government in Africa was involved and the consequences are as stated in the
testimony.” Latrobe continued chastising the missionaries when he stated that he could not “find
any palliation for conduct which so ill becomes the sacred character of your messengers of God’s
mercy to the heathen.” 95 Latrobe’s suggestion that the missionaries should leave the colony if
the ABCFM could not control them was not sufficient to abate Latrobe’s wrath as he felt the
need to express his disapproval to the Secretary of the Navy too. To the honorable secretary,
Abel P. Upshur, he wrote that the officers of the Vandalia had held some “sort of drum head
court martial, not over the thieves, but over the poor old negro, called king Freeman…and
sentenced him to pay so many bullocks + croos of rice as an arbitrary valuation of missionary
losses guessed at by the parties.” While admitting that Captain Ramsey may not have intended
to “act with discourtesy or unkindness,” he had nonetheless acted inappropriately. The issue was
one of internal affairs in the colony, and in the future it should be handled as such. 96
The great irony here was that the situation was mostly the result of actions taken by
Latrobe and MSCS officials. It had long been in the making. Furthermore, asserting that the
United States Navy had no reason to interfere, even at the request of American citizens, went
against his own correspondence to previous Navy secretaries and officers in the West African
Squadron because he often referred to the colonies as American possessions. American military
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presence, for Latrobe, was only desirable when it was useful to Maryland in Liberia’s agenda,
and not welcome otherwise. Finally, this situation illustrates the duality of MSCS policy in
determining the status of the Grebo and Latrobe’s internalization of American race relations.
Latrobe chided the secretary for the way Captain Ramsey treated “the poor old Negro, King
Freeman,” which clearly showed his adoption of paternalistic behavior so characteristic of
southern slaveholders. But Latrobe had also played the inverse of the paternalistic master as he
had condoned the policy of forcing the Grebo leader to account for the actions of his subjects.
This had been policy under Maryland in Liberia’s government since James Hall was the
governor. One must conclude, then, that the real issue for Latrobe and Russwurm on this
occasion was the interference of outside forces, which imputed weakness on the part of
Maryland in Liberia.
Many of the conflicts that occurred in Maryland in Liberia during its first nine years were
in fact caused by the inconsistent policies implemented by the MSCS as well as the misreading
of cultural conflicts and the political situation in the United States and Liberia. All of the MSCS
members assumed that the colonists and Greboes would amalgamate into one people. They did
not. Latrobe in particular assumed that the presence of the missionaries would not only further
his colonization goals, but also that they would help keep relations peaceful while further
westernizing the Greboes. They did not. Instead, the missionary presence evolved into one of
the greatest sources of difficulty for the governor of the colony and the MSCS president as
J. Leighton Wilson repeatedly challenged the power of both. Finally, the U.S. Navy became
involved in the affairs of the colony, which contradicted the policy of both the MSCS and the
United States. The aid the navy gave to the colonies of Liberia, including Maryland in Liberia,
gave credence to the assertion that these colonies were under the control of the U.S. as well as
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further solidifying in the minds of indigenous Africans that the colonists had no intention of
becoming one people with them. Finally, the presence of the African Squadron would help
Maryland in Liberia move into its next phase as Commodore Matthew Perry used his command
to aid Russwurm in bringing the Greboes under the rule of the colony.
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Chapter 5: “Hear me for my cause”: the Politics of Colonization and Abolition in the
United States: Part One, 1834-1843
The realities of colonization in Africa were far different from the ideals envisioned by
Latrobe and his colleagues in Maryland. The repeated troubles between the settlers and
indigenous peoples, the differing agendas of the MSCS and the missionaries, and the military
presence of international powers forced Latrobe and the MSCS to alter their policies in Africa.
Yet success in Africa depended on more than resolving the colony’s problems and the unification
of the numerous parties involved in Maryland in Liberia. Colonization was a movement that
encompassed two fronts. While Latrobe dealt with the colony’s problems, a debate flared in the
United States over slavery and its future as well as the final status of African Americans. The
colonization movement, at the state and national level, inevitably joined in this political fight,
particularly after the formation of the American Antislavery Society late in 1833. The assault on
the institution of slavery had only just begun and John Latrobe, whether he wanted to or not, had
to carve out a place for his colonization plans within the national debate. Latrobe chose to
follow what he and others described as a middle path of action designed to give colonization the
best chance for success in Maryland while alleviating rising tensions throughout the Union. His
task in the United States, however, proved quite difficult. The actions of the MSCS in the fight
over slavery in the United States and Latrobe’s attempts to promote and defend the Maryland
Plan as the one solution to all questions regarding slavery and African Americans are the
subjects of this chapter.
By the time the MSCS established its colony in Africa in 1834, the debate over slavery
was becoming increasingly antagonistic and violent. The division of opinions on the subject
widened after the Missouri Compromise of 1820, but the fastest growing and most feared
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segment seemed to be those calling for immediate abolition. That many thought the institution
repulsive cannot be denied. Hostility to the institution of slavery, however, changed the position
of many southerners as their defense of slavery evolved from the “necessary evil” argument used
before the Virginia Debates of 1832 to that put forth by John C. Calhoun’s “positive good”
speech before the Senate in 1837. 1 Yet not all Americans saw it this way. The Virginia Debates
of 1832 showed clearly, that in the Upper South, the feelings about slavery and the need to
defend it as critical to southern culture was not universal. Most knew that they had to tread
softly on the subject of slavery because it was a delicate issue, which inflamed men’s passions.2
This was even more evident after the issue of states’ rights burst onto the national scene during
the Nullification Crisis of 1832-3. Nevertheless, a new generation opposed to slavery, more
active and bold, emerged under the leadership of men such as Benjamin Lundy, Arthur Tappan,
Thomas Weld, and William Lloyd Garrison. Deep South defenders of slavery followed the likes
of Calhoun, and their newest hero, James Henry Hammond. 3
Increasing agitation by abolitionists, especially those seeking immediate emancipation,
led the MSCS to further define its goals and position relative to slavery. Latrobe saw himself as
1
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a southern man, and as such, he was a strong believer in the doctrine of states’ rights. The
institution of slavery, no matter how repugnant to his or anyone else’s sensibilities, was beyond
the rule of the federal Congress. Nor could northern states interfere within the boundaries of
slaveholding states. Such a stance did not make Latrobe unusual, as many northerners shared
that belief. 4 Northern activism to end slavery in the South only led to a more rigid defensive
posture by southerners. This belief was a guiding principle for Latrobe when it came to slavery
and colonization. Latrobe and the MSCS adopted
a rule to avoid interfering by word or deed with the subject of slavery in other
states. When each state thus holds colonization in its own keeping it will cease to
be an object of dislike or apprehension to any one of them: It will no longer be the
pretence for raising the cry of interference on the part of the North with the
slavery of the South, which has already excited such angry feelings, and which
threatened at one time to jeopardize the continuance of the Union itself. 5
Efforts by abolitionists only made southerners hostile to both abolition and colonization because
they violated the sovereignty of southern states. Furthermore, Latrobe did not want to attack
slaveholders as a group because the MSCS counted on them to free their slaves for colonization
in the near future. Aggravating them only worked against the long-term objective of
colonization.
Latrobe understood the problems associated with slavery and why many opposed the
institution; he opposed it as well. His disgust with the institution became clear in the fall of 1834
when he toured Louisiana and the Deep South. His anxiety was due primarily to the fact that
both his father and brother had died from fever while working in New Orleans. Somewhat of a
hypochondriac, he feared that he may suffer the same fate. Taking advantage of an opportunity
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to leave the city to visit a sugar plantation, Latrobe went to see sugar production first hand. This
was the first time he had ever seen the process, which relied on slave labor. He marveled at the
process, the mechanical aspects of the mill no doubt arousing his engineering interests. But
slavery overshadowed his enjoyment: “The melancholy recollection however that the many were
labouring for the one in the very worst form of servitude—Negro slavery, destroyed the zest with
which I would otherwise have enjoyed the new scene before me.” 6 While slavery personally
repulsed Latrobe, he, like most southerners, recognized that the Constitution protected the
peculiar institution. He also realized the need to distance himself and the MSCS from
abolitionists. He wrote a friend that “I would not have you think however that I am one of those
fanatics who would, if possible procure immediate abolition throughout the land.” No matter
how much he detested slavery it was “recognized by the laws” and none could interfere with it
unless the masters consented. Plus he, like Jefferson, feared the effect that emancipating
thousands of slaves at one time would have on his society. A race war would surely take place. 7
The plan he suggested, and the MSCS followed, kept these concerns in mind.
Independent state action tried to lessen conflict between the supporters of slavery and
abolition, which increased with every passing year. Conflict escalated with the number of antislavery petitions Congress received each session beginning in 1835. The wave of memorials
asking Congress to interfere in some aspect of slavery, whether with the slave trade or slaves in
the nation’s capitol had actually begun years earlier. Such petitions were almost always left
without discussion after being read on the floor of the House. Marylanders were not strangers to
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this process either. In 1827 Congressman John Barney presented a petition written by Benjamin
Lundy and signed by several Baltimoreans requesting that the children of slaves born in
Washington be free thereafter. 8 Southerners insisted that petitions that found their way on to the
floor of the House of Representatives or Senate be ignored, but the petitions continued. In 1828
the citizens of Washington petitioned Congress on the basis that “The People of the District
have, within themselves, no means of legislative redress, and we, therefore, appeal to your
honorable body, as the only one invested by the American Constitution with the power to relieve
us.” They continued by asking Congress to provide some gradual means of ending slavery in the
capitol. 9 They sent a similar petition in 1829.
The unique status of Washington, D. C. provided a point of weakness which those
wanting to end slavery could attack. Many conceded that Congress could not interfere with
slavery in the individual states, but it could in the District of Columbia because no state claimed
jurisdiction there. Colonizationists used this logic to renew attempts at enlisting Congressional
aid in their plan. In 1830, Charles Fenton Mercer introduced a bill in Congress that would have
provided $50,000 to the American Colonization Society for transporting emigrants to Liberia.
Deep South states quickly objected. Members of the Maryland Legislature responded by arguing
that Congress could do so by using the “general welfare clause” of the Constitution. 10 The
majority did not agree with Maryland or the petitioners of the District of Columbia, thus neither
gained any support from Congress.
8

Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s
Relations to Slavery, completed by Ward M. McAfee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 68.
9

Doc. No. 215, House of Reps. 20th congress, 1st session “Memorial of the Inhabitants of the District of
Columbia praying for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia,” March 24, 1828 (Washington:
Gales & Staton), 3.
10

Maryland State Archives (online), MSA SC3170, pp. 186-189
(http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/000050/html/m59-0045.html ).

148

The failure of these early attempts to penetrate the armor of slavery in Congress may
have discouraged those wanting to end slavery, but it hardly curbed their zeal or efforts. The
formation of the American Antislavery Society and cries for immediate abolition raised the level
of confrontation at the beginning of Congressional sessions in 1835. During the winter session
of the twenty-third Congress New Englanders presented several petitions regarding slavery.
Influenced by the likes of William Lloyd Garrison, citizens from Maine and Vermont sent
petitions to their representatives in Washington. On February 16, 1835, a Maine Congressman
presented a memorial from the citizens of Waterville “praying Congress to pass a law prohibiting
slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia.” The Honorable Horace Everett of
Vermont followed this with another petition from his state asking for the same thing. Just as
with earlier petitions, the basis of the argument was that Congress was the only body with the
power to do so in Washington. Furthermore, it was a national disgrace to see an institution such
as slavery continued near the halls of the most democratic government in history. 11
The strategy of abolition was to start small, attacking slavery at its weakest link. To
many, that link was Washington. Defenders of slavery noted this too, arguing the opposite point,
that if slavery was forced out of the capital, it was only a matter of time before it ended
throughout the Union. The House of Representatives in 1835 read the petitions and referred
them to the Committee for the District of Columbia, knowing that they would make it no
further. 12 The twenty-fourth Congress repeated this scene when it came into session in
December of 1835, tabling the petitions by a vote of 180 yeas and 31 nays. The vote well
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illustrated the ‘slave power.’ With the help of northern doughfaces, southern Congressmen had
no trouble dismissing the northern antislavery petitions. 13 Two days later, on December 18,
1835, the representatives from Massachusetts followed with more petitions. This time, the
freshman representative from South Carolina, James H. Hammond, moved that the petitions not
be received yet alone read on the House floor. 14 Hammond had heard enough and refused to let
northerners further impugn the South in the House of Representatives. Much more aggressive in
his defense of slavery than John C. Calhoun had been, Hammond argued that it was time that
Congress stop indulging these inflammatory requests. His motion to stop receiving antislavery
petitions not only caused a controversy because the right of petition was protected by the
Constitution; the move also broke the traditional response the House of Representatives made to
memorials asking for abolition. His proposal sparked a debate that eventually led to the first
“gag rule” regarding antislavery petitions demanding an end to slavery in the District of
Columbia. 15 The motion by Representative Hammond led southerner to see him as their
protector and it also marked a new stage in the debate over slavery. No longer would the South
stand for political interference with clear states’ rights and property issues.
Hammond’s unusual request originated in the mass mailings abolitionists sent to the
South via the federal postal service during the summer of 1835. A large number of these
pamphlets were sent to Charleston, South Carolina in July. Charleston residents responded to
this outrage by storming the post office and burning the mail. The repercussions of this direct
assault on slavery went far beyond this act, however. Such agitation further hardened the
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division between the North and South as well as the division over slavery emerging within the
South. Those in the lower South began to see Northerners as meddlers who actually hurt the
cause of emancipation by making slaveholders reluctant to free their chattels. South Carolinians
in particular also accused those in the Upper South of being traitors because Maryland and
Virginia had so publicly declared in 1832 that slavery would eventually end. Hammond’s “gag
rule” would theoretically end the agitation by not bringing the issue of abolition up at all in
Congress. Hammond’s arguments received enough sympathy that Congress enacted the first gag
rule in 1836, which prohibited the reading of abolitionist petitions. 16
The gag rule in Congress alleviated the fears of some slaveholders. Nevertheless,
slaveholders remained vigilant against the agitation of abolitionists as members of the MSCS
soon discovered. “I assure you, sir,” wrote a slaveholder to MSCS agent John Kennard, “that I
feel it to be the duty of every slave holder to use his best exertions to prevent Abolition from
depriving him of any rights, privileges or advantages whatever.” 17 The consequence of political
agitation in the South, then, was a determination by southerners to resist every effort touching
slavery. This rigidity of mind, Latrobe’s confidants assured him, could be found among
northerners too. “The spirit of abolitionism, the fierceness + craft of which, we have had to
encounter at every step, has created groundless + stupid prejudices against the South en
masse.” 18 Any effort that touched upon the possible end of slavery thus set off controversy.
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Unfortunately for Latrobe, this hostility extended to colonization as both sides saw
colonization as the agent of the other. To the Deep South, colonization efforts in Maryland and
Virginia, the states where it had the strongest support, was nothing more than an attempt to
diffuse slavery. Diffusion was the cowardly way out of the quandary over slavery. Partly, this
assessment grew out of the seemingly abolitionist tone of the printed communications coming
out of colonization societies like the MSCS. Latrobe’s closest friend and fellow colonizationist,
Charles Harper, hinted to the public that it was in fact the purpose of colonization generally to
end slavery. MSCS members must “act upon the belief, that Colonization has a tendency to
promote emancipation…and so inducing masters to manumit, for removal to Africa, who would
not manumit unconditionally.” 19 To those from Deep South states like South Carolina
colonizationists appeared to be traitors, especially when Harper said it “cannot be denied that the
coloured is the injured race.” 20 This was not a radical departure for the MSCS; the society had
always proclaimed its purpose was to make Maryland a non-slaveholding state by gradual
means. Slaveholders, however, no longer distinguished between immediate and gradual
emancipation; both were an attack on their personal rights.
Colonization also faced opponents in the North especially among northern abolitionists.
Even the “Maryland scheme whose benevolence + success would seem to defy all opposition, is
denounced here with unmeasured malignity,” according to one colonizationist. 21 With the
formation of the American Antislavery Society the abolitionist movement split between
immediate abolitionists and gradual emancipationists. Those demanding an immediate end to
19
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slavery, while in the minority, not only politicized the issue of slavery nationally, but succeeded
in politicizing colonization too. Following William Lloyd Garrison, extreme abolitionists
attacked colonization in 1832. Garrison’s Thoughts on African Colonization made several
charges against the national society based primarily on its refusal to oppose slavery. Garrison
argued that the ACS, in fact, actually strengthened slavery by its recognition of slaves as
property, and its aim to remove only free blacks inflated the price and made slavery more secure.
“In short, it [the ACS] is the most compendious and best adapted scheme to uphold the slave
system that human ingenuity can invent.” 22 ACS members as well as some gradual
emancipationists defended colonization, arguing that a plan involving immediate, unconditional
abolition, such as that advocated by Garrison “would without doubt, be inexpedient and
dangerous. The change must be effected gradually, to be safe or useful…Slave holders at the
South have in various instances declared their entire willingness, nay, their anxious desire to
manumit their slaves…all that is wanting is the zealous action of the North” in support of
colonization. 23
The attention that both colonization and slavery received nationally was one of the
reasons that Marylanders pushed separate state action. State action, Latrobe assumed, would
remove the scheme from the national political arena along with the objections to colonization
noted by Garrison. Latrobe observed the increasing political division among even the supporters
of colonization in January of 1834. He, perhaps more than any other colonizationist in
Maryland, recognized that the politicization of colonization had the potential to doom the effort
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and the Union. 24 He misjudged the mood of anti-colonization sentiments, however, as
abolitionists turned their attention toward the MSCS after it established a colony at Cape Palmas.
As with the national society, the leader in opposing the MSCS was William Lloyd Garrison.
Garrison believed that the “subject of American Slavery is one of paramount interest and
importance to every American citizen. Its bearing on the character and future destiny of the
nation—on the purity and permanency of our free institutions—is such as makes it a matter of
common concernment; and attention to it, and its proper remedy, a matter of common obligation
and duty.” 25 Latrobe agreed but also noted that the nation’s expansion promised to give further
life to slavery. The success of the cotton growing states would make abolition more difficult.
Where he diverged from Garrison was in how to achieve it. 26
Latrobe also disagreed with Garrison’s emphasis on abolition. One problem abolitionists
had with colonizationists was their refusal to make the end of slavery their primary mission. 27
This, Latrobe argued, only caused more division as many slaveholders supported the ACS. “Any
attempt on the part of the north to procure the avowal, in the Parent Society, of principles
obnoxious to the South, could only succeed after a bitter contest, and would if successful be
followed by the withdrawal of nearly all, if not all, the Slaveholding States from any
participation in the general design; which the success of the South in such a contest would
perhaps be followed by the North’s withholding that assistance which it had heretofore so
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liberally afforded.” 28 Latrobe remained convinced in the wake of immediate emancipationists’
attacks that the plan presented by the MSCS offered the best possible solution by proposing a
middle path to end slavery: state colonization societies controlling the movement within each
slave state, assisted monetarily by the free northern states, could end slavery peacefully and
without objections by southerners.
Latrobe’s moderate stance, similar to the tactics used by Henry Clay in abating crises
threatening the Union, faced a severe challenge as Garrison had just returned from England,
where he received high praise as the head of American abolition. Garrison’s new status gave
added momentum to the push for immediate emancipation. The timing was critical for
abolitionists in the United States who wanted to capitalize on Britain’s 1833 decision to abolish
slavery in its West Indian colonies and all others. Garrison took advantage of the wave of
enthusiasm for the cause to push the New York City Anti-Slavery Society and its leadership,
none more prominent than Arthur Tappan, to call for a convention to form a national society.
Coincidently, the move and resulting formation of the American Anti-Slavery Society saved
Garrison and his paper, the Liberator, from financial ruin. It also made him one of the most
hated men in the country as southerners immediately thought of him when abolition was
mentioned. 29
With the formation of the American Anti-slavery Society, Garrison’s attacks on
colonization extended to the MSCS. He had already publicized his disapproval of the national
society in 1832. The editor of the Liberator next published a pamphlet entitled The Maryland
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Scheme of Expatriation Examined in early 1834. No doubt his hostility to the Maryland scheme
was partly influenced by his imprisonment in Baltimore a few years earlier when he worked with
Benjamin Lundy to promote abolition in the state. Garrison labeled the Maryland scheme as the
“most atrocious oppression” conceivable because colonization was linked to the removal of
blacks from the state through fines and imprisonment. Much of Garrison’s antipathy for the
Maryland colonization movement focused on the laws passed by Maryland after Nat Turner’s
Rebellion in 1831, which led the state to incorporate the Maryland Colonization Society. These
laws had less to do with colonization than with a response to fears lingering after Turner’s
Rebellion. The state turned to colonization because of its tendency to end slavery gradually and
peacefully. State legislators assumed that by preventing slaves from being brought into the state
and requiring their removal after emancipation, Maryland could diffuse slavery away until there
were so few slaves a general emancipation could be executed. Nevertheless, Garrison
condemned both the state and the society because the laws required involuntary removal. 30
Garrison characterized the whole plan as “the cold-hearted and bloody design of
extermination,” abolishing slavery only by getting rid of blacks completely. 31 Garrison also took
the MSCS to task on its efforts to occupy the middle ground that Latrobe used to define state
action. Latrobe argued that state action was preferable because it removed slavery and
colonization from the national arena. Garrison, however, determined that independent state
action should be rejected because it was “a middle ground—a resting place! What is this but
saying it is effectual to check the progress of public sentiment, and thus stand between it and the
abolition of slavery?” Garrison wrote:
30
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Colonizationists, and especially the Maryland Colonizationist, does stand in the
breach, to keep off the abolitionists, and if he would only give up his colonizing
schemes and get out of the way, the question would be brought to issue at once,
and then the slaveholder would not find an advocate in the literature, or the public
opinion, or religion of the whole world; and if he did not go for abolition, the
abolitionist would be upon him. 32
Garrison’s position was a moral, not a political, one. He ignored the growing rigidity of the
South. In fact, he matched it. Furthermore, he ignored the fact that Maryland really was a
middle ground between slavery and freedom, as well as between an agrarian society and an
emerging free-labor industrialized one. For Maryland, independent state action was aimed
specifically at avoiding the tensions growing out of the fight to end slavery, which slowly
engulfed the nation. To colonizationist C. C. Harper,
It is evident…that the vicinity of non-slave holding States has a powerful
tendency to induce a similar condition of things in any adjoining slave-holding
State; whether by example, or by the superiority thus exhibited of free labour over
the labour of slaves…Of this fact we may satisfy ourselves by remarking that in
those counties of Maryland that bound on Pennsylvania there are comparatively
few slaves, but in those that border on Virginia a great many; and that the slave
population, sparse in Delaware and here, becomes more and more numerous and
compact in your descent towards the South…If then we earnestly design to
attempt the eradication of slavery from our country, we must proceed from the
north, where it is weaker and more manageable, to the south, where it is more
firm and obstinate; commencing with this State, which is the frontier of the
deplorable system. 33
Maryland’s middle ground was caught in a trap; colonization was too slow for Garrison’s
immediate emancipation, but hard-line southerners saw Upper South colonizationists as traitors
for not supporting their society. Under these circumstances, the MSCS worked to broaden its
support. At the insistence of John Latrobe and Charles Harper, it proposed the creation of
“Societies for the purpose of aiding the Maryland State Colonization Society” in its efforts to
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render Maryland a non-slaveholding State. This plan hoped to create MSCS auxiliary societies
in northern states, particularly New England. By doing so, Latrobe assumed that the true nature
of the Maryland plan would be correctly presented to northerners. Converts to the Maryland
scheme of colonization would form aid societies that would contribute financially to the MSCS,
giving the movement much needed additional resources. This would also encourage those
wanting to end slavery to participate directly while avoiding direct confrontations with
slaveholders. Aid societies would further be useful in countering the anti-colonization spirit
coming from the abolition camp. If successful, the agenda of the MSCS would compete for the
supporters of the American Antislavery Society by promising a decrease in sectional tensions,
which ultimately would save the Union as other states adopted the Maryland plan to become free
states. 34
Latrobe miscalculated, however, just as he had with the realities of colonizing Africa.
His efforts to reduce sectional tensions and create auxiliaries drew little support in the north.
Latrobe’s attempts to gain even minimal financial aid for the cause of the MSCS in the northern
states proved difficult. His experiences in the summer of 1833 should have convinced him of
this. Apathy if not outright resistance to the idea of independent state action continued even after
the establishment of Maryland in Liberia. The MSCS’ failure to hire an agent to represent the
society in the North provided another illustration of northern resistance to the plan. The best that
the MSCS could manage in northern states until 1836 was a part-time agent. Even the Board of
Foreign Missions, which had set up missions in Maryland in Liberia, tried to avoid a full
association or the appearance of one with the Maryland colonization society in New England.
Rufus Anderson felt that “no good would be gained by publicly associating ourselves or any of
34

MSCS Papers, I. Minutes, reel 1. June 9, 1834.

158

our missionaries with any existing colonization society. On the contrary, it would soon cripple
our power of aiding you directly or indirectly.” 35 The Maryland plan had indeed received a cool
reception in New England.
Stephen Wynkoop, formerly associated with the Fair Hope mission in Cape Palmas, did
what he could as a temporary MSCS agent in New England, but he faced numerous difficulties.
His experiences illustrated exactly why the MSCS failed to produce auxiliaries in northern states,
and suggested that hostility to the plan grew from both the agitation of abolitionists and those
loyal to the American Colonization Society. The course of action Latrobe should pursue in New
England required
the right kind of man_ a fearless, bold man, a zealous, fluent, eloquent, and very
persistent man. The plans of your Soc. meet the approbation of the N. Eng.
people_ but then the abolitionists will oppose your agent with ten fold bitterness.
The Maryland Soc. on account of its intrinsic excellence is a very eye sore to
abolitionists. Could your society be crushed they would mount a citadel and cry
victory!_ Then again the real and tried friends of colonization feel a reluctance in
withdrawing from the old society. 36
As Wynkoop indicated, the MSCS had to deal with more in the northern states than abolitionists.
Several state colonization societies opposed the move by Maryland too. One New York
colonizationist explained that even
though many of us, + myself of the number, regard your state effort as worthy of
all praise + would personally rejoice if we could throw our whole efforts, funds, +
prayers into the scale in behalf of Cape Palmas, yet it would be impossible for us
here to accomplish any thing, should we take that step. True we do but little
indeed in our present union with the Pennsylvania society, in comparison with
what ought to be expected of our great city + state, yet that little would be lost to
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the cause, should we even seem to be in league with a slaveholding state. Such is
the fact of the case, however much we may + do regret it. 37
The subjects of slavery, abolition, and colonization had become so polarizing by 1836
that the mere hint of association with slavery by northerners was enough to destroy any
colonization society. The message was clear to Latrobe; he could not unify antislavery and
colonization sentiment through auxiliary societies. He could not even count on any significant
aid from the north. Still, he hoped to avoid the confrontation Garrison predicted if
colonizationists stepped aside. To Latrobe, the plan he and the MSCS were pursuing was the
only one that could preserve the Union.
Abolitionist efforts had clearly affected the support of colonization, and Latrobe’s refusal
to respond gave the charges legitimacy. In fact, Latrobe’s feelings about the attack made on his
society are conspicuously missing from his voluminous correspondence and his personal
writings. His general feelings can only be implied from letters written to him. The society’s one
representative in New England, Stephen R. Wynkoop, frequently corresponded with Latrobe
about his instructions and the progress of the cause there. On one occasion Wynkoop
encountered a less than friendly group of abolitionists in Boston as he made his rounds on behalf
of the society. The effect of Garrison was obvious to him.
Mr. Garrison has resorted to the blackest and foulest means of slandering the
Maryland Scheme of colonization. He has taken your laws, adopted for your own
necessity against your colored population, and connected them with your scheme
of colonization; and thus has tried, and with a good deal of success to impress the
community with the belief, that these laws were enacted expressly to drive your
blacks into the plans of colonization. 38
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Of course other northern states had laws seeking to keep blacks outside their borders, but
Wynkoop concluded that Latrobe’s refusal to respond gave credence to the charges leveled by
Garrison. Wynkoop made an impassioned plea for Latrobe to take Garrison on publicly. The
people of New England “are not disposed to favor Garrisonianism, few, surprisingly few…have
connected themselves with the antis. They hate them as bad as you do_ and yet they are
paralyzed. Charge after charge of blackest hue has been reiterated against you and no reply, or
refutation being made, some have thought there might be truths among these charges.” 39
Still, Latrobe continued to promote colonization as he had done, choosing not to
exacerbate the antagonistic feelings already existing between north and south. Instead, he
remained silent; relying on the colonization journal the society began publishing in the spring of
1835 to win supporters for the organization and plan. Latrobe suggested to one confidant that if
Maryland failed, “I see nothing but a chaos, frightful with the elements of abolition,
amalgamation, extirpation and disunion.” 40 This was one reason why so many opposed abolition
without the removal of slaves. Latrobe, Maryland colonizationists, and most white Americans
equated the demand for immediate abolition with amalgamation. This was one of the key
differences between colonization and abolition. The MSCS wanted to end slavery but the
members doubted that in the climate that existed in America blacks would be given social or
political equality once slavery was abolished.
This incomplete emancipation could only betray them at some future period to
assert an equality of rights, which would produce a struggle that no man sincerely
bent on doing good can desire to see ensue, even though he believe it might
possibly be successful. To manumit great numbers of them suddenly would
39
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therefore be not only a serious nuisance to society, but a false and mistaken mercy
to themselves. To manumit them at all, however, gradually, without removing
them, would but consign them to the same fate by degrees. Most abolitionists, I
know, disclaim amalgamation. But if the end of abolition be equality, abolition
were incomplete, it seems to me, without amalgamation. 41
Nevertheless, abolitionists successfully challenged colonization. Latrobe and the MSCS board
finally realized that they must adopt at least some of the strategies of other societies, including
the abolitionists themselves.
Within Maryland, colonizationists claimed that abolition had little effect on the
movement and that the MSCS was having a positive impact. Unlike the rest of the country,
Latrobe asserted at the colonization society’s annual meeting in 1836 that Maryland was free of
“the excitement which, during the past year, has agitated the country at large on the subject of
slavery.” 42 The actions of the society, however, indicate that Maryland was far from being free
of the very agitation that was occurring elsewhere. The MSCS had already changed its policy in
regard to using the printed media for propaganda purposes by 1836. Latrobe and the MSCS tried
to voluntarily separate colonization in Maryland from the debate over slavery by breaking with
the national society and promoting independent state action. Likewise the society rarely made its
actions known to the general public, other than through the occasional address, which it had
printed, to avoid public controversy. But abolitionists did not hesitate to use newspapers,
journals and pamphlets to promote their agenda. This tactic had proven very successful in
politicizing their cause and bringing the abolition of slavery into national politics in a way not
seen since the Missouri controversy. Thus, the MSCS decided to take its case to the public
through the newspapers. Newspapers in Baltimore, however, were unwilling to devote much
41
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space to the cause without remuneration. To win in the media required a considerable outlay of
money by the MSCS, money it did not have. The society was already in debt nearly $6,000.
Nevertheless, the members decided to begin publishing their own journal—The Maryland
Colonization Journal—on a monthly basis. Latrobe insisted that the purpose of the colonization
journal was to disseminate information about the plan of state action and MSCS’ colony rather
“than to enter the arena of controversy in regard to abolition and colonization.” 43 Whether
willing to admit it or not, Latrobe and the MSCS were in fact practicing the same tactics other
organizations used to promote their causes. The MSCS sent copies of the journal far beyond
Maryland’s borders and listed subscribers from numerous states. Thus the abolitionist attacks on
the MSCS elicited a vigorous response.
The first issues of the Maryland Colonization Journal defined the Maryland plan in a
way that distinguished it from pro-slavery and abolitionist factions. Latrobe hoped to promote
“the real nature and merits of colonization on the Maryland plan,” through the journal.44 The
effectiveness of the journal in winning converts to the Maryland plan is difficult to determine.
What the records indicate, particularly the numerous letters from postmasters throughout the
country, is that this tactic did not work very well. Hostility from abolitionists continued to be a
problem and opposition actually increased from other groups as well. As a result, many
subscribers refused to pick up the journals from their local post offices. Furthermore, just as the
ACS had experienced free black animus toward its efforts, so too did the MSCS as slaveholders
in the state came to oppose the Maryland organization. And worst of all, the legal apparatus
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itself, seemingly poised to help the cause of colonization, worked against the objectives of the
MSCS.
Free black opposition was the most vexing. African Americans viewed the United States,
and in some cases Maryland, as their homeland. Most felt little if any attachment to Africa and
had no desire to immigrate to that continent. African Americans exercised their claim to an
American identity as abolition sentiment increased in the 1830s. After all, they had fought in the
American Revolution and they had worked the land. They had sweat, bled, and died just as
much as any white man; perhaps, some argued, even more. Africa was not the home of African
Americans as they saw it; “our language, habits, manners, morals and religion are all different
from those of Africans.” As such, African American leaders decried colonizationists in general
for denying their claim as Americans and for enlisting the aid of communities “to a plan which
we fear was designed to deprive us of rights that the Declaration of Independence declares are
the unalienable rights of all men.” If colonizationists really wanted to help black Americans as
they claimed, they should do it in America; colonization “cannot promise the least advantage to
the free people of color.” 45
Latrobe recognized this feeling among the African American population early in
Maryland’s colonization effort, even before the society founded its own colony. But to him, it
conflicted with what he believed were the inevitable interests of both blacks and whites. The
best way to overcome the unfortunate attachment of blacks to America was to teach “Negro
youngsters…at an impressionable age to consider Africa as their natural home,” and then “they
would look forward to emigration as adults.” They should be taught African history with the
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understanding that it was there alone that they would be free. The suggestion that African
Americans should be educated was not new; Thomas Jefferson had proposed that blacks be
educated before they were colonized. Latrobe, however, was not suggesting that they be taught
only skills that would better prepare them to create a new nation. Instead, education should
instill a sense of pride or nationalism. This, he hoped, would surely remove the objections of
African Americans to going to Africa. 46
The mere proposal of educating black Americans met with little approval, even if it was
to instill in them a desire to leave the United States, so the MSCS turned to other ideas to
promote a favorable reception to colonization among Maryland’s African American population.
One of the primary draws was the promise of equal rights. As Latrobe made clear, settlers of
Maryland in Liberia gained full political rights, something he felt they would never achieve in
the United States. The MSCS also encouraged direct communication between the colonists in
Maryland in Liberia and friends or family remaining in Maryland. The society regularly
forwarded correspondence for its settlers. Latrobe believed that this was the most effective way
to entice black Marylanders into emigrating. Slavery and racism had created a justified mistrust
and skepticism of white colonizationists’ reports about the colony, thus publications like the
colonization journal and even the efforts of the society’s traveling agent could not carry as much
influence as one letter from a family member in Liberia. Latrobe even went so far to counter the
general opposition among Maryland blacks as to allow them to pick a representative to go to
Maryland in Liberia and report back to the community. The MSCS picked up the tab for this in
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the hopes of increasing emigration. 47 Such efforts, however, translated into few converts among
African Americans in Maryland.
MSCS representatives found the task of recruiting colonists increasingly difficult in this
atmosphere and the society pushed for new ways to draw African Americans to Maryland in
Liberia. Latrobe next suggested in 1837 that the society purchase or build a vessel for use solely
by the MSCS. This would save the society money in the long term by allowing the MSCS to
send expeditions whenever it pleased, and provide a direct commercial link with the colony. The
trade carried on by the society was almost exclusively designed to offset the costs of
colonization. A society-owned vessel would increase profits that could be used to fund the
colonial government and transport colonists to Africa. Latrobe envisioned other benefits. “The
prejudices of the colored people of this state, which have hitherto proved one of the most serious
obstacles to emigration, will, it is confidently believed, receive a decided check, from the regular
departure and return of the Liberian Packet.” He further proposed that the crew (including the
captain) be African Americans, this directly addressed charges abolitionists made about
colonization. A regular line in which African Americans freely participated would encourage
“worthy and intelligent colonists to embark, intercourse in trade:- will become more frequent
between the colonists and their friends in this country;- adventurously small capitalists [will]
become more common, and in this manner, confidence will gradually” replace “suspicion and
distrust; and the idea of being sold as slaves into a southern market.” 48 Unfortunately for
Latrobe, the idea required far more resources than the society possessed in 1837.
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The cool reception among African Americans continued despite Latrobe’s best efforts to
make Maryland in Liberia appealing. In fact, few black Marylanders willingly made their real
feelings about colonization known out of fear that they would face increasing oppression. Most
African Americans wanted nothing to do with colonization. Some were willing to speak out
regardless of the consequences. William Watkins, a long-time leader in the African American
community and an opponent of colonization, made this clear as early as 1831. Watkins wrote to
William Lloyd Garrison that African Americans would “rather die in Maryland under the
pressure of unrighteous and cruel laws than be driven, like cattle, to the pestilential clime of
Liberia, where grievous privation, inevitable disease, and premature death; await us in all their
horrors.” 49 Ten years later Watkins’ opinion had changed little in regard to colonization and he
was now “seriously of the opinion that colonizationists, in general, are so hostile to our
remaining in the land of our birth, so intent upon the prosecution of their scheme, that the
‘stating definitively’ of our views and sentiments relative thereto would be regarded by them as
of secondary importance.” By 1841, given the increased vigor of MSCS efforts to resettle blacks
in Africa, Watkins concluded that definitive opposition on the part of Maryland’s black
community would only cause prejudice “more virulent, and an increased impetus be given to
persecution and proscription.” 50 What was most frustrating about this for Latrobe was that the
MSCS had tried very hard to promote Maryland in Liberia’s benefits to the black community
believing that it would change the minds of free African Americans.
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Maryland colonizationists slowly learned that abolitionists in Maryland fostered the
attitude they encountered among the African American community. With much dismay, the
Maryland society discovered that
upon arriving in a neighborhood to be visited, the agent would address himself at
once to the free coloured people, and explain to them the design of colonization,
and make statements in regard to Africa, its climate, soil and productions, and the
privileges granted by the Society to those who emigrated to the colony. In most
instances, the persons thus addressed, would hear with kindness what was told
them by the agent, many would express a willingness to emigrate, and some
would at once, put their names upon the list for the next expedition.
In this situation would the agent leave them, and after completing his
round, would return to assist those whom he had first visited and who proposed to
emigrate, in making their preparations. But in every instance, he would find that
an antagonist had been at work in his absence, and that the mind of the coloured
people had in the interval been filled with ideas, which it was difficult, if not
impossible to eradicate in the time that he could devote to the purpose; that
calumnies and falsehoods, prepared with art, and suited to the prejudices of those
for whom they were intended, had been uttered by persons, whom it was
impossible to identify, and who could only be traced in their course, by the
mischief they had done. 51
The MSCS rarely identified the individuals that it charged with injuring colonization, but
its leaders, Latrobe in particular, continued to note the effect they believed abolitionists
had on their efforts in later reports.
Maryland’s state courts also frustrated Latrobe’s efforts, compounding what must
have seemed a tidal wave of opposition. The 1831 law passed by the Maryland
legislature stipulated that emancipated slaves must leave the state, preferably going to
Liberia under the supervision of the colonization society. A similar provision applied to
free blacks entering the state; they had to leave after ten days. What was often
overlooked by nearly everyone but Latrobe, were provisions in sections 4 and 5 of the
code. These sections allowed the courts to intercede if removal separated families, or if
51
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manumitted slaves “deserve such permission on account of their extraordinary good
conduct and character.” So convinced was Latrobe of the virtue of his cause that he
actually complained that the court was too liberal in the number of exemptions issued. 52
After inquiring as to the number of permits the county courts were issuing under these
provisions of the law, 53 Latrobe discovered that between 1831 and 1841, masters
emancipated 2,300 slaves in Maryland. Out of this number, the MSCS had transported
only 627 from the state. Not all of that number went to Maryland in Liberia; 177 went to
the ACS colony and a smaller number went to Haiti. 54 To Latrobe the message was
clear. Slave owners were willing to emancipate their chattels, but the reason the MSCS
settled so few in Africa was because the courts did not do their jobs. Instead, “the
manumitted slave remains unnoticed in the community keeping the fact of his freedom as
much as possible to himself and not disturbed by those who have no especial interest in
doing so_ relying in fact upon his insignificance for exemption from the operation of the
law.” 55 Latrobe put the interests of colonization above the hopes of free African
Americans to avoid exile. Circumvention of the law diminished the numbers of potential
settlers for Maryland in Liberia.
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Despite the MSCS’ difficulties in defeating its enemies in Maryland, the
Maryland plan gained in popularity in other states. The enthusiasm shown for
independent state action in the latter half of the 1830s did not necessarily help the MSCS,
but other state colonization societies copied the MSCS. In New York and Pennsylvania
the colonization forces combined their resources to establish a third separate colony in
West Africa at Bassa Cove. Latrobe’s friend Robert S. Finley, who was employed by the
New York Society, played an important role in this effort. By 1837, colonization
societies in Virginia and Mississippi had also begun setting up independent colonies
along the Liberian coast. 56 The popularity of the Maryland plan no doubt grew out of the
fact that it focused colonization efforts within the boundaries of respective states, a
strategy that provided the best alternative to keep the movement alive in the face of
abolitionist attacks.
Giving greater impetus to the state plan was the growing violence against
abolitionists in 1837. Violence toward abolitionists was not new in 1837; Garrison had
been arrested and assaulted numerous times. But the killing of Elijah Lovejoy, editor of
an abolitionist paper in Illinois, caught the attention of the nation. Some southerners
lamented the loss of Lovejoy, because they feared he would become a martyr. The
overall impact of the murder was a noticeable renewal of abolition efforts in the southern
states. One Virginian, hoping his state would follow the precedent of Maryland, noted
his surprise “that abolition operations were so extensive,” In fact, Lovejoy’s death
seemed “to double their efforts in extending the doctrines they advocate, and giving
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energy and tone to all their operations.” Worse yet, he equated the abolitionists to
crusaders in the eastern world who would not “easily be dissipated.” 57
The escalating tensions and newfound popularity of state action prodded the American
Colonization Society to redirect its efforts in tandem with the MSCS. The increasingly rigid
sectionalism emerging in the nation forced all those interested in colonization to redouble their
efforts at pacifying the “fanatics” on each side and concentrating resources available to the
several societies. The ACS first tried to accelerate colonization nationally by suggesting that
Congress incorporate the organization on the example of Maryland. ACS president, Senator
Henry Clay, presented the petition to the Senate of the United States on January 27, 1837, which
would have made the ACS a government institution with access to funding that it desperately
needed. It was not to be, however, as Calhoun led the opposition. According to James Carroll,
Calhoun “thought the subject could not be agitated with benefit to any interest; and he hoped,
therefore, it would not be acted upon.” In short, Calhoun was proposing a gag on colonization
petitions, and he carried the day with the help of northern doughfaces. 58
The ACS also formulated other plans to regain its momentum. In March of 1837, the
national organization’s committee on auxiliary relations urged the managers to restructure the
colonization movement by unifying all the societies with colonies in Africa under its leadership.
The security, freedom, and happiness of the colonists obviously rest on union
among themselves [and this] presupposes the harmonious co-operation of their
friends and patrons in America. Accordingly, the Committee have framed a
Constitution of General Government for the various settlements of Liberia, with a
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view to a reunion of the American Societies engaged in the colonization of
Africa. 59
Interestingly, the proposition for organizing the now numerous state organizations apparently
came from none other than Latrobe. At its November 1836 meeting, the MSCS adopted a
resolution creating a corresponding committee, consisting of Latrobe, Hugh D. Evans, and John
J. Proud, whose purpose was to organize a convention to adopt a set of common laws for all the
American colonies in Africa. 60 The notion of streamlining the relationship between the colonies
along the Liberian coast was only the beginning of Latrobe’s larger vision of turning the
settlements into confederated states in a republic. The change in attitude by Latrobe reflected
national debates in the United States. It also reflected Latrobe’s desire to strengthen the colony,
which he assumed would be yet another factor encouraging African Americans to immigrate to
Liberia.
The ACS supported the concept of reunifying the movement, but went beyond what
Latrobe intended. The ACS suggested that all organizations possessing colonies in Africa adopt
a new constitution and become members of a federation headed by the ACS. 61 The constitution
was immediately unpalatable to Latrobe and the MSCS. The document gave the governor of the
colony at Monrovia, the original settlement, and considerable power. The governor of the ACS
colony would hold powers stronger than those of the president in the United States, including the
right to appoint government officials, to preside over the congress and vote on legislation, and to
preside over the court system in Liberia. To Latrobe, such power resembled a monarchy more
than a democratic government. More serious for the state societies, however, was a resolution by
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the ACS that gave it financial oversight and required the state societies to forward ten percent of
their revenues to the ACS. 62 Latrobe had objected to a similar proposal at the time the MSCS
was created; he was not about to accept it in 1837. While seeing the need for greater cooperation
between the societies with colonies in Africa, the MSCS could not agree to the ACS proposal.
Latrobe countered the proposition of the national society within days, clearly showing his
vision for the colonies. Latrobe suggested to his friend Robert Finley that the state societies
unite and send delegates annually to a “central colonization convention, which should have
power in all matters touching the general interests of the colonies in Africa…uniformity in
fundamental Laws_a currency, a tariff and port charges_a flag_education.” The colonies should
also form a militia. Such cooperation, however, in no way diminished the right of state societies
to govern their colonies, appoint officers, and manage affairs in the states. By making such
changes, the State Societies could eventually transfer their powers to the colonists in Africa. The
colonies “would there become State governments and the central colonization convention
composed there of delegates from the different colonies, would become the general congress of
Liberia.” Nowhere in his plan did the ACS have a superior role. As far as Latrobe was
concerned, the parent society was an equal, but certainly not deserving of more influence in a
new confederation simply because it controlled the oldest colony. 63
In the spring of 1837, neither side seemed able to find a common ground. Latrobe and
his society wanted nothing to do with the plan of the ACS and even expressed ideas that alarmed
the members of that society. The MSCS members, Latrobe wrote, acknowledged the debt owed
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the ACS for proving that colonization was possible. But it was a different world now; with the
tensions in American society and politics so high, “the appropriate functions of the Society are at
an end. The discordant views entertained among the friends of Colonization themselves
throughout our wide country, forbid the idea of such an unity of sentiment and action in any
general society as is necessary to entire success.” 64 To Latrobe and the MSCS members, “the
friends of colonization in different parts of the United States, are widely at variance, and cannot
be harmonized. Nor is it necessary that they should be.” Latrobe urged the MSCS to adopt the
opinion that:
so far from there being any value in a national society for the purpose of securing
unity of opinion experience has shown that any attempt to do this would be
attended with consequences most sincerely to be deprecated, and which would
convert the annual meetings of the American Colonization Society into the arena
for fierce, unyielding and dangerous discussions…but still, they are decidedly of
the opinion, that the three societies should meet on this subject as equals; and that
any system to be adopted should be the result of joint deliberations, and should be
carried out, where necessary, by a joint action. The committee see no reason for
the apportionment of power recommended in the constitution. The settlements of
Monrovia owe their greater population to the fact of their having been the longest
established, and not to any peculiar advantages belonging to them; for, indeed,
there is much reason to doubt, whether the position of Monrovia is the best that
can be selected, and whether, in time, Monrovia itself will not be surpassed in
population and prosperity, by other settlements. 65

Despite a heated exchange with the ACS, much of which found its way into the
press, and after Latrobe himself concluded that the ACS served no further purpose,
anymore, support for a colonization convention remained strong enough that the New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and American colonization societies all sent
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representatives to Philadelphia in the summer of 1838. 66 John Latrobe endorsed
whatever position the MSCS took regarding the convention, but he certainly was not
supportive of any position giving advantage to the ACS. He made this clear to Thomas
Buchanan before the convention met in September. Buchanan, a member of the
Pennsylvania Colonization Society and organizer of the convention, supported
reorganization so that the national society would exert “supervisory control in this
country and the care of a general government for the colonies; while the whole business
of sending out emigrants and regulating their local affairs shall be committed to the State
Societies.” 67 This was essentially the same stance the ACS took with the Maryland
society in 1831, which caused the MSCS to sever its ties. Such a proposition was
completely unacceptable to Latrobe, who responded quickly to Buchanan’s ideas: “we
think to associate the plan of a convention with the idea that it is to end in giving control
of any kind to the Am. Col Soc would be running counter to all that we have heretofore
been doing and connect with the plan of state action, which is now conciliating the
South.” 68 Buchanan wrote back on June 30, 1838 in a conciliatory tone, acknowledging
Latrobe’s argument; however, he still hoped that the ACS might at least represent the
political union of the societies in the United States. Unity of any kind was certain to
increase the international respect of Liberia’s colonies and “ensure more generally the
confidence of the American people than our present plans.” 69
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Although the position of the MSCS differed from that of the ACS, the softening
of the stance of such men as Thomas Buchanan offered the possibility of a compromise
that kept everyone’s hopes alive. In September 1838, fourteen representatives from the
four colonization societies holding colonies in Africa gathered in Philadelphia to discuss
unification. The meeting turned sour very quickly when Latrobe proposed an alternate to
a resolution presented by Judge Wilkinson of the ACS. The MSCS representatives, John
Latrobe, William Stuart and William Crane, all objected to the latest version of a
constitution drawn up by the ACS because it gave too much power to the ACS. Latrobe
countered with three resolutions, which excited his colleagues to the point that no
consensus could be reached, not even on adjourning the meeting. The three resolutions
suggested that another convention be held at which the delegates from each society
would create a plan regulating only the commercial concerns of the colonies. Opponents
objected on the grounds that the resolutions went beyond what the other societies had
authorized their representatives to sign. After a long and drawn-out discussion, the
representatives decided to form a five-member committee charged with finding some
agreeable terms of association. Latrobe was a member of this new committee, but the
ACS held two of the five positions. 70 The Associated Colonies of Liberia in West Africa
resulted from the efforts of the committee. Members of the association had to agree to all
of the twenty-three articles, which aimed at easing trade between the colonies more than
anything else. Showing the influence of Latrobe, the final provision asserted that
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legislative power for the colonies resided with the individual societies in the United
States; cooperation was not going to occur. 71
Despite Latrobe’s influence in shaping the parameters of the association, the MSCS
effectively abandoned the idea within a few months. ACS representatives still insisted their
society be the head of unified action and any representative body in Africa. Latrobe countered
with the suggestion that representation of the societies be exercised through a governor-general
in Africa who would enforce the laws made by the convention in America. Such a representative
would be chosen by all the societies. The ACS insisted upon its prerogative and chose Thomas
Buchanan. This was the final straw; Latrobe objected arguing that “The colonies are too far
apart_too thickly populated_the intercourse between them too unfrequent to let him [Buchanan]
act with energy, or even discharge his duties to all of them…the influence of this officer would
only be a moral one for he would have no bayonets to back him and the moral influence of the
state societies’ laws by themselves would be as great as his.” 72 In reality, Latrobe was stating a
determination by the MSCS not to give up its sovereignty in Africa or the United States to the
American Colonization Society.
Latrobe’s intransigence made him the focus of controversy. Some delegates questioned
Latrobe’s motives. Perhaps, some suggested, his participation was a ploy to gain control over
the whole enterprise. Clearly incensed, Latrobe defended himself by appealing to Thomas
Buchanan, the very individual he claimed could not enforce convention decisions in the colonies.
Latrobe denied any ulterior motives: “I had none when I offered the substitute for Judge
71

MSCS Papers, VIII. Commissions and Reports, D. Reports of the Board of Managers, 1835-47, reel 17.
Appendix of the Seventh Annual Meeting, January 23, 1839, 19-21.
72

MSCS Papers, III. Correspondence Sent, Latrobe Letter Books, reel 16. John Latrobe to Robert Finley,
September 18, 1838.

177

Wilkinson’s resolution_ our society you know seeks no alliances and I had fully stated my views
in Baltimore when you were present.” Latrobe felt that critics “did me great injustice” when
they accused him of trying to assume control. Instead he felt the convention “was bringing about
unconsciously the very State of things” that he was most anxious to avoid. Even though Latrobe
felt he had been wronged, he did admit his regret in contributing to “the warmth” exhibited at
Philadelphia. 73
By January of 1839, it was official; the MSCS would not join the other three societies to
form a single organization. In his annual report, Latrobe urged MSCS members to see that the
plan “was wholly premature, and would afford no possible advantages, so far certainly as the
Maryland colony was concerned that would compensate for the additional drain it would make
upon the means sufficiently limited and the complication it would introduce into affairs which it
is on all accounts desirable to keep simple.” 74 The reality, despite Latrobe’s public comments,
was that Latrobe and the MSCS shared the responsibility for what had happened in Philadelphia.
Nevertheless, Latrobe defended the decision by suggesting that the plan of action pursued by the
other three societies would raise objections from slaveholders to colonization. Worse yet, the
new constitution of the ACS allowed life members to influence the operations of the
organization, which presented an opportunity for the ACS to be taken over by either northerners
or southerners, provided they were willing to purchase enough memberships. If this happened,
there would be no saving the Union. Therefore, the MSCS planned to continue its policy of
independent state action. 75
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The failure to unite the colonies and societies suggested weakness in the colonization
movement and only encouraged opposition to the Maryland effort. The MSCS was perceived to
be the strongest of the societies because of the substantial funding it received from the state.
But, after the convention fiasco, the MSCS was in fact at one of its weakest moments. The
society had debts substantial enough that it sent no expeditions or emigrants to the colony in
1839. The society left Russwurm to fend for himself essentially, as Latrobe found it difficult
even to send supplies to Maryland in Liberia. In such an atmosphere Latrobe was shocked to
find that criticism from missionaries in Maryland in Liberia had made its way into the American
papers in 1838. After investigating, Latrobe found that criticism of his colony came from
missionaries other than just John Wilson. Unfortunately for Latrobe, this problem turned out to
be one he could not easily dismiss.
As was typical for Latrobe, he attempted to solve the problem caused by missionary
criticisms behind closed doors. He mostly wished to avoid any public dispute, which would
further hurt the efforts of the MSCS. This was the last thing he needed after the very public
dispute with the ACS in Philadelphia. Latrobe wrote to the ABCFM in Boston that Mr. Wilson
was “mistaken about the colony,” and that while he has a right to communicate his sentiments
he should do it with more discretion than he is inclined to do_ otherwise the
minister of Religion…may become to us the source of bitter mischief. How can it
be expected that we should willingly afford countenance and protection to those
who use the opportunities we afford to assail us in random communications to this
country, expected to be published._ We have unfriend enough, without adding to
them the missionary within our borders. 76
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Latrobe addressed Reverend Wilson too, and made it very plain that his letters home had caused
“great pain” to himself and the society. 77 Latrobe’s actions were clearly driven by his desire to
avoid criticism of the MSCS and its colony. Colonization in general had critics enough with
abolitionists and free African Americans. Latrobe further worried that criticism would cause him
to lose the support his organization garnered from the state and numerous religious
denominations.
The missionaries did not lie down for Latrobe. Wilson responded to Latrobe by
elaborating the most serious accusations against the colonists and the movement in general. He
asserted that the colonists actually injured the natives by their presence, that the colonists hated
the natives enough that they would eventually drive them off the cape, and, most distressingly,
that the colonies would probably engage in the slave trade were it not for the missionary
presence. 78 Latrobe immediately appealed again to the missionary’s superiors in Boston.
Latrobe challenged the assertion regarding the trade in slaves. While he admitted that “the site
of Monrovia was once a depot for the exportation of slaves,” colonization “has blotted out a
slave depot from the coast of Western Africa.” 79 Despite his efforts, Latrobe achieved only a
temporary peace between the missionaries and colonists. He could not control their reports,
which continued to make their way into print. The MSCS had no alternative but to do as it had
done with abolitionists a few years earlier; the society turned to its colonization journal to
combat critiques coming from Africa.
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This incident with the missionaries brought a noticeable increase in abolitionist
opposition to the MSCS. The traveling agent of the MSCS claimed that abolitionists followed
him from one town to the next in Maryland, undoing all his efforts to gain supporters for the
cause. In the north, opposition to colonization strengthened too. One member of the New
Hampshire Colonization Society wrote that the best remedy for this in New England was for the
MSCS to send someone who could, from experience, refute the objections abolitionists brought
against colonization. The colonization society, he felt had made little effort to combat their
enemies in the north. Latrobe and the Maryland society certainly had a full plate in Maryland
and Africa, without responding to every form of opposition in New England. Nonetheless, the
MSCS was losing the battle between colonization and abolition. 80
Unfortunately for Latrobe, the struggle only became more difficult. By 1841
slaveholders in Maryland joined with abolitionists, free African Americans, and missionaries. A
slaveholder’s convention held in Maryland in the summer of 1841 demonstrated that there was
clear opposition to colonization and abolition efforts among that class in Maryland. Some of
those attending looked at colonization as a poison that must be countered with an antidote. The
convention held by Maryland slaveholders in Annapolis and its publicity was a start. W.W.
Bowie, one of the members attending the convention, questioned colonization outright, boldly
asserting that each emigrant taken to Liberia by the state cost $5,000. 81 While Bowie
acknowledged in later statements that the real expense of colonizing African Americans in
Africa lay in purchasing the territory, paying for buildings and fortifications, and government
expenses, the suggestion of such a cost had a political effect. Slaveholders realized the antidote
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to the poison of colonization was in stressing the cost to the state. Once people learned how
much was spent to settle colonists in Africa, slaveholders were certain that the public would
demand elected officials repeal the state appropriation, and loss of state funds would all but kill
the MSCS. The position outlined by W. W. Bowie overwhelmed those slaveholders who felt
that the convention should publicly support colonization because it answered the riddle of “what
is to be done with the blacks or with our selves and our children, it must be settled, and can be
settled only by uniting upon colonization.” 82
The slaveholders’ convention in Maryland caused considerable controversy in addition to
unneeded problems for the Maryland society. The society’s traveling agent, John Kennard, saw
the effects of the convention more clearly than anyone in the MSCS. Kennard reported that in
the wake of the convention even firm friends now questioned the cause of colonization.
Abolitionists were taking advantage of the slaveholders’ convention to “honestly or not, make us
one in purpose and interest” with slavery. 83 Among Maryland’s black community, a resident of
Queen Anne’s County reported, some now looked at colonization as a tool of slaveholders to
strengthen slavery. 84 The reaction to mobilization by Maryland slaveholders was clearly
interpreted in numerous ways by citizens of the state, but all affected the efforts of the MSCS by
the summer of 1842.
It would have been very easy for Latrobe to abandon the cause of colonization given the
renewed opposition to the movement. There was a rumor circulating that the MSCS intended to
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“abandon both the cause of colonization here, and the colony itself at Cape Palmas.” This was
never an option for Latrobe. Instead he looked positively on the effects of the slaveholders’
convention in Maryland, which confirmed the moderate course of colonization.
The Board, I believe, (certainly Individually do) look upon the very
excitement which has grown out of recent events in reference to the free colored
population as most favorable to our cause. The tendency of excited parties is
always to extremes: and hence in the discussions with which the newspapers were
not long since filled it was contended on the one hand, that free black labour was
essential to the prosperity of the State, and that all measures tending to drive off
the free blacks were politically as well as morally wrong_while on the other hand
it was contended that the sooner the free blacks were driven off the better and that
it was slavery which was essential to the State, and that therefore it was proper to
perpetuate the institution in Maryland.
Now colonization is the middle ground_...it disavows all intention to
coerce the free blacks, all right to interfere in any way with the property of
masters in their slaves_ a property recognised and guaranteed by the law of the
land. It appeals to the free blacks to remove on the ground that it is their interest
as it is that of the whites that they should do so_ and having prepared an asylum
in Africa they look to its being filled by the free blacks as well as by those slaves
whose masters may manumit them…This is the place of colonization and it is
believed that the present is the very time to prosecute it,_ for if you have a good
cause excitement on the subject even though unfavorable to you is better than
apathy…To abandon it now is the farthest from their thoughts. 85
Now was the time, Latrobe believed, for the MSCS to be aggressive in promoting
itself as the answer to tensions between North and South; to the conflict between
abolitionist and slaveholder, and finally to the question of the status of African
Americans in the United States. Furthermore, Latrobe responded to the charge made by
Bowie who opposed colonization on financial grounds. Bowie missed the point, Latrobe
charged; the purpose of the MSCS was not to carry every single African American from
the state. Success could not be measured in sheer numbers. The MSCS had succeeded
by removing “those willing to go.” The numbers would in fact be larger were it not for
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“evil, and, unfortunately, controlling influences,” of those opposed to colonization.
Finally, the MSCS had succeeded because there was now “an outlet for emigration
against the time when the free coloured man himself will admit that there is no alternative
but removal.” 86 The day was coming when all anti-colonizationists, be they abolitionists
or slaveholders, would see they were wrong.
In the meantime, the MSCS struggled to continue its work. The society was able
to make some headway on the idea of a regular vessel owned by the MSCS to run
between the colony and Baltimore. But the challenges posed by Maryland slaveholders
and attacks made by missionaries in the United States hurt the organization’s efforts. The
tenuous peace Latrobe brokered in 1838 had ended. New reports coming from the
missionaries J. Leighton Wilson, Reverend A.E. Griswold, and Dr. Thomas Savage were
much more damning. These reports focused on the high death rates in the Liberian
colonies due to waning support from the societies. 87
The implications of such negative press for the MSCS were significant as
Maryland in Liberia now drew international attention. The complaints of Wilson reached
beyond the United States. English missionaries working through the Wesleyan Church
were also active in West Africa, and they too began to spread the word about Cape
Palmas at a missionary convention in London based on the charges leveled by Wilson.
Although these missionaries had no first-hand knowledge of the conditions in Maryland
in Liberia, they spread the bad news in Europe. Latrobe’s friend Thomas E. Bond, who
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attended the convention, urged Latrobe to respond. “You must,” Bond asserted, “explain
and refute. Your own periodical is too limited in its circulation to meet the necessity. If
you make a clear case of it ‘The Christian Advocate and Journal’ is at your service.” 88
Latrobe took the advice of his friend. First he reassured Bond that the charges were
completely and “utterly false.” In addition, the MSCS formed a committee to prepare a
report from extracts of correspondence from the colonists to combat missionary charges.
Latrobe intended it to be used as Bond suggested in journals other than the one published
by the MSCS. 89 He also informed other clergymen that “I am perfectly aware of the
statements that have been made by the gentleman you mention [missionaries Wilson,
Griswold, and Savage], calculated, and I fear, intended, to injure the cause of
colonization…I may be wrong: but if I am I have not yet had the first reason to suspect
it.” The truth, as far as he was concerned, was “at utter war with what has now been said
of the relations of the colonies.” 90
After attempting to pacify representatives of religious organizations, Latrobe
chastised the editors of papers publishing the reports from missionaries at Cape Palmas.
Latrobe specifically went after the editors of the New York Observer for “the constant
reiterations of the unfounded allegations, that our colony instead of assisting, as we
humbly hoped it would do, in the great work of evangelizing Africa was an obstacle in its
way.” Nonetheless, the MSCS had refrained from attacking the missionaries publicly for
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their erroneous facts about Maryland in Liberia because it did not want to risk “offending
the pious men who have as missionaries put their lives in peril for the Heathen’s sake.”
He then asked that the editors give his organization space for an article refuting the
allegations of the missionaries and justifying the new policy the MSCS instituted in the
colony in 1843. 91
Latrobe’s actions were more damage control than anything else because they did not
address the real source of the society’s current problem. Latrobe had long supported the
colonization cause along with that of spreading Christianity. He initiated the relationship of the
MSCS with the missionaries in 1833. He was the one who suffered it to be policy for MSCS
agents “to lend to missionaries all their countenance and aide._ We have granted them land and
privileges; and we have borne and forborne when we have been sorely tried by the
misrepresentation with which we have been repaid at times.” 92 This would no longer be the case
as Latrobe convinced the MSCS board to implement a change of policy regarding missionaries in
Maryland in Liberia.
In December 1842, the MSCS instituted its changed policy for missionaries. 93 Latrobe
then informed the ABCFM that the Presbyterian mission, led by none other than John L. Wilson,
had to go. Latrobe explained that it was
painfully and absolutely necessary for us to rescind the conveyance which the
Presbyterian Missionaries have for the land they occupy at Cape Palmas and
request their immediate removal from our territory unless the A.B.C.F.M. give
such absolute and peremptory instructions to their agents as shall make them
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conform to the laws of the civilized territory in which they now reside and prevent
such occurrences as the painful one now referred to. 94
This was not the only condition that would be applied to missionaries in the colony. Latrobe and
the MSCS added another provision requiring that all white males over fourteen years of age
residing in Maryland in Liberia longer than ten days take an oath acknowledging Maryland in
Liberia as the official authority at Cape Palmas and submitting to the authority and decisions of
the governor, John Russwurm. 95 This most certainly would have been a tough pill for John
Wilson to swallow. Clearly, Latrobe was seeking to gain control over the situation in Liberia.
The breach between the two organizations had grown too large by this time and the ABCFM
could not, or would not, agree to the conditions demanded by Latrobe. The missionaries at Fair
Hope station were leaving.
The MSCS’ policy change caused serious repercussions in the United States. Latrobe
had to justify his actions and those of the MSCS. Rufus Anderson greatly aided Latrobe in this
matter as he reprimanded one of the missionaries, A. E. Griswold, for his conduct in the events
leading up to separation with the MSCS. Anderson also secured a written apology from him,
which he then sent to Governor Russwurm. The whole process, however, still left Latrobe jaded
when it came to the missionaries in the colony. Writing Governor Russwurm, Latrobe stated his
confidence that “You are aware of the views of the Board of Managers in regard to the value and
importance of making the colony a religious community.” Unfortunately, “white men, educated
with the prejudice of this country,” are “restive under a government whose powers are wielded
by those whom they have been accustomed to consider their inferior…That such feelings are
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wrong all men must admit.” 96 As this was the case, Latrobe concluded that “the cause of
missions and colonization cannot go hand in hand at home. Ill designing white men will keep
them apart.” 97
This line of reasoning did not carry as much weight at home as Latrobe hoped, and he
was forced to confront the ill effects of the episode with the missionaries. Colonization agents in
New England reported that abolitionists were “springing up” against the MSCS fiercely in the
fall of 1843, which adversely affected the efforts of the New York Colonization Society and the
American Colonization Society. Renewed resistance to colonization was certainly a sign of
things to come, as the anti-slavery impulse would finally succeed in ending the gag rule in
Congress. While the defeat of the gag rule symbolized a response from northern democrats
against their characterization as doughfaces dominated by their southern brethren, it also
symbolized renewed vigor of those opposing the MSCS and colonization generally. 98 As such,
Latrobe needed to give “some explanation to meet the prejudice of the public mind!” 99
The first ten years of Maryland’s colonization efforts in the United States, like the first
decade of colonization in Africa, were full of controversies and conflicts. Latrobe had to face the
reality that slavery and the ultimate fate of black Americans were powerful forces that he could
not fully reconcile within his colonization plans. Furthermore, the relationship between the
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MSCS and ABCFM proved just as difficult in the United States as it had been in Maryland in
Liberia. There were, of course, factors existing in the United States that proved to be barriers to
colonization. Indeed the challenges to colonization proved formidable in America and Latrobe
adjusted his policies accordingly, but with limited success. The next decade of his presidency
over the Maryland society proved no less difficult, and tested the true mettle of Latrobe’s
leadership. Latrobe’s confidence in his plans and his vision led him to fight for the Maryland
society until 1853, when his efforts and leadership won him national prominence as president of
the American Colonization Society.
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Chapter Six: Challenges Abroad and at Home, 1843-1848

The problems faced during the first decade of the Maryland State Colonization Society’s
existence seemed to be resolved by 1843. Latrobe had fought to resolve the issues raised by
political debates over slavery in the United States, the emergence of abolitionists, opposition
from both African Americans and the missionaries in Maryland in Liberia, and finally the
problems of colonizing Africa. With the departure of the missionaries from the colony in 1843
and the absence of any major national conflict, Latrobe assumed he could now settle into the
work they hoped would result in their ultimate objective—a racially homogeneous America. The
peaceful climate of the early 1840s, should have offered Latrobe the opportunity to gain
additional support for colonization and move Maryland in Liberia toward independence.
However, the façade of peace in the states and in Africa was just that, as Latrobe soon
discovered. The absence of conflicts and opposition turned out to be a lull in the continuing
series of difficulties Latrobe was forced to navigate.
This chapter examines the next phase of Maryland’s colonization effort between 1843
and 1848. At the beginning of this phase of Latrobe’s activities, the colony found itself in
greater danger than ever before. Within a few years, however, it was his beloved American
republic that was in peril. By narrating the events on both sides of the Atlantic during this fiveyear span, Latrobe’s evolving program of independent state action and his long-term vision for
colonization, the United States, and Africa become clear. It was the events of this period that led
him back to the national society in 1853 and motivated him to accelerate the political progress of
Maryland in Liberia.
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Latrobe’s work in the United States as well as his career as a lawyer often overshadowed
his efforts in Africa. But when problems arose, it was to him that the colonists appealed for help.
Latrobe was often flexible and adaptive in his responses, taking advantage of the crisis with the
missionaries to effect several legislative changes designed to solidify the authority of the
governor. Latrobe gave the executive greater powers to enforce policies and he attempted to
create a secondary police force responsive only to Russwurm. Latrobe emphasized his
satisfaction with the changes when he told Russwurm that “I trust that the unfortunate
difficulties…are happily terminated and at rest forever.” Latrobe’s hopes were soon crushed by
a number of crises in the colony, which threatened its future. 1
As 1843 drew to a close, Maryland in Liberia suffered from both chronic problems
associated with food production and trade as well as a new threat—one not seen by the colonists
or the MSCS before. Most of Maryland in Liberia’s problems stemmed from the general
inability to generate sufficient food supplies for the colony. After nine years and numerous
attempts on the part of Latrobe to promote agriculture in Maryland in Liberia, the colony still
depended on the indigenous people for basic foodstuffs. Poor harvests affected the settlers’
relationship with the Grebo people as well as the economic prosperity of the settlement, which
greatly concerned Latrobe. 2 Poor crop yields added tensions in other areas too. Acquisition of
land had been an objective of the MSCS for many years, but a lack of funds as well as numerous
other difficulties prevented Governor Russwurm from fully achieving this directive. Latrobe
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urged the governor to never lose sight of this goal even though he understood that circumstances
hindered the expansion he envisioned. Latrobe wanted as much coastal territory as the colony
could procure for future expansion; it was part of his overall vision for what the African colonies
could become in time. In the first ten years Russwurm succeeded only in purchasing the nearby
Grebo village of Fishtown. 3
The purchase and expansion of the colony’s influence along the coast pleased Latrobe
because it promised to provide commercial opportunities that could be used to accelerate
colonization. No matter how desirable, expansion nevertheless created other problems. First, it
hindered settler-African relations at Cape Palmas by creating unwanted competition. Extension
of the colony weakened the trading position of the Greboes closest to Cape Palmas who
traditionally acted as middlemen in coastal exchanges; it reduced the dependence of the colonists
on the Greboes for food, and it strengthened the economic power of the MSCS on the coast.
Ultimately, this competition served as the catalyst for settler-native conflicts throughout the
region. The colonists almost always won out, however, as they took advantage of the traditional
divisions between the various Grebo towns, which seldom cooperated with each other. This
divide and conquer strategy put King Freeman at a disadvantage in dealing with Governor
Russwurm and contributed to conflict among neighboring peoples competing for good land. 4
Expansion of the colony also thrust American settlers into competition with European powers,
whose citizens, particularly British and French, traded up and down the coast. The European
presence, commercial as well as military, further motivated the colony to gain control of as much
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territory as possible. A month before Russwurm negotiated the Fishtown annexation, he
reported that French military officers had visited the coast not more than twenty miles from Cape
Palmas to survey territories for French acquisition. This was an issue of concern for both
Russwurm and the MSCS as all recognized that the establishment of a French post would hinder
economic opportunities for the colony. 5
Due to the deteriorating situation with the Greboes surrounding Cape Palmas, King
Freeman decided to isolate Maryland in Liberia. This precipitated a series of events that brought
the colony closer to war with the local population than it had yet been. It also foreshadowed the
armed conflict that would eventually occur with the Greboes in 1857. Fed up with the colonists,
King Freeman ordered a complete embargo of the colony. This was not the first time that the
king had attempted such a tactic, but all his efforts prior to 1843 fell well short of subduing the
colonists. The only result of his prior efforts had been the growing animus of John Latrobe, who
by the 1840s instructed Russwurm to look for any opportunity to remove the king and his people
from the immediate vicinity of Cape Palmas. Ironically, this was just the sort of policy toward
the indigenous population that Latrobe lamented in the United States, but now seemed a
necessity if his colonization plans were to succeed. 6 Most often the reason that Freeman failed
to cow the colonists into submission was because the Greboes were divided. The American
settlers always found a way to exploit this fact and trade with another Grebo town, which forced
Freeman to capitulate. 7
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In 1843, however, Freeman successfully united the Greboes against the Maryland
colonists. Only the fortunate creation of a strong military presence in the area a year earlier
saved Maryland in Liberia from possibly being exterminated. 8 On August 9, 1842, the United
States and Great Britain had signed a treaty that, as it turned out, greatly aided the American
colonies. Specifically, the Treaty of Washington (also known as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty)
provided that both Great Britain and the United States “prepare, equip, and maintain…on the
coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of vessels, of suitable
numbers…not less than eighty guns.” 9 The primary purpose of the force was halting the slave
trade. The treaty turned out to be a godsend for Maryland in Liberia by the end of 1843.
The creation of an American military presence, known as the African Squadron,
presented some unique opportunities to compensate for the colony’s military limitations.
Latrobe had desired a strong military presence in Maryland’s colony for sometime. Yet the
resources of the colony and limited manpower at Cape Palmas prevented him from actually
creating the force he wanted in Africa. 10 The signing of the treaty provided a force that, while
not directly concerned with the Liberian colonies, benefited them through a secondary directive
issued by the Secretary of the Navy, Abel P. Upshur, to protect American commerce. Latrobe
appealed to the secretary on behalf of the colony asking him to instruct his officers to act
judiciously with the settlers in West Africa. Specifically, he requested that naval officers aid the
fledgling government when colonial officials sought help, but that American forces should not
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act to enforce the law as they had during the recent conflict at the Fair Hope mission. Latrobe
was fortunate in this regard, since the commander of the African Squadron, Commodore
Matthew Calbraith Perry, interpreted his orders in a fashion corresponding to Latrobe’s
understanding of them, giving support where he could without being so overt that he violated the
pronounced American policy of not holding colonies. 11
Latrobe not only sought to profit from this new military presence, but he also urged
Governor Russwurm to encourage the belief in Africa that the colonists could call on United
States vessels of war. This idea was especially desirable in dealing with the Greboes who
resisted the sovereignty of Maryland in Liberia. Latrobe cautioned Russwurm, though, that this
must be done carefully as neither of them wanted the sort of direct military interference that had
occurred in the dispute with the missionaries at Fair Hope. American intervention should be
only at the request of Russwurm. Latrobe wrote Commodore Perry to lay out his view of the
officer’s mission in Africa; Perry agreed with his ideas on involvement in the colonies. 12
Between the creation of the African Squadron and Perry’s arrival at Monrovia, Africans
to both the north and the south of Cape Palmas carried out three separate attacks on American
traders. These traders were not connected to the colonies; nevertheless, one of the attacks was
near enough to Cape Palmas to cause Russwurm concern, and he sought to profit from it. The
attacks were on the merchant vessels, Edward Burley, Atalanta, and the Mary Carver. Perry was
aware of them before he took his post and he fully intended to address them when he reached
11
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Africa. On June 5, 1843, the new commodore of the African Squadron, Matthew C. Perry, set
sail for his new post. 13
The appointment of Commodore Perry as commander of the squadron pleased John
Latrobe. He knew that Perry fully supported the cause of colonization. Perry had, in fact, been
intimately involved with the colonies since their inception. On August 3, 1819 Perry took his
post as a junior officer on the American war sloop Cyane. The vessel escorted the first group of
colonists to Africa in 1820. It was Perry, so he boasted, who suggested Cape Mesurado as the
most suitable spot to establish the American Colonization Society’s first settlement. 14
After Perry earned a command of his own, he carried the U. S. agents who supervised the
transportation of recaptured African slaves back to Africa in 1823. Thus, Perry was no stranger
to colonization or the colonies of Liberia. Well aware of this tie with Africa, Latrobe took the
liberty of writing to Perry before he left the United States. The exchange concerned two
subjects. Alluding to the conflict with the Fair Hope missionaries and the intrusion on the part of
an American naval officer, Latrobe stressed the independence of Maryland in Liberia, claiming
that it was not a dependency of the state government. The recent instance may have injured “our
purposes in Africa,” he informed Perry. Both Russwurm and Latrobe hoped that Perry would
not freely interfere as other naval officers had done, but rather wait until asked to do so by the
authorities on the spot. Secondly, although desirous of limited involvement on the part of the
squadron in the colonies, both Russwurm and Latrobe pointed out the potential value of Perry’s
presence. Latrobe told the Commodore, “without having any particular request to make to you,
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the object of this letter will be answered, if, by drawing your attention to the subject, our colony
shall receive your countenance and support during the time you remain upon the coast.” 15
Countenance and support indeed! Perry immediately expressed his “pleasure to cooperate
harmoniously with the authorities. Having long been deeply interested in the cause of
colonization I shall enter zealously into those measures which may best serve to carry out the
great object of its friends.” 16
Russwurm wanted more from the new American commander than Latrobe. Russwurm
felt that the United States government, specifically with military force, must address the recent
attacks on American traders. To do otherwise would invite further aggression against
Americans, which included the colonists. The American government limited its involvement in
Liberia because of Constitutional issues that prevented the possession of colonies. No matter
how white Americans viewed the settlers, Russwurm knew that indigenous Africans throughout
the region of Liberia considered them all, black or white, Americans. Russwurm wanted
considerable force used against those alleged to have committed the violence against the crews
of the three ships, especially in the case of the Mary Carver, her crew having been massacred.
“Mere burning a few villages will be nothing in their estimation,” he told Latrobe. Russwurm
did not specify what he thought was an appropriate punishment to Latrobe; that did not become
clear until he met the Commodore face to face. In addition to punishing the attackers, Russwurm

15

MSCS Papers, III. Correspondence Sent, Latrobe Letter Book, reel 17. John Latrobe to Commodore
Matthew C. Perry, May 10, 1843.
16

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 4. Matthew Perry to John Latrobe, May 24, 1843.

197

also wanted assistance, military and strategic, from the Navy in preparing for a possible conflict
with King Freeman. 17
Neither Latrobe nor Russwurm were disappointed in their hopes that the African
Squadron would serve the interests of Maryland in Liberia. The tactics that made Commodore
Perry famous in Japan a decade after his appointment in the African Squadron were sharpened in
Africa. One of the navy’s primary assignments for Perry was to protect American commercial
interests. Just like Governor Russwurm, Perry thought the proper place to begin that mission
was to bring to justice those responsible for American deaths along the coast. 18 Perry arrived at
Monrovia, the ACS colony, with a plan of action already in mind. By this point Maryland in
Liberia was on the brink of war. That very well could have been the outcome were it not for
Perry. The commodore interpreted aiding Maryland in Liberia as being consistent with his
mission of protecting commerce and commanding respect among Africans for the American
flag. 19
The Cape Palmas Greboes had expressed their displeasure regarding the settlers,
particularly regarding land claims, many times. The dispute in 1843 had many causes, only one
of which was land. As far as the colonists were concerned this was yet another example of
Grebo efforts to assert a claim on the land. Latrobe of course sided with the colonists who held
fast to the interpretation that the Greboes gave up claim to all the territory except for the towns
they inhabited and those fields under cultivation in 1834 when the original agreement was
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concluded. 20 Latrobe in fact encouraged Dr. Hall to gain preemptive rights to all land bordering
the colony. Based on this, the settlers successfully cowed the Greboes into submission each time
they attempted to assert their rights, as they understood them. Latrobe praised his governor for
his stern position on this point. In fact, Latrobe had abandoned his concern for the Greboes
suffering a fate like that of the Five Civilized Tribes in the southeastern United States. Now he
just wanted them out of the way. Governor Russwurm resolved these challenges every time to
Latrobe’s satisfaction. Nevertheless, this occasion was different; for the first time the colonists
faced the Greboes who were united against Maryland in Liberia. This was the reason the
Maryland settlement needed the assistance of American forces. 21
Perry proceeded down the coast from Monrovia to Cape Palmas. After anchoring, the
commodore was given a full report of events, not by the governor, but by the Reverend Samuel
Hazlehurst, a cousin of John Latrobe, who had recently joined the remaining missionaries in the
colony. Hazlehurst served as a courier for the governor because the Greboes prevented the
colonists from reaching the ships, and he informed Perry of the grave danger to the colonists and
his fellow missionaries at Half Cavally. 22 Africans at Half Cavally, southeast of Cape Palmas,
had “broken up” Rev. John Payne’s school and were at present threatening his family, reported
Hazlehurst. Russwurm’s letter expressed similar distress. The colony was under duress because
King Freeman had “laid an embargo on all trade from Bush or elsewhere, prohibited all natives
from working for us, or even carrying a note on board, raised the prices of rice, palm oil, and
20
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fowls, to such high rates as are paid no where else; in fact, they wish to extort from us the most
extravagant rates for every thing whenever they like.” 23 Russwurm’s grievances against
Freeman were not new, as he well knew. What was clear in his complaints was the fact that the
colonists were not able to dominate the Greboes for their own economic advantage. Interference
by American military forces because the Greboes refused to work for the settlers at the price they
wanted hardly justified action by Perry. However, Russwurm was fortunate that Perry was
sympathetic to colonization because King Freeman’s plans included more than an embargo. The
colony was in more physical danger than Russwurm realized.24
Perry acted decisively to put the natives in “awe of the American flag” and rescue
Maryland in Liberia as well as the missionaries at Half Cavally. 25 The commander determined
to first make an example of all those responsible for the massacre of the Mary Carver’s crew,
then address the problems facing Maryland in Liberia. Perry instructed Russwurm to call for a
palaver to be held on 8 December with Freeman and the other Grebo leaders. Perry would join
the governor along with the captains of his four warships and Governor Roberts, the ACS
governor who accompanied the commodore on his journey down the coast. Perry next
dispatched one of his officers and a small boat to retrieve the Rev. Payne and his family. 26
The leader of the African Squadron had already acted on behalf of American traders and
had even taken steps to help Maryland in Liberia before he arrived at Cape Palmas. Perry’s word
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to Latrobe that he would act zealously on behalf of colonization was not an empty promise. As
Perry cruised along the coast, he addressed the people of Sino and Blue Barra, those he believed
responsible for killing crewmembers from the vessels Edward Burley and Atalanta. At both
spots, Perry made a treaty in which the people issued formal apologies for the misdeeds and the
leaders of both towns promised assistance to Maryland in Liberia in any direct confrontations
with the Greboes. 27
On 7 December 1843, Perry and his entourage landed at Cape Palmas and joined
Governor Russwurm who then briefed the commodore on the current state of affairs with the
Greboes. Once again he repeated his personal belief that an attack by the Greboes was
imminent. In fact, the governor suggested that Perry should mount a preemptive offensive
against King Freeman’s people. Perry informed him that he could defend the settlement, but a
direct offensive would violate the directives issued by the Secretary of the Navy. Direct
offensive action of the nature Russwurm advocated would have exceeded Latrobe’s wishes too;
he wanted to avoid such an overt display on the part of the American government, which
opponents of colonization could use to injure the movement in the United States. Perry preferred
to use a show of force to bluff Freeman into submission to the governor’s will. Perry assembled
a force consisting of his four battleships, smaller armed boats and a detachment of marines that
he would use to intimidate the Greboes the next day. 28
The plan seemed like a good one, but an assault negated the impact Perry’s force would
have made at the palaver on 8 December. Russwurm hoped to use the presence of the African
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Squadron to his advantage, but the Greboes moved first. About three in the afternoon on 7
December a runner from the farthest outpost in the colony reported to the governor and the
commodore that a contingent of armed Africans had attempted to pass the guards. When they
tried to break past the guardhouse, the sentries fired on the Greboes and killed three of the men
while causing the rest to retreat into the forest. The failure of the initial foray and the losses
inflicted by the guards, most agreed, would demand a counterattack before sundown. Authorities
in the colony, the militia, and Perry expected that this would be the case. Thus he and
Russwurm, along with a contingent of marines, responded with a forced march to Harper, four
miles from the cape where they reinforced the colonists defending the settlement. By the time
these additional forces reached Harper the danger had passed; the Greboes would not attack
again as King Freeman agreed to meet with Perry and Russwurm the next day. 29
December 7, 1843 was an eventful day for the African Squadron and Maryland in
Liberia. Later that evening Commander Joel Abbot, who Perry dispatched to Cavally, returned
to Cape Palmas safely with the Reverend Payne and his family. Abbot reported to Commodore
Perry what he learned on the mission. The news was less than encouraging and contributed to
the concerns raised by the events earlier in the day at Harper. Payne’s rescuers learned from the
local population at Cavally, about ten o’clock in the evening of 6 December, that those hostile to
the missionaries were acting on the instructions of King Freeman. Furthermore, “there is an
extensive effort making for a general and combined resistance and warfare against the
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Americans.” 30 It was then that Perry and Russwurm realized the extent of the danger facing the
colony. This was not simply another effort to gain concessions from the governor. In some
ways, news of a concerted effort on the part of the Greboes against the colonists and the
preparation for full-scale war resembled the history of American Indian relations with
frontiersmen in the Ohio Valley preceding the 1812 War when the Shawnee leader Tecumseh
attempted to unite all Indians against white settlement. 31
Perry and Governor Russwurm hoped to avoid this fate through the palaver held on 8
December 1843. At the gathering Perry listened to each side hoping to reconcile the two factions
before an open conflict erupted. Russwurm began by listing the terms he wanted King Freeman
to accept. The governor wanted the embargo lifted because it violated the original treaty signed
when the colony began; second Freeman must agree not to “enter again into any combination
against the settlers,” nor could he prevent any Grebo from working for the colonists. Russwurm,
in listing his charges, was not simply trying to protect the colony from future Grebo hostility. He
also recognized the strength of the Greboes if they united, and thus sought to ensure they
remained at odds with one another. Further, Russwurm sought to use this opportunity to achieve
more of Latrobe’s agenda, particularly that of moving the Greboes away from any territory
controlled by the colony. If Freeman agreed to relocate his people, the MSCS would pay him an
annual sum for the next five years. If he refused to leave, then the settlers must leave. This was
necessary, he said, because the king had broken his word three times and Russwurm no longer
trusted him. Although, the departure of the settlers was most likely very appealing to King
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Freeman that eventuality was unlikely. The most interesting aspect of this specific exchange was
Russwurm’s paternalistic tone and how similar his approach was to the tactics employed against
Native Americans in the Southeast. He implied that there was no chance of success because
Freeman had violated his trust and it was the king’s fault that relations had come to the point that
one of the two peoples must leave. Some of the speech he made at the palaver was simple
rhetoric, as the colonists had no intention of leaving. But Russwurm’s overall position also
reflected the change in Latrobe, who was now willing to sacrifice the Greboes to carry forward
his objective of ridding the United States of its black population. 32
King Freeman acknowledged the laws to which Russwurm referred, but asserted his
belief that the cause of the disturbance rested squarely on the settlers, not the broken promises of
the Greboes. The king supported his argument by citing clauses from the same treaty,
specifically the article requiring each party to punish, by death, any member that murdered
another person. Freeman recalled the earlier incident in 1838 when Eben Parker shot and killed
two African men. Russwurm ordered Parker’s arrest but the local authorities failed to execute it.
As a result of this failure, the friends of the deceased set fire to the town and killed Parker at his
home. This incident was completely unrelated to the current situation, yet in his eyes, the
inconsistency in carrying out judicial orders had voided the treaty from that point forward. As
for the embargo against the colony, Freeman placed the blame directly on the governor and his
determination not to pay more than a stipulated price. Further, Russwurm had personally
insulted Freeman when he stated that he would “eat grass” before he paid the price the Greboes
asked for their rice. This only served to inflame the anger of Greboes who were tired of being
strong-armed by the settlers. At this point the commodore intervened, chastising the Greboes for
32
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the embargo. They did, Perry agreed, have the right to do as they pleased with what they
produced; this was free enterprise. They should, however, refrain from trying to prevent the
colonists from trading with others. Perry’s logic won over the leaders of the Cape Palmas Grebo,
and they agreed to withdraw their long-standing complaints. 33
Perry succeeded in ending the dispute without bloodshed yet Russwurm still held fast to
the idea of buying out the Greboes should an opportunity present itself. Again he pushed
Freeman to sell his remaining lands near Cape Palmas to the society. Freeman avoided the issue
seeing that Perry was not inclined to interfere in this matter. Perry made it clear that such
subjects were a matter for the civil authorities, not the United States Navy. His focus was on
protecting the Americans on the coast, which he had done. Russwurm dropped the idea of
removing Freeman and his people for the moment, but did not dismiss it from future discussions.
Behind Russwurm’s insistence on breaching the matter of native removal was Latrobe, who
wanted the Greboes gone. 34 The removal of the Greboes from Cape Palmas remained a theme
with Latrobe from this point until the colony became independent. 35 In one way, this episode
demonstrated just how much Latrobe’s own attitude had changed about what was most
important. The experience of colonization in Africa demonstrated that enduring cooperation was
not likely between the colonists and Africans. And, though he hoped to avoid the sorrowful tale
of the “Five Civilized Tribes” of the southeastern United States from being repeated in Africa,
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the success of the colony was more important to his ultimate agenda of saving the American
Republic.
Since the conflict with the Greboes of Cape Palmas appeared resolved for the time being,
Perry and Governors Roberts and Russwurm turned their attention to punishing those responsible
for the massacre aboard the Mary Carver. Aboard the frigate Macedonian the two governors and
military officers determined that reparations must be exacted from Rockboukah, Grand Tabou,
Bassa, and Grand Berriby, all well within striking distance from Cape Palmas. The evidence
possessed by Perry, which included two detailed accounts of the massacre from Governor
Russwurm, indicated that the residents of these towns were involved in the incident. Perry
already planned to capture those individuals directly responsible for murdering the captain of the
Mary Carver, try them and execute them. To send a message to the rest of the people and
hopefully deter possible future violence, they also decided to demand monetary compensation
for the vessel and its cargo amounting to $12,000. Each town was to pay $500 annually for six
years. Should any of the towns fail to meet these terms, the territory would be given over to the
colonization society as a trust for the families of the victims. Of course the inhabitants of the
towns knew none of this. Furthermore, the legal basis on which territory could be ceded
automatically to the Maryland State Colonization Society is unclear. Part of the reason Perry
chose this plan of action was because the evidence he possessed was circumstantial; he did not
have any eyewitnesses. Russwurm, for his part, suggested that the commodore consider burning
the towns because he did not think the rulers of the towns would make restitution. Leveling
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these towns would, interestingly enough, benefit the colony materially and be another step
toward fulfilling Latrobe’s designs. 36
Governor Russwurm did not join the rest of the party in sailing east to Berriby to confront
the accused. Perry and company arrived there on 11 December 1843. The scene must have been
alarming for both sides; standing on shore were approximately 500 well-armed natives waiting
for the Americans. Neither side appeared anxious to fight as the white flag was raised and
representatives from each agreed to attend a palaver the following morning. On the 12th, Perry
landed with a number equal to that of the armed men mustered by the Africans. Perry
immediately deemed the king of Berriby, known as Ben Krako, to be a sinister old man. From
there the events spiraled out of control; the commodore did not receive what he considered
satisfactory answers to his inquiries. Angry, Perry demanded the truth about the events leading
to the massacre on the Mary Carver. As the naval officer moved toward Krako, a shot was fired
which started a mêlée. In the ensuing scuffle Krako sprang to his feet hoping to escape, but
could not as Perry was clinging to his loincloth. Perry slowed the king long enough for another
marine to club the man across the head with his musket stock. 37 The other soldiers engaged in
gunplay for about an hour. The artillery, in the meantime, shelled the jungle behind the town to
injure those fleeing into the vegetation and to give Perry’s forces cover while they advanced on
the town itself. Most of the residents had already fled by this point; nevertheless, the American
forces set fire to the town.
The African Squadron suffered no deaths as a result of the fighting, but several marines
were wounded. At least eight members of Berriby were killed and an unknown number
36
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wounded. Krako died the next morning aboard a U. S. vessel from his injuries. In the following
days, American marines burned four other towns in the vicinity before a peace treaty was signed.
All told, at least fifty people died between 12 and 15 December. 38 Governor Russwurm was
pleased with the outcome because it eventually gave Maryland in Liberia an opportunity to
acquire more territory on the coast. Furthermore, he felt that the Berriby people “deserve all that
they have received.” It was fortunate that in the battle the commodore killed two of the
“principle ones concerned in the murder.” 39
The effectiveness of the African squadron in its engagements with Africans added
strength to the colonies on the coast of Liberia. No African familiar with the colonies doubted
the military capabilities of Americans now. Perry had shown himself capable of making
Africans bow to the interests he considered paramount to the United States while intimately
linking U. S. military force to the colonies settled by African Americans. The colonists of
Maryland in Liberia recognized that the African Squadron had probably saved them, if not from
complete destruction, at least from a long war with a united Grebo people. Further, should the
people near Cape Palmas not live up to their treaty obligations, the MSCS stood to benefit
materially. The irony in this whole episode is that the U. S. military was protecting people in
Africa that it would not have protected in the United States. 40
Beyond this fact, the squadron helped ensure that the Greboes accepted the position of
the colonists on land and trade. The governor strictly adhered to the 1834 treaty signed by King
38
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Freeman, which gave all the territory around Cape Palmas to the colony except the towns the
Greboes occupied. With the threat of military force presented by the African Squadron,
Russwurm could expand the colony by exercising the preemptive rights secured by Governor
Hall. This was the legal basis for Russwurm’s purchase of Fishtown to the west, and later of
towns to the east. Finally, Perry’s cooperation with Russwurm and the friendship exhibited at
the palaver with King Freeman further entrenched in the minds of Africans the idea suggested by
Latrobe, that the colonists could rely on American military intervention when necessary. The
Greboes remained unaware that Perry would not initiate any offensive maneuver against them on
behalf of the colony because it would violate his orders. But even had they known, Perry’s
vicious assault at Berriby made Freeman hesitant to take military action against the colony.
Thus, in the future, they would have to weigh American naval force when considering any action
against Maryland in Liberia.
Latrobe had long contended that an American naval presence would benefit the colonies
and American commerce. Perry and the African Squadron proved him right. It was clear that
the sailor had few qualms about giving his countenance and aid to the colonies. Latrobe would
have liked to make this arrangement permanent. The protection of the colonies with American
forces would secure a permanent market for American goods and should be “a matter of policy,”
stated Latrobe, “on the part of our government and of justice to the colonies themselves.” 41
Commercial links to Africa were about more to him than markets for American manufactures;
commerce, he believed, was the agent that would pull African Americans to Maryland in Liberia.
Latrobe’s intimate involvement with colonization skewed his opinion when it came to American
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involvement in Africa, but he was also well aware of the growing presence of European traders
in the region of Maryland in Liberia, which necessitated an American military presence.
Much of the peace Commodore Perry helped bring about in Maryland in Liberia soon
dissipated. The problems facing the colony were twofold. The underlying causes of past
conflicts with the Greboes remained unresolved despite Latrobe’s best efforts. In addition, there
were internal issues that the colonists wanted addressed. 42 Despite Latrobe’s policies and efforts
to promote agriculture, most of the colonists wanted more than a subsistence living earned from
farming. Latrobe either failed to recognize this or did not want to accept it because it did not fit
in his overall vision. The colonists tried to make the MSCS aware of their feelings on the matter
in October of 1844, when one group of settlers filed their protests with the MSCS. Through
Latrobe, they informed the board that agriculture in the colony was “poor and we have tried it—
its true the 1st or 2nd crop of potatoes will produce tolerable good and after that we might as well
plant them on the sand beach without measure.” 43 Moreover, even when there was a surplus no
market existed where they could sell their produce. The colonists complained further that “you
say that we must cultivate the soil…and we still find that it will not give us a comfortable
support all that we can raise on our farms is not sufficient to feed + clothe a man’s family leaving
out of the question the vast expenses yearly by repairing our houses.” The petitioners urged the
board of the MSCS to do something to help them. Further, they reminded the members of
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African American slavery and suggested that Maryland would not have prospered “if it hadn’t
been for the labor of the colored man.” 44
The powers of the governor had been expanded to the point where they too became a
source of complaint among the colonists. Most of what Latrobe instituted through Governor
Russwurm was designed to carry out his vision for colonization, avoid future situations such as
that experienced with the missionaries, and advance the colony toward its final goal—to become
the independent state of Maryland in Liberia. Latrobe also gave Russwurm considerable latitude
in trading on behalf of the society, and the society decided to begin levying a tariff on imports.
These moves became a source of irritation for settlers, who often were unaware of Latrobe’s
goals. Not knowing the source of all the policies Russwurm instituted, the settlers saw the
governor as a petty tyrant who was unsympathetic to their situation. Eventually, they sought to
have him removed from power. 45
Despite the grumbling of the colonists, Latrobe and the other members of the MSCS
viewed their efforts in Africa as positive. Maryland in Liberia expanded physically as
Russwurm began to acquire more and more land. By 1846, Russwurm had added the coastal
towns of Tabou, Bassa, and Little Berriby to the colony, which only served to strengthen the
monopoly on trade. 46 The independence of the Republic of Liberia in 1847 and its recognition
by European nations only further encouraged Latrobe to accelerate his own timetable for
Maryland in Liberia’s proclamation. The “word Republic is a magic one” here and its influence
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on emigration clear, wrote Latrobe to Russwurm. 47 The independence of Maryland in Liberia
would be the final step in fulfilling Latrobe’s vision for the United States and Africa. This last
objective proved the most difficult for Latrobe, however, because of the situation in the United
States. Challenges remained in the United States that had to be addressed if Latrobe’s vision was
to be achieved.
The crisis of the early 1840s in Africa had repercussions in the United States. Even
before news of the most serious conflict to date with the Greboes reached America, criticism of
the colony began to surface due to the departure of the missionaries. The negative publicity
turned public opinion against the MSCS, particularly outside the state. For example, in New
York, Reverend Leonard Bacon, once a member of the American Colonization Society, attacked
the traveling agent of the MSCS, Reverend John M. Roberts. 48 Pointing to the recent conflict
between the missionaries in Africa and Governor Russwurm, Bacon declared that it was the
agents of the MSCS who were accountable for the moral and religious problems in the colony.
Roberts had responsibility for recruiting emigrants who were not only suited for settlement in
Africa, but also those most likely to succeed. Therefore, if the colonists failed, Roberts was to
blame for many of the difficulties in the colony, according to Bacon. Ralph R. Gurley, long-time
agent of the ACS, sadly reported to the corresponding secretary James Hall that Bacon’s attack
upon Roberts has “greatly disturbed some of our friends [and] may have among those who do not
know him, nor the history of his connexion with the Society, an injurious influence.” 49 The
criticism was hardly fair; few of the agents, not even Latrobe, knew those who wanted to go to
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the colony well enough to anticipate their behavior once in Maryland in Liberia. Nor was this
the first time such charges had been made. In fact, Reverend J. Leighton Wilson made similar
accusations in his correspondence with Latrobe in 1837. Had Bacon known of the activities
taking place in Maryland in Liberia described above he probably would have used them to
further support his charge. The charges nevertheless hurt Latrobe’s efforts to cull more support
for colonization, particularly in New England.
Opposition from African Americans surfaced in Baltimore too in spite of MSCS efforts
to counter critics. Objections to colonization were “so virulent and unrelenting” that friends of
the MSCS organized a “Society of Enquiry” in Baltimore to directly engage African Americans
in hopes that they would voluntarily leave the state. Black leaders sympathetic to the cause,
especially Garrison Draper, agreed to contribute to the effort. The MSCS recognized Draper’s
support of colonization and offered him as much space in its colonization journal as he wanted.
The MSCS also arranged for Anthony Wood, a Cape Palmas resident, to attend the first meeting.
The MSCS had employed such methods before to promote its purposes, bringing colonists back
to Maryland specifically to make appeals to the black community. However, such tactics had
produced little fruit for the society. 50 These years were arguably some of the toughest for
Latrobe and the Maryland society even though it was a relatively calm period in the conflict
between slave states and free states. Nevertheless, the opposition of Latrobe managed to survive
the missionary scandal, the opposition of abolitionists and African Americans challenges from
slaveholders and all the problems of the colony.
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Finally, in 1845, Latrobe was heartened by new opportunities, which arose that promised
to advance the colonization movement. The relatively peaceful climate of American politics
coincided with the colony’s steady rate of growth. The society also proudly announced an
economic venture in 1845 on the part of several African Americans in Baltimore—the creation
of the Liberia Packet. Latrobe had long envisioned a regular, society owned transport between
Baltimore and Cape Palmas. The vessel, planned as early as 1837, fulfilled several objectives.
Latrobe assumed that a society owned ship would reduce expenses and generate revenues that
the MSCS could use to offset its costs. Latrobe did not look to commercial revenues for
potential profits, but rather emphasized commerce as the means to further colonization.
Combining the sailing venture with the expansion of the colony achieved by Russwurm in 1846
strengthened the colony’s economic position and promised to prepare Maryland in Liberia for its
move to independence in the future. Furthermore, Latrobe anticipated that a booming economy
created by these endeavors in Maryland in Liberia would draw colonists, especially those being
squeezed out of employment at the docks and shipyards of Baltimore by the swelling number of
immigrants from Europe. This too would reduce the settlers’ dependence on indigenous
Africans. Finally, a regular line between the ports could facilitate communication and increase
travel opportunities for African Americans to visit the colony before moving there. Increased
trade, expansion of the colony, and the availability of testimonies from sailors who visited the
colony on a regular basis would be effective weapons in countering the arguments of
colonization’s opponents. Unfortunately, the society never had the additional resources to make
it happen before 1845. 51
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In 1845, a small group of African Americans from Baltimore gave new life to the effort
to acquire a vessel. The society solicited investors again in the spring; to Latrobe’s delight, these
men provided the much hoped for revenue that made the Liberia Packet a reality. The operation,
however, was not what he had initially anticipated. The packet belonged to the Chesapeake and
Liberia Trading Company, a joint-stock venture started by a small number of Baltimore’s
African American community. The company had other help too, as the state incorporated the
business and the MSCS guaranteed it at least $2,000 in freight annually. The ACS followed suit
guaranteeing at least the same amount of business to the company. 52
The state’s actions regarding the Chesapeake and Liberia Trading Company were
designed to give investors a degree of financial and legal protection from white businessmen.
The Maryland legislature, as part of the act of incorporation, specified that the majority of the
company’s stockholders had to be African Americans. This, it was assumed, would give the
venture more legitimacy and credibility among potential colonists and customers. Latrobe
further proposed that African Americans operate the line. Latrobe wanted blacks for the ship’s
crew to help dispel the charges propagated by abolitionists that emigrants were sold into slavery
after leaving the state. Due to the state’s involvement, the Liberia Packet had both African
American owners and crewmembers. This virtually guaranteed that white business interests
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would not be able to exploit the commercial value of the colonies in West Africa through the
company. 53
The state did tie the Chesapeake and Liberia Trading Company to the interests of
colonization, however. While on the surface, the whole endeavor was legally separate from the
colonization society, in reality the operations of the trading company were closely linked to the
MSCS because the act of incorporation also dictated that a three-member commission oversee its
activities. It was no coincidence that Latrobe, James Hall, and fellow MSCS member William
Crane comprised that panel. Through this role the MSCS could ensure favorable rates of
transportation for its emigrants as well as for merchandise it sent to the colony for its own
trading purposes. 54
The packet operated successfully over the next six years, but its operation did very little
to raise emigration rates among Maryland’s African American community. Latrobe, like many
other colonizationists sought explanations for the society’s inability to draw new colonists.
Emigrants had more rights and freedoms in the West African colonies and more economic
opportunities in Latrobe’s mind. Combined with an increasingly oppressive environment in the
United States, these factors should have generated a flood of colonists. Still colonizationists
found it increasingly difficult to convince African Americans it was in their best interest or that
Maryland’s white citizens should continue to support the society. Agents reported that they
often found less than favorable receptions awaiting when traveling the state. The fact was that
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the best efforts of colonizationists, even those more recognizable than Latrobe, did not appeal to
African Americans. Therefore, members of the MSCS began looking inward, examining their
own actions to determine why, in the face of such heavy discrimination and rising sectional
conflict that would likely result in more social and economic pressure on African Americans,
Maryland’s black population did not flock to Maryland in Liberia.
The Maryland Colonization Journal published one answer to this question in January of
1847. An anonymous author suggested that colonizationists were in fact making their efforts
more difficult because of the arguments that they used to promote the cause. 55 Most
colonizationists started with an assumption that equality between the races was unrealistic.
Latrobe argued that African Americans were capable of improving their condition if given
opportunities for education, but prejudice proved too strong and widespread to achieve true
social and political equality in the United States. This reasoning was steeped in the Jeffersonian
thinking that was so influential in Latrobe’s generation, particularly among men in the border
South where the push for colonization as a means to preserve the republic was the strongest.
Upper South Democrats like Latrobe as well as their political rivals, Whigs such as Henry Clay,
wholeheartedly accepted the notion that if two free races existed, sooner or later, they must be
separated or the republic would fall. This was one subject on which members of the two parties
dominating national politics could find some common ground. The republic Latrobe envisioned
had no room for African Americans.
Yet the situation was only getting worse. The annexation of Texas in 1845, followed by
the Mexican War, further inflamed the debate over slavery and made the peaceful coexistence of
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free whites and blacks seem even less possible. However, some believed that this argument,
made so often by Latrobe, had backfired. Rather than encourage emigration, it stirred the pride
of African Americans to the point that they determined to stay no matter how oppressive
American society became. 56 What seemed to Latrobe to be a pragmatic statement of reality
actually created more enemies than he realized. Latrobe differentiated himself from the Deep
South by looking to the extinction of slavery, while at the same time seeking to remove the
greatest threat to the Union in his eyes—a second free race. For this he was a traitor to hard-line
slavery supporters but “a Negro-hating colonizationist” to abolitionists. 57
Latrobe recognized that colonization appealed to different people for different reasons,
but this also created a problem. Latrobe’s defense of colonization to white audiences aroused
criticism from Baltimore’s African American community. Arguments that supported the
preservation of the American republic by separating the races constituted a poor sermon to
preach to African Americans. Latrobe’s rhetoric harkened back to arguments used by the
federalists in winning support for the Constitution. A homogeneous population—essential for a
republic—referred to a white culture. When he spoke at places such as the state house in
Annapolis, for example, the audience was overwhelmingly white. These arguments resonated
with his listeners even if their motives differed from Latrobe’s.
Latrobe needed to craft a different message to reach African Americans, one that extolled
the liberty they would have in Liberia as well as the possibility for self-determination. In fact,
Latrobe’s efforts through the MSCS had begun to deliver on such promises. From the beginning

56

MSCS Papers,XII. Newspapers, reel 28. Maryland Colonization Journal, January, 1847. Vol. 3.-No. 19,

291.
57

MSCS Papers,XII. Newspapers, reel 28. Maryland Colonization Journal, May, 1849. Vol. 4.-No.23;
William Freehling, Road to Disunion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 353-354, 422.

218

of the colony, settlers had a say in selecting officials, with the exception of the governor. They
practiced law, used juries to judge the guilt or innocence of those accused of crimes, and pursued
an education if not for themselves, then for their children. This was beyond the realm of
opportunities extended to African Americans in the United States. Latrobe made no appeal to
the civic pride of African Americans, because he did not want to invoke the feelings exhibited
for the republic by some members of the black community. African American leaders
recognized the contribution their people had made to the United States and they asserted what
they believed their rightful claim to America—a claim that was as strong as any white man’s.
The settlers in Maryland in Liberia reminded Latrobe of this fact in justifying their demands for
aid from the colonization society. 58 Furthermore, there were shining examples for African
Americans to follow, examples that gave them a hope that, whether Latrobe understood it or not,
supported the notion that equality was perhaps attainable. One of the best examples, in fact,
came from Baltimore itself via Frederick Douglass, a former slave who fled the city and
eventually gained his freedom as well as the friendship of white Americans in the North. Some
colonists felt that this was a false hope, but it was hope nonetheless. 59 Still, Latrobe tried to be
careful to emphasize that only in Africa could most blacks expect to enjoy the freedom and
opportunity of Douglass.
Another area Latrobe needed to address was the growing opposition of slaveholders to
state support for the MSCS. The society still depended on the state for a significant portion of its
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funding even after the successful launching of the Liberia Packet. While such ventures were
partly intended to increase the revenues available to the MSCS, they fell far short of the total
revenues needed to fund the colony’s civil list. Slaveholders bristled at any perceived attack on
their labor force. The issues they raised at the slaveholders’ convention of 1841 eventually
found a sympathetic ear in the House of Delegates. As Maryland colonizationists examined their
progress, John Johnson, the chair of the Ways and Means Committee, notified Latrobe that
slaveholders had finally succeeded in securing a motion to repeal the appropriation of 1832. The
slave interest could protect their property by appealing to Americans’ natural hatred for spending
tax dollars on unnecessary programs.
To counter slaveholder opposition, Johnson asked that Latrobe, who had addressed the
members in the past on this very issue, to come to Annapolis before a vote was called. The
primary reason for the slaveholders’ sudden success in challenging the continuing appropriation
was that the state’s public debt weighed against the “smallness of the apparent results as
compared with the amount of money expended by the Society.” 60 Latrobe defended the cause
and urged that the state continue its support, as the colony was not yet able to stand alone. He
had to counter some damaging facts, however. It was true that the society had not removed great
numbers of African Americans, but the cost-benefit ratio was not so simple as slaveholders
suggested. Maryland now had a moral obligation, he argued, to Maryland in Liberia.
Abandoning the colony financially would cause considerable suffering among the colonists. A
more powerful argument was that the state needed to continue its efforts through the MSCS
because immigration from Europe would force African Americans out of the state in the future.
There must be a place to send them; Maryland in Liberia and colonization served a future
60
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purpose, and past numbers were not indicative of the potential. Latrobe carried the day, and the
motion to halt funding was defeated for another year. 61 Challenges against state funding
resurfaced in 1847, but as before, the delegates amenable to colonization helped the MSCS
prevent any cutbacks in funding. Still, the MSCS had transported only about 1,000 people to
Maryland in Liberia, and a very small number of Marylanders went to Caribbean islands, though
Latrobe discouraged this location as a destination for African Americans. 62
National events were equally unsettling for the colonization movement. Texas, so far
removed from Maryland physically, impacted the MSCS’s arguments beginning in 1845 by
bringing the extension of slavery into the national spotlight again. Latrobe urged state action as
the safest means to address slavery, and that seemed adequate as long as no national crises
emerged to threaten the Union. The debate over the annexation of Texas did just this by fueling
contention over the expansion of slavery. As much as Latrobe wished to avoid the slavery
debate, it was a divisive issue that polarized the nation and even Maryland. Texas illustrated this
more than any of the previous controversies, the gag rule included, by upsetting the balance
between the sections. The Upper South sought to diffuse slavery away to protect the Union
while the Deep South saw such efforts as part of a general effort to deprive citizens of their
rights, which undercut the desirability of sustaining the Union. The Texas controversy further
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enraged the North where Americans already fumed about the ‘slave power’ that dominated their
government. 63
One result of the growing tension caused by debate over Texas, was a stricter control of
slave and free African American populations. After the rebellion led by the slave Nat Turner
there had been a general increase in proscriptive laws against African Americans, which
continued long after 1831. Renewed political debate only added to these tendencies. Not
surprisingly, Latrobe presumed that stricter regulations against black civil rights would increase
the desire to emigrate as blacks perceived these laws as the beginning of social pressures that
would force African Americans to leave the United States. 64 In Maryland, slave owners in
counties with large numbers of slaves made concerted efforts to drive free African Americans
out of these areas. While these attempts often succeeded in driving blacks from the counties of
southern Maryland, often they went no further than Baltimore City. This migration pattern,
along with the practice of selling slaves deeper into the South, reflected what was happening on a
larger scale. Whites generally sought to avoid the possibility of being stuck with large black
populations should antislavery politicians achieve a general emancipation. 65
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Maryland was a microcosm of the nation, which included several divisions within the
south. 66 Maryland, for instance, was a southern state where some counties had few if any slaves,
and thus little loyalty to the slave interest. In other counties slavery was declining, making it less
important economically. But in the very southern counties, large slave populations remained and
slavery was still deeply entrenched. Further complicating Maryland’s politics was the rising
economic and political strength of its northern urban centers, especially Baltimore. The biggest
problem slave owners faced other than attacks from those opposed to slavery was the declining
productivity of the soil. This was true in other areas of the South as well. Texas appealed to
those tied to the slave plantation system in the Deep South or those in a state like Maryland who
supported annexation because it would open new markets for them to dispose of their excess
slaves. In fact, Maryland joined with Kentucky and Virginia as the biggest sellers of slaves
within the United States between 1830 and 1860. 67
The tumultuous atmosphere created by the annexation of Texas should have been
expected as Americans discussed the possibility long before 1845. During the administration of
Andrew Jackson some urged that he invite Texas to join the Union. Jackson avoided the issue; it
was too politically sensitive in the 1830s, especially after his war on the bank. Jackson’s
position on issues such as tariffs, and his determination to destroy the Second National Bank led
to the organization of an anti-Jackson political party. Anti-Jackson feeling was strongest in the
North, and an effort to bring Texas into the Union after his war on the bank, a reduction in the
tariff, and the gag rule in Congress would have risked irreparable division between the sections
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of the United States. Questions about annexation, just as attacks on slavery, seemed to fade in
the latter 1830s, which was what a colonizationist like Latrobe wanted because it allowed the
societies to do their work in a less hostile environment. However, when the issue of Texas
reemerged it revived the earlier intensity in part because it threatened to upset the national
balance between free and slave states—something national politicians had worked to maintain
since the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Texas was vital to the Black Belts of the south because
it was fresh land, economically coveted, and a place where declining regions could sell off large
numbers of slaves. The North saw this as yet another means of preserving or perhaps even
increasing the national power of the slave interest. The annexation of Texas forced Latrobe to
accept, grudgingly, that independent state action would not achieve his goals if such conflicts
continued. In this sense Latrobe found himself in the same sinking ship as national politicians;
they had to recognize that the Missouri Compromise could no longer keep slavery discussions
out of Congress. 68
Texas offered many things to the slave power. Nationally, the annexation of this huge
western territory provided the opportunity to check the growing power of the North, which had
made steady gains in the House of Representatives due to immigration. Slave interests had
already lost their ability to significantly influence that body. Marylanders knew this well as their
state’s share of representatives steadily declined during the first half of the nineteenth century.
There was also the Pacific Northwest to consider, as those territories would become states at
some point in the near future. The saving grace for the South and the slave power before the
addition of Texas had been the Senate. This check, however, depended on maintaining the
balance between slave and free states, and on the unity of the Democratic Party faithful.
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Southerners in the White House offered some comfort, but slaveholders were still worried.
Texas and the five additional states that southerners hoped to carve out of its western tracts made
slaveholders salivate. Not only would it save them economically, it would ensure their continued
protection in America’s political system, since most people recognized that the North would be
unable to amend the Constitution regardless of its rapid population growth. 69
For Latrobe, the safety valve of the West was not just for slavery. The West, including
Texas, kept social pressure from causing an explosion of racial wars. Manifest Destiny also
allowed the African colonies and their parent societies more time to gain strength; it was more
time to prepare for the wave of emigrants all colonizationists anticipated. Maryland
Congressmen agreed with this analysis and openly supported colonization because of it. Others
suggested that the additional territory would soften the pro-slavery stance because it alleviated
their fears of being hemmed in by the Free-soil movement emerging in the 1840s. 70
Texas began another national debate that made any new territory a political issue and the
intensity of the subsequent debate made it more difficult for colonizationists like Latrobe
because abolitionists looked askance at any program that did not promise the end of slavery.
Worse still for his program was the appearance of Free-Soilers who not only wanted slavery
prohibited from new territories, they wanted all African Americans kept out. On the surface it
seems that the Free-Soilers’ platform would play into the hands of colonizationists. However, in
fact it hurt Latrobe’s cause because it further threatened slaveholders who interpreted the debate
as an attack on their rights and opportunities to move or dispose of their property as they wished.
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In the end, the Free Soil platform caused thousands of defections from both the Whig and
Democratic parties in the 1840s, which only further divided the polity. 71
The conflict with Mexico raised additional questions and prompted an anti-slavery
response in August of 1846 embodied in the Wilmot Proviso. David Wilmot proposed to bar
slavery from any territories gained from Mexico in the war. The resulting debate divided the
country along sectional interests and destroyed the long-standing party unity of the Democrats.
The division was most evident between Northern and Border South Democrats who opposed the
annexation of new territory and the extension of slavery. 72 Latrobe had always been a strong
supporter of the Democratic Party, especially during Jackson’s administration. 73 Nevertheless,
he would cross party lines if his conscience dictated; still he did not want to see sectional
conflict. The debate caused by the Mexican cession and Pennsylvania Congressman David
Wilmot’s amendment was the worst thing that could happen for his vision for America.
The debate over the proviso confirmed Latrobe’s long-held belief that slavery must be
kept out of national politics. Southerners saw the proviso as an attempt to diminish their political
influence over national policies. As a result, colonizationists had to operate in an even more
hostile environment. The effects of the conflict were apparent to Latrobe. The society journal
noted that the debate over slavery’s expansion was so hot that none, whether from the North or
South, could discuss the topic rationally. The sections of the country were too different in
“character and circumstances” for any agreement now. The editorial echoed a line of reasoning
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that Latrobe had laid out over the years in supporting colonization. The issue of slavery had
been settled by the Constitution—it was a subject for the individual states alone. 74 Latrobe was
hardly unique in his position; the reasoning behind his position on slavery was widespread
among southerners. The commentary was meant as a plea, a voice of reason advocating a
‘middle ground’ hopeful of calming the fury over slavery in national politics. Latrobe had made
this same appeal in the 1830s during the first gag rule controversy. The overriding tone evident
in his writings, however, suggests a new phase in his thinking as he sought to adapt colonization
to meet the growing crisis that threatened to destroy the Union. 75
Colonizationists beyond Maryland knew the significance of Wilmot’s amendment. The
proviso was of even greater consequence after statehood was proposed for California and New
Mexico. Free Soilers had “been out generaled in the matter of Texas, but we had our
Presidential candidate in the field, and could not desert him. At all even if we cannot do any
good, we will not permit anybody else to do any.” 76 Slaveholders felt likewise. Wilmot’s
provision to keep slavery out of new territories would effectively fence slavery in, and the
addition of a free California would shift the political advantage even more in favor of the North
at the Congressional level. As such, pro-slavery factions vowed to halt the proviso and prevent
New Mexico from entering as a free state while anti-slavery forces attempted to ram the
amendment through Congress. This, noted the national colonization society, violated the
Constitution and the republican principles which had been the legacy of the revolutionary
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generation. Further, northerners were not giving in this time; they were tired of the humiliation
inflicted by the slave power and the Northern doughfaces that supported the South. 77
Maryland colonizationists felt the effect of the escalation of tensions immediately. The
debate radicalized both sides, commented one colonizationist in Virginia. While there had been
public support for colonization before Wilmot’s Proviso, that optimism quickly disappeared.
Due to the feud over slavery’s expansion, many whites in slave states now perceived
colonization as a failure. 78 Some even went so far as to suggest that the general scheme of
colonization had been premature. Some day, when the slaves were properly civilized, they
would return to Africa as the bearers of civilization and Christianity. 79 Few colonizationists
would have agreed. In Latrobe’s mind, things were heating up to the point that colonization was
an essential factor in maintaining peace.
Colonizationists generally denounced the efforts of some to force the proviso through
Congress. Let it alone, many said publicly, and “all will be well.” 80 The MSCS, as a matter of
policy, had formerly refused to discuss slavery or abolition publicly or in its publications. But
the editor of the MSCS journal, Dr. James Hall, abandoned this policy in 1849. 81 The move by
Hall to address slavery in society publications illustrated the society’s aggressive policy designed
to push colonization as the means to remove the subject of slavery from national agitation.
Politicians offered an alternative, the policy of popular sovereignty. Although Daniel S.
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Dickinson, Lewis Cass, and George M. Dallas had suggested popular sovereignty as early as
1847, it was Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas who maneuvered the issue through Congress three
years later. One of the primary tenets of the compromise was that popular sovereignty would
remove the issue of slavery from Congress. Let the residents of each territory decide. As a
strong states rights’ democrat, this compromise was acceptable to Latrobe; let the states decide
had been his motto in colonization for nearly twenty years. 82
Popular sovereignty seemed a saving grace for Border South Democrats like Latrobe who
saw the issue of territorial expansion tear apart the Democratic Party and the nation. The notion
of popular will determining the fate of slavery in a territory about to become a state appealed to
Latrobe because it fit into what he based his colonization plans on since 1832. For nearly twenty
years he proclaimed that the individual states were the only entities where slavery could be
discussed safely. In the realm of colonization, support for a program that resulted in a
compromise restoring balance between the sections seemed to be bringing the state and national
societies together.
Though Latrobe’s hopes were very high for the success of colonization in 1847 he had to
weather more crises as the decade closed. The worst troubles in the colony seemed to have
passed and the notion of popular sovereignty advocated in Congress as the guiding principle for
turning territories into states promised to relieve sectional tensions. Furthermore, the
proclamation of independence by the oldest Liberian colony in that same year seemed to have
propelled unprecedented numbers of African Americans to consider moving to Liberia. The road
to this point, however, had been difficult. Maryland in Liberia faced its most difficult challenge
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from a united Grebo people, and the fact of the matter was that Latrobe was powerless to do
anything about it. Fortunately, for the MSCS and the settlers, the United States military was
there to assist the colony in its worst dispute to date with indigenous Africans. Likewise,
garnering support for colonization became a more difficult task after the annexation of Texas.
Still, the MSCS had weathered all the storms between 1843 and 1847, and with the independence
of Republic of Liberia, the expansion of Maryland in Liberia, the creation of a dedicated
commercial link through the Chesapeake and Liberia Trading Company, and the emergence of
the doctrine of popular sovereignty domestically, it looked as though Latrobe was quite an
accurate prophet. Perhaps now it would become clear just what colonization, as he envisioned it,
could achieve.
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Chapter 7: The Last Years, 1848-1854

The year 1847 brought new hopes to colonization plans of the MSCS on both sides of the
Atlantic. The independence of the former ACS colony and its recognition by European nations
renewed interest among African Americans in colonization. The MSCS hoped to capitalize on
the momentum the movement seemed to be building. National support for allowing the fate of
slavery to be determined within the borders of territories and states suggested that sectional
conflict might be resolved, enabling white America to accept the wisdom of Latrobe’s program.
The year 1847 marked a watershed of sorts in other ways for Latrobe as well. The MSCS was no
longer in debt, its colony was growing, and the Liberia Packet provided a more consistent
connection between America and Africa. All that remained for the MSCS was to initiate the
process that would make its colony independent and Latrobe’s final vision for Africa and
America would be fulfilled. But colonization was neither simple nor easy. As Latrobe and the
MSCS soon discovered, the goals of the settlers in Maryland in Liberia were not always
compatible with the society’s objectives. This chapter narrates Latrobe’s last years with the
MSCS as well as the process he orchestrated in making Maryland in Liberia independent in
1854. As in the last chapter, the MSCS dealt with colonization on two fronts. The positive
conditions existing in 1847 quickly dissipated and Latrobe found crises threatening his plans
again. He thus had to consider what objectives were most important to colonization’s success.
Ultimately, he made choices that demonstrated what was most important to him, which clearly
were the policies that would most speedily help rid the United States of its racial conflict.
The independence of the Republic of Liberia in 1847 and its recognition by European
nations was an event that Latrobe could not ignore. On one level it must have given him some
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sense of satisfaction despite his differences with the ACS because he had been involved in that
period of Liberian history as well. The most important effect of independence for the MSCS,
however, was that it encouraged Latrobe to accelerate the timetable for Maryland in Liberia’s
proclamation of independence. Latrobe revealed some of his personal sentiments when he later
wrote John Russwurm that the “word Republic is a magic one” here. Its influence on emigration
was clear to Latrobe. 1 The independence of Maryland in Liberia would be the final step in
fulfilling Latrobe’s ideas for republicanism in Africa, an idea that became more developed as
time passed. Accelerating the process, however, required ignoring certain articles of the
constitution drawn up in 1834. The constitution adopted for Maryland in Liberia originally made
population the determining factor in independence. That document provided that once the male
population of the colony reached 5,000, the colony would automatically become a representative
government and proclaim its independence. 2 This was abandoned as Latrobe moved to make the
colony a republic in its own right so as not to lose out on the momentum of colonization in the
United States. The proclamation of the independent Republic of Liberia seemed to renew
interest in colonization. Though largely a decision by the MSCS, Latrobe stressed the need for
the enthusiasm for the independence of Maryland’s colony to appear to be an act initiated by the
colonists, who, by and by, had no problem following along.
Latrobe had very specific plans about how Maryland in Liberia would proclaim its
independence. Unfortunately for him, Latrobe found the process did not move quickly. There
were several factors that contributed to the pace at which independence came. The war with
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Mexico halted communication with the colony temporarily in 1847. The colonists also were
divided over the nature of the government they would have once independent. And finally,
Latrobe himself was still forming his own ideas about the exact nature of government that would
follow, thus the real process of independence took almost four years to begin. The real push for
independence by Latrobe started in 1851. Latrobe determined that the colony was to be an
independent republic first, and then he wanted it to form a confederation with the other Liberian
nation and its dependencies “like the old colonies of Great Britain in America.” The colonists,
he told Russwurm, should then look forward to this union “as a general government of the
United Republic of Africa.” The United States should be the model. To Latrobe the society in
Maryland was already engaged in achieving this goal, and he instructed Russwurm to begin
preparations in Africa for independence and confederation. 3 Though initiating the process,
Latrobe cautioned Russwurm not to proclaim independence too soon; he urged him to be patient
until all the other preparations were complete. It is also noteworthy that Latrobe assumed that a
confederation of the Liberian settlements would naturally appeal to all the parties. He would
learn that not everyone shared his sentiments.
Latrobe recognized, nevertheless, that several tasks needed to be accomplished before the
colony issued a declaration of independence. First, the colonists needed to write a new
constitution. Naturally the American version should be the model, but Latrobe also suggested
that it include a provision giving the MSCS preferences in sending immigrants. Second, he
hoped that Russwurm could arrange a confederation with the Republic of Liberia ahead of
independence. “It will give me unqualified pleasure to hear from you after you shall have visited
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Monrovia that the confederation can be accomplished.” Finally, he urged Russwurm to
emphasize the need for all the colonies established by African Americans to devise their own
representation in a Congressional body. The details of representation should be decided as a
subject “of African or Liberian nationality,” rather than one determined by the societies here. 4
There was one possibility in the move to independence that Latrobe hoped the colonists
would not entertain. Some of the settlers of Maryland in Liberia favored annexing the colony to
the Republic of Liberia as a county. This seemed the easiest method in attaining independence;
it further seemed the most acceptable option to the leadership of the new nation. Latrobe
strongly opposed this fate for the colony even though he himself began working more closely
with the ACS in the early 1850s. Annexation was not advisable, in his mind, because it would
negate the boost he hoped independence would give to immigration from Maryland; it would
also cause the state legislature to rescind the annual appropriation, which he hoped to continue
for transportation. Furthermore, handing the colony over to the older settlement as a dependency
would be offensive to all those who worked to establish the colony. Finally, annexation would
result in the Maryland settlement losing its most industrious colonists to Monrovia’s commercial
advantages and the liberty the settlers enjoyed. What Latrobe feared was that these citizens
would become absentee landlords—the system that “has destroyed Ireland.” Instead, full
independence secured the colony against such a fate by “giving dignity and importance to
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Maryland in Liberia,” Latrobe believed. Nothing but the “Republicanism of the United States of
Africa will guarantee the independence of Cape Palmas and the Maryland colonists. 5
On the surface Latrobe’s stance on independence seems very contradictory. Latrobe
opposed confederation of the colonies in any way in 1838 when other colonizationists and
several other societies proposed the idea in Philadelphia. Now it appeared that he was in fact
suggesting what had been proposed thirteen years earlier. What had changed in Latrobe’s
thinking? First, the independence of the ACS colony had motivated his sense of urgency in
making the Maryland colony independent. Second, he realized that this one word sparked a new
interest in African American emigration as evidenced by the rising numbers leaving for Africa,
although increased emigration also resulted from the tensions in America. Whatever the cause,
Latrobe wanted Maryland to benefit from the increase in emigration. Latrobe’s emphasis on
independence and confederation on the model of the United States reflected his vision and desire
to realize his goals in America. Latrobe showed that he would sacrifice some policies and even
the Greboes to make colonization work because he believed he was fighting to save the
American republic. He also never hesitated to change his course when necessary to ensure
success for colonization. On the one hand, willingness to adapt his program demonstrated how
he was like many other antebellum Americans. Latrobe believed in the republic and its
preservation, but also in its superiority as the best type of political system. This was why he
opposed annexation, and why he supported both independence as a republic and the notion of a
United Republic of Africa. Latrobe’s evolution as a colonizationist, his changing and sometimes
contradictory policies, nevertheless reflected a consistency in that he never ceased to act in a
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manner that he believed would ultimately realize his vision—a white republic in the United
States and the spread of Christianity and western civilization.
Latrobe and the MSCS’s hopes for seeing the colony become an independent republic
suffered a significant blow during 1851. Governor John Russwurm, in whom Latrobe had placed
so much faith and trust, passed away during that summer. Russwurm suffered from repeated
illnesses, and he died unexpectedly before he could carry out any of the diplomatic overtures
designed to create a confederation of colonies as Latrobe instructed. This too delayed the
process because Russwurm was most intimately aware of all the ideas Latrobe had for the
colony’s future. Dr. Samuel F. McGill succeeded Governor John Russwurm as the executive
officer in Maryland in Liberia. The choice seemed a natural one to Latrobe; McGill had been a
long-time friend of his, the society had paid for his education, and he was an employee of the
MSCS and confidant of Russwurm. However, McGill did not share the vision of Latrobe and
Russwurm, and this delayed independence for the colony as well. 6
Latrobe was unaware of the difference of opinion McGill held regarding independence,
and the MSCS was in a bind of sorts because Russwurm had initiated the electoral process for
the selection of government officials. Thus he instructed the doctor to take over the colony until
those elections could be held. The most important task for McGill, Latrobe said, was “to get the
consent of the Republic [of Liberia] to a confederation—to get rid of the idea of a county.”
McGill disagreed with Latrobe on this issue and had even made plans to leave Maryland in
Liberia for Monrovia before Russwurm’s death. Furthermore, he was not afraid to voice his
concerns about a confederation as outlined by Latrobe. McGill’s actions confirmed the fears of
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Latrobe that the most skilled settlers may leave the colony. More important was McGill’s open
support for annexation, which led many colonists to conclude that this was Latrobe’s desire for
the colony. 7
The colonists formed at least three factions on approaches to the MSCS’s move toward
independence. One group, sympathetic to McGill, desired the Republic of Liberia to annex
Maryland in Liberia as a county, thus making one Liberian state. The second group wished the
colony to become an independent republic in its own right, and form an alliance of sovereign
nations with its sister colonies. The third faction sought independence and confederation with
the Republic of Liberia as states. This segment appeared the strongest of the colonists, not
simply because it was the model preferred by Latrobe, but also because more colonists endorsed
this plan. However, even these settlers expressed a number of concerns that they hoped to see
addressed before independence.
The annexationists addressed the MSCS first to explain their reasons for supporting this
plan. In short, they desired annexation because they assumed that the position of the colony
relative to trade, international status, and civil benefits, particularly education, would be
strengthened by the connection of the colonies, one of which had already been internationally
recognized as a republic. McGill threw his weight to this group, arguing that the older colony
would never agree to a confederation with Maryland in Liberia as Latrobe proposed.
Furthermore, foreign merchants paid no heed to the colony as it was, and a change in name

7

MSCS Papers, II. Correspondence Received, reel 6. Samuel F. McGill to John Latrobe, January 9, 1851,
September 25, 1851; William A. Prout to John Latrobe, September 23, 1851; MSCS Papers, III. Correspondence
Sent, Latrobe Letter Book, reel 17. John Latrobe to Samuel F. McGill, October, 1851.

237

would do little to alter this fact at Cape Palmas. 8 William Prout, one of the more prominent
citizens favoring confederation, countered that McGill’s willingness to annex the colony as a
county under any terms would destroy the freedoms the colonists enjoyed. The danger in
annexation as a county, as Prout and his supporters saw it, was in losing the legislative freedom
that they enjoyed during the seventeen-year existence of Maryland in Liberia. For this reason,
independence and confederation as two states was most appealing to William Prout; it required
little fundamental change and would retain all the powers currently exercised by the colonists. 9
Other colonists raised questions relating their concerns about the changes that independence may
bring. What, they asked, would become of the society’s property and possessions? Would they
have to continue the prohibition of alcohol? Members of the group raising these questions also
expressed concern that they would not have a say in whatever action the MSCS took. Given that
it was their future, such questions were justified. 10
McGill’s open support of annexation infuriated those colonists already suspicious of their
new governor. Specifically, some questioned his motives and whether or not his actions really
benefited the colony. William Prout informed Latrobe that he believed McGill was using his
position as governor to illegally acquire society-held lands at very cheap prices, from which he
would be able to reap immense profits after independence. This, determined Joshua Stewart,
was not only an abuse of his power and a conflict of interest, but it was particularly offensive
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because McGill had no authority to do anything in the colony as far as he was concerned because
he had resigned the position of governor. It was only an appeal from Latrobe that kept McGill in
the executive post until the elections were held. Stewart, unaware of this fact, boldly announced
that the colonists would not budge until Latrobe responded to the accusations and addressed their
concerns. A representative committee of colonists conveyed them to the board in November of
1851. 11
Latrobe’s position was quite clear on independence, as was his position on the questions
posed by the colonists. The property of the MSCS would be transferred to the new state, and
alcohol, in his opinion, should remain illegal. As far as the future state, his response to the
colonists was firm. Independence and confederation as two states was what he wanted. “No
Republic one and indivisible, ever stood, or can stand,” he declared, and “the Federation of
States…is the only plan consistent with permanent freedom.” County annexation, he agreed,
would require Marylanders to give up power, and this should never be done; it is the “precursor
of a dictatorship, an Empire, and a despotism. Freedom, Republican freedom in Africa, can
exist only through the agency of confederated states…united as a constitutional
republic…consolidation may give you a Louis Napoleon yet.” 12 Latrobe encouraged individual
colonists to follow his plans through short notes to specific people; this offered the best chance
for retaining their personal freedoms. Until this process was completed, however, he asked that
the colonists trust in the MSCS leadership and obey Governor McGill, if for no other reason,
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than out of respect to the society. Latrobe did not address the charges regarding the governor’s
land deals in any of his dispatches. 13
While he urged the settlers to obey the governor, Latrobe privately challenged McGill’s
contention that the older republic would never agree to confederation. Latrobe boldly declared
that Monrovia would not “dare to refuse a treaty.” Latrobe demonstrated a degree of
megalomania when he proclaimed to one Marylander that “I can have our colony declared
independent as ‘The Republic of Maryland in Liberia’ and then it will be seen” what the
Republic of Liberia will do. “I tell them this, and threaten them with the voice of the family of
nations!!! of which they are one.” Latrobe intimated that international pressure could be brought
to bear on the older republic to bring about a confederation that followed the model of the United
States. This “will be,” Latrobe bluntly stated, “the confederation I want.” 14 This was indeed a
bold statement considering the fact that the United States would not recognize the existing
republic, yet alone a second one he was trying to create. Nevertheless, Latrobe explained to
McGill that he considered the matter not from the “parental fondness of my own notions,” but as
“an old lawyer of some experience should do.” The parental tone of the letter is nonetheless
there. Latrobe had spent the last twenty years intimately involved in every aspect of the colony’s
existence. Ultimately, Latrobe found McGill’s arguments unconvincing, and, he explained, saw
no reason to change his position from that outlined in his October 1851 dispatches. In short,
Latrobe intimated that the Republic of Liberia must unite with the Maryland colony in a
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constitutional government like that of the United States or go the way of France, an “empire until
it falls into despotism.” 15
By this point Latrobe and the MSCS managers surely realized that they needed to act
soon before divisions between the colonists threatened their plans. During the course of the
summer and fall of 1852, the MSCS prepared for the colony’s independence. In its July session,
the Board of Managers directed Latrobe to address a letter to the “Secretary of the Navy in
reference to the advantages presented by Cape Palmas as a rendezvous for our Squadron while
cruising on the Coast of Africa, and to call attention to the benefits conferred upon the colony by
frequent visits of our National vessels.” 16 One purpose of this was commercial, but Latrobe had
other objectives in doing this that tied into his plans for independence. The actions of the
African Squadron had in fact benefited the colony on several occasions and Latrobe hoped this
would continue. Continuing the appearance of protection for the fledgling nation was important
in its relations with indigenous Africans. His efforts, he informed McGill, happily have paid off
as the Navy agreed to “extend its countenance to your colony as well as to its elder sister, and
with the treaty with the later, which cannot well be refused, relations may be established leading
ultimately it is hoped to a close political union as suggested.” 17 Latrobe had succeeded in doing
two things, keeping up the appearance of the United States Navy protecting the colony, and
creating a situation in which he could use this relationship to apply pressure on the older colony
to confederate with Maryland in Liberia.
15
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In November of 1852, the MSCS publicly announced its plans for the independence of
Maryland in Liberia. The MSCS members decided that it was in the best interests of the colony
to terminate its relations with the MSCS. The members, however, expressed the same desire as
Latrobe to see all the American settlements in Africa form a union “similar in its general
principles to that under which the United States have grown and prospered.” Their feelings on
the importance of the settlements confederating reflected the experiences of the United States in
its ongoing sectional crises. “It is much to be apprehended, that ill feelings, jealousy and
rivalries will spring up, leading to results which cannot be too strongly pictured or deprecated”
should there be no cooperation under a constitution. Nevertheless, the Maryland colonizationists
also realized that they could not make union a condition before declaring Maryland in Liberia
independent. Thus the leadership of the MSCS determined to “aid the colonists in organizing for
themselves a separate and Independent government,” one on which the colonists would vote.
The Board of Managers then directed Latrobe to communicate the desires of the society to the
governor and ordered an election so the settlers could begin fully determining their own future. 18
Latrobe added his thoughts to the official communication of the society. Latrobe
reiterated his feelings that McGill was incorrect regarding annexation. The independence of
Maryland in Liberia as a republic was actually just the beginning. “I desire that you should
know this.” “I have fancies which are yet immature,” but I have my “eye embracing the whole
line of coast.” Two republics united would not only benefit the settlements in Africa, it would
also help those in the United States trying to persuade Congress to recognize the colonies.
All this can be avoided by uniting the whole west coast of Africa in one
republican government_ composed of separate sovereignties_then, alone, will the
power of using one section of the coast against another section, be lost to the
18
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nations, who, utterly regardless of the great issues involved in colonization call
out to lift high the gates that the king of commerce may go in and question, now,
is, how best to form this one Republican government_ and the answer is_
copy_copy_copy in Africa, what has been done in America. This, my dear Sir, is
common everyday sense. Did not S. Carolina plume herself in the day of
Secession, on her ability to let in the Goods of England at her own rates, and so
absorb the trade of the Union!!! a notion rash, idle [and] impracticable, only
because of the confederation, or union, that made secession treason. Take care in
Africa, to have the same safeguards, addressing you now, as one holding the
opinions I know you entertain. 19
Latrobe’s words captured the sentiments of the majority of the colonists. The settlers’
enthusiasm for the plans of the society, reported McGill, had driven a new wave of land clearing
and planting of farms as well as the desire of the colonists to form a constitutional convention.20
Latrobe’s vision for Africa was becoming a real possibility.
By the time that the colonists responded to Latrobe’s communications and held their
elections, he had already accepted the leadership of the American Colonization Society. Though
officially no longer affiliated with the MSCS, he no doubt took pleasure in learning that the
colonists voted unanimously for independence as he proposed. McGill reported that the
colonists were now preparing for another vote to select delegates for a constitutional convention
and to choose commissioners to go to Baltimore for a conference with the board. Together they
would create a new constitution and nation. 21
The process moved rapidly. The colonists completed a constitution by June of 1853 and
sent it to the MSCS in Baltimore along with their representatives. The two representative bodies
amended the constitution together and the commissioners returned to Maryland in Liberia to put
19
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it before the voters. In May of 1854 the voters, nearly unanimously voted for the new
constitution. On 6 June 1854, the Republic of Maryland in Liberia held its first election of
officers. So the colony begun twenty years earlier became a nation.22
The independent state of Maryland in Liberia began with little fanfare in the United
States and without the involvement of one of the most influential men in creating the tiny nation.
So too, ended John Latrobe’s tenure with the Maryland State Colonization Society. The
organization continued to exist well into the American Civil War, though its primary purpose
was now aiding education and emigration from Maryland to Africa. Latrobe had worked to
make the settlement a success, and a model of American society and government. It was by no
means an easy task as Latrobe shared the challenges that the colonists faced in addition to those
posed by critics of such an effort in the United States. Ultimately, much of what Latrobe
suggested as well as what he did for the colony seemed contradictory. However, he succeeded
for a short period, in creating an entirely new and independent republic on the coast of Africa. It
was to be, however, a fleeting dream. The Republic of Maryland in Liberia endured only until
1857, when a war with the Greboes forced the state to join its older, sister republic as a county. 23
In examining Latrobe’s push for the independence of Maryland in Liberia, the situation in
the United States played a role as well. It also led Latrobe back to his roots with the ACS. As
Maryland in Liberia transitioned to a new period of its history, so too did the colonization
movement in the United States. Just as independence in Africa was necessary for Latrobe’s
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colonization plans to succeed in Africa, his move to the ACS was necessary to meet the changing
situation of American society.
As it turned out, the draw of the word Republic, as Latrobe interpreted it, was only part of
what led to increased interest in African Americans returning to Africa. War with Mexico from
1846 to 1848 and the resulting territorial expansion set in motion a phase of sectional conflict
that accelerated the rate of emigration, which Latrobe wanted to take advantage of by
proclaiming the MSCS colony independent. That process did not go as smoothly as he
anticipated. The conditions in the United States, while helpful in raising immigration rates to
Liberia, altered the relations of colonization societies too. One result of sectional conflict on
colonization between 1847 and 1850 was a return to friendly relations between the state and
national societies. Latrobe returned to national society meetings and communication between
the societies resumed, possibly in hoping to create an amicable relationship with the ACS that
would prove helpful in confederating the Maryland colony and the Republic of Liberia.
However, Ralph R. Gurley, long instrumental in the efforts of the ACS, was not convinced by
Latrobe’s change of heart. Although he never called Latrobe out by name, Gurley asserted his
belief that Latrobe’s plan was not the “best mode of carrying forward the scheme.” Latrobe’s
independent state action did not meet the current need in the United States and it would in fact
only succeed in transferring sectional tensions to the colonies in Africa if they united them in a
republic like America. 24
Despite Gurley’s doubts in regard to Latrobe’s ideas, Texas, the war with Mexico,
territorial cession, Wilmot’s Proviso, and California statehood not only tore at the nation, they
brought the national society and the MSCS closer out of necessity. Most colonizationists
24
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realized by 1850 that they needed to cooperate in a new way to accelerate transportation of
emigrants and restore faith in colonization as a scheme that could render sectional conflict over
slavery unnecessary. In this process, Latrobe ascended to the leadership of all of the
colonization efforts after the death of Henry Clay. Supporters of the ACS decided in January of
1853 that they wanted a leader who worked for the cause rather than one who was a figurehead
easily recognizable by white Americans. The crises of the latter 1840s convinced Latrobe of the
propriety for this change as well as the need for returning to a national plan of action. The events
in Kansas and Nebraska only confirmed this fact. Latrobe transformed his view of colonization
and its ultimate purpose and applied it beyond the state of Maryland over the next few years. His
efforts made him one of the most prominent figures in colonization before and after the Civil
War.
The change in feelings between Maryland colonizationists and the national society was
only one of the effects that the crises over the extension of slavery had on the movement.
Annual emigration from America to Africa rarely surpassed a few hundred before the crises. For
instance, in 1847 the ACS transported only 129 colonists to its colony; Maryland transported
even fewer. The only exception in migration numbers was the statistical spike after the Nat
Turner Rebellion in 1831. In the immediate aftermath the number of people applying for
transportation to Liberia exceeded the resources of all the societies combined. Even so,
colonizationists managed to muster enough to send over 700 colonists to Africa before the
momentum created by the white backlash faded. 25 The sectional conflict of the latter 1840s had
a similar effect; this one proved more lasting, however. The rise in the number of colonists was
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noticeable after 1847. Combined with the hostile environment in the United States, emigration
multiplied more than five times. By 1853, the number of colonists leaving for Africa neared
800. 26 The number of colonists the MSCS was sending to its colony had slowed to a trickle by
this time, perhaps because they did not feel obliged to leave. 27 Most interesting was the fact that
emancipated slaves from black belt states made up a significant portion of the colonists,
supporting the notion that some southerners feared an end of slavery without a resolution to the
race problem. 28 Just as had happened in the wake of Turner’s Rebellion, emigration from 1848
through the early 1850s rose to the point that the ACS could not accommodate all who wished to
leave the United States.
The crises had still other effects that colonizationists, especially Latrobe, took pleasure in
hearing. Though politicians reached a compromise in 1850, it seemed clear to some that slavery
would end in the foreseeable future. Some Congressmen from the black belt states proposed in
1850 that the federal government establish a regular fleet of at least four steamships to run from
American ports to Liberia. The pretext for this was to carry mail between the two continents;
British shipping carried most of the mail at the time. There were secondary benefits, however,
for commerce and colonization. 29 Other political action followed in state legislatures. In their
1850 sessions, both Virginia and Indiana publicly endorsed colonization. Virginia followed its
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endorsement with an appropriation of $30,000 for the use of the ACS and, to encourage
emigration, the state levied an annual tax on all free African American males. Tax receipts were
targeted at defraying the costs of colonization, but more importantly the tax illustrated the
increased pressure being applied to oust African Americans. In Indiana the legislature instructed
its national representatives to push for a national policy against the slave trade and a policy
requiring colonization. Well-known, long-serving politicians joined in this push too. Daniel
Webster stood before the rest of his Congressional colleagues and recommended that the central
government fund colonization. Webster proclaimed his willingness “to incur almost any degree
of expense to accomplish that object.” 30 While such acts must have pushed some African
Americans to leave the United States, they were also proof of Latrobe’s contention that whites
would pressure blacks to the point of a racial explosion. However, they violated one of
Latrobe’s more consistent positions, that emigration needed to be voluntary. This was a practical
consideration really, because the MSCS relied on the help of clergy. A forced removal would
draw criticism from those with humanitarian concerns and stiffen African American resistance to
his efforts.
The atmosphere for colonization had shifted. Indeed, in this context Latrobe’s efforts to
make Maryland’s colony independent appear to have been a sounder decision. More white
Americans appeared ready for the plan and willing to listen to Latrobe. Latrobe became one of
the most recognizable colonizationists. After 1851, he began to speak at venues outside of
Maryland. His speeches emphasized his growing attachment to a national system of
colonization. Addressing the annual meeting of the ACS in January of 1851, he stated that
twenty-five years ago “we were laughed at as visionary enthusiasts…Nearly all men now admit,
30
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that the two races, white and coloured…must ever be separate and distinct.” The experience of
those years has also shown that “education and refinement make no difference…where both
[races] are nominally free, that in whose hands are the political power and superior position, will
exercise a tyranny over the other in proportion to the occasions of collision between them.” The
recent act of Virginia was ample proof that this was true. 31 Discussion of slavery, in Latrobe’s
estimation, was disastrous not only for white Americans, but for African Americans. The only
saving grace for the country was the vast West yet to be filled. Westward migration prevented
the true crisis by relieving competition between immigrants and African Americans, particularly
in urban centers like Baltimore. Once the west was filled, African Americans would have to
leave the United States. 32
Like other national figures, Latrobe also pushed the importance of commerce in carrying
out colonization. The emphasis on economics served many purposes, some of which have been
previously explored in this study. On the surface Latrobe’s emphasis on commerce supports his
vision for America’s economic future. However, his support for trading ties between the two
continents as well as the directives and policies he tried to implement in Liberia were designed,
so he thought, to be attractive to potential colonists who faced bleak earning potential in
America. Not only should the government establish a “bridge of boats,” the Liberia Packet
established in 1846 being an example, the United States had an obligation to recognize the
independent Republic of Liberia. By doing so the country could have favored trading relations
with Liberia, which not only would increase the value of the economic exchange, but also would
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lead to mass migration among African Americans. The interpretation of political economy by
Latrobe was strongly influenced by his understanding of history. No colonization in history, he
argued, was successful without commerce. Neither government monies nor charity would make
it work; commerce “is to take to Africa the coloured people of America.” 33
As Latrobe became more recognized nationally in the colonization movement and as
sectional tensions rose, he came full circle. Both the push for independence and his return to the
ACS make sense when analyzed in the context of what was occurring in Africa and the United
States. He dealt with the problems posed by the reality of colonization in Africa, opposition
from abolitionists, slaveholders, and African Americans, financial crises, and even division
within the colonization movement. Increasing sectionalism and the tensions caused by the
debate over slavery gave added weight to Latrobe’s long-held position. The reasons that
motivated him to join colonization as a young man still held sway over him, but the nation
seemed in more danger than ever before by 1853. Colonization remained the only method of
saving the republic and he was more involved in it than any other man now that long-time
proponent Henry Clay had passed away. Latrobe came to realize that slavery could not be
removed from the public conscience or national politics through compromise. Colonization was
now a political necessity—one beyond that of party affiliation. Colonization was about the
happiness of man and nation. 34
At the same time, he realized that state action, as valiant as the effort in Maryland had
been under his tutelage, could not overcome sectional jealousies. Now was the time that
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colonizationists throughout the nation must be diligent in strengthening the ACS to remove the
flood of emigrants that he anticipated in the wake of the recent crises. The independence of both
the Republic of Liberia and Maryland in Liberia would further accelerate the process. Latrobe
also emphasized commerce as the one medium capable of pulling African Americans from the
United States to Liberia. Thus, Latrobe slowly returned to his roots in the national society,
where he felt he could do the most good for the movement and the Union. Latrobe’s efforts
domestically showed more than anything else his desire to save the nation. He was willing to
stand up for his ideas, but he would also alter them to meet the changing conditions of nineteenth
century America and to meet the challenges posed by the debate over slavery.
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Conclusion
John Latrobe once wrote that colonization was a thread that could be traced throughout
his life. Ironically, it is a thread that few know about as history has followed the alternate
strand—that of John Latrobe, lawyer for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This study has
attempted to trace at least part of the fabric that intertwined him with colonization. John Latrobe,
was drawn to the subject of colonization because it was one of the first national movements in
the United States and it involved many of the most famous men of his youth. He chose at a
young age to become intimately involved in the effort to colonize African Americans in Africa
and remained active in the cause for the rest of his days. One of the central questions this study
has sought to answer is why he did so. The answer is found by breaking down his role in the
colonization movement into three epochs.
In the formative years of his life, the influences on Latrobe were such that he was deeply
concerned with the future of the American republic. Associations with men whose public lives
revolved around the future of the United States imbued Latrobe with the republican values that
almost all of his generation shared. These values were instrumental in motivating him to devote
more than seventy years of his life to colonization. His efforts provide an example of his
generation’s passion for social reform as well as its willingness to compromise. His generation
was not simply born into the most democratic nation in history, but also it was a nation where
democratic institutions opened more and more to white males regardless of class, birth,
education, or wealth. His generation was critical for another reason—it was the first after the
American Revolution. As such, Latrobe held a strong allegiance to the new nation; he was
taught to value what it stood for and to preserve it by any reasonable means necessary. This was
perhaps the purest of the motives that led him and many other people to support colonization.
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Latrobe particularly adopted the notions of republicanism espoused by Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison. His generations’ belief that the United States would only survive if its
people were free and homogeneous was more often than not the unifying factor in the beginning
of the colonization movement. As an eighteen year old returning home from West Point, labels
such as pro or anti-slavery, abolitionist, and even humanitarian did not fit colonizationists, as
Latrobe knew them. The man who brought him into the ACS, Robert Goodloe Harper, was a
republican first. The belief that two free races could not work in a republic brought Latrobe
along with many other more prominent white Americans together in joining the movement they
thought offered the best chances of remedying this reality for the betterment of both races in
North America.
American society in Latrobe’s young adult life, however idealistic, did not function as he
hoped. There were underlying tensions that split both white America and the colonization
movement. In the schism between Marylanders and the ACS, Latrobe played a significant part.
The ideas that divided colonizationists and led to the creation of independent state societies
represented the divide in white American society caused by the failure to reconcile freedom and
slavery. Further, they reflected the conflict between states’ rights and federalism. But they also
laid bare the problems faced by the colonization movement because the emergence of radical
abolitionism made slaveholding members of the movement suspicious of colonizationists who
had different motives. Latrobe recognized in this change that the Missouri Compromise of 1820
could not hold the conflict between the sections of the United States forever; that was perhaps
nowhere more evident than within Maryland. The controversy over slavery and the struggle to
determine the ultimate fate of African Americans also convinced him that any discussion of
slavery in national politics was bound to hurt the nation. Thus he devised a variation within
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colonization that he believed would accelerate emigration to Africa and defuse the most obvious
source of sectional conflict—slavery. The separation of the Maryland society from the American
Colonization Society was the ultimate reflection of his plan for solving the problems of the
United States while making Africa part of the world, as he understood it. Some have contended
that because of this desire to remove slavery from national political debate, colonization was a
failure in diffusing that conflict. This study contends, however, that colonization, particularly as
Latrobe viewed it, did not propose to end slavery though it was a possible outcome.
The founding of Maryland in Liberia in 1834 was an extension of that effort. It resulted
from Latrobe’s efforts to make colonization a state issue. However, the difficulties of starting a
new colony in Africa were many, and these forced Latrobe to reconcile his assumptions about
colonization and Africa with his long-term objective of making America solely a white man’s
home. Still, Latrobe was idealistic and naïve in one sense because he tried to blend his personal
values with that goal. His desire that indigenous Africans not fall victim to the same atrocities
that befell Native Americans could not be maintained along with his vision for Africa. Likewise,
his desires to spread the gospel through a strong missionary presence in the colony served only to
cause him, the governor, and the colonists more headaches. Just as his position changed
regarding the Greboes, so he was ready to sacrifice his desire to spread religion to achieve his
ultimate goal of removing African Americans from the United States.
Yet the realities of colonization in Africa were not the only factors that forced Latrobe to
change MSCS policies as well as his personal beliefs. Now well established professionally, and
known as a colonizationist in many areas of the country, Latrobe had to navigate an increasingly
complicated and divided domestic front as the issue of abolition and the expansion of slavery
reentered national politics in the mid-1830s. One result of the contentious debate over slavery in
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the 1830s was that Latrobe spent much of his time defending the cause of colonization and
attempting to persuade others how it fit within notions of republicanism held by many
Americans. The effectiveness of such efforts is difficult to gauge, but what was clear was
Latrobe’s use of republicanism to appeal to white Americans regardless of political party
affiliation, religious persuasion, or economic status. It was this argument, and a foreshadowing
of Rudyard Kipling’s ‘white man’s burden’ that appealed to people.
Between 1840 and 1845 colonizationists experienced the calmest period in the United
States for their operations since the movement formed in 1816. Yet it did not last because Texas,
the war with Mexico, and westward expansion let ugly sectional divisions loose in America. The
intensity of the feud after 1846 and the promotion of the Wilmot Proviso returned Latrobe to his
roots in the final era of his involvement in the Maryland colonization effort. More emphatically
the sectional conflict of the late 1840s forced Latrobe to sacrifice still more of his ideals, values,
and goals in order to hold onto the one kernel that meant the most to him—a white, republican
United States. He returned again to the national society and a national program in an effort to
reunite white America before it split apart permanently. This marked the beginning of a new
phase in Latrobe’s life of colonization, which this study only begins to explore.
As the era of Maryland colonization came to a close, Latrobe directed the MSCS’s
colony to independence. The direction he provided in making the colony independent
represented what remained of his original vision for Africa. The fact that he thought about a
United African continent put him well ahead of his time. But like so many of Latrobe’s notions,
the United States of Africa was lost as crises in Africa and America that threatened his chances
for success in removing African Americans. Latrobe’s willingness to sacrifice some principles
in order to gain elsewhere was symbolic of his generation’s compromising to prevent larger
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conflicts. Yet it also presents a not so rosy profile of Latrobe. He was not involved in
colonization because he was a humanitarian first as some suggest, though he did not hesitate to
use the rhetoric about how the end result would be the happiness of both races. His desire to
reduce the number of African Americans in the United States makes him a racist in the purist
sense of the word, but that descriptor does not make him unique in Antebellum America. Labels
serve little purpose in explaining why Americans supported colonization because more than one
could be applied to colonizationists. Latrobe knew this when he commented that members
joined for good and ill purposes. He was concerned about humankind and religion, but they
were the subsequent benefits of the program not the factor motivating him in colonization. If a
label must be applied to the movement it should be republican. Latrobe was trying to solve THE
question of nineteenth century America: What will be the final fate of the black man? The
question was most meaningful in the sense that Latrobe understood it. In his mind the United
States could not continue as it existed in his lifetime, and the Civil War undoubtedly convinced
him that he had been right.
In the end, Latrobe contributed significantly to the history of Liberia and the United
States in ways that are often overlooked. Most focus on him as the famous lawyer from
Baltimore or as the son of an internationally recognized architect, or the namesake of a town in
southeastern Liberia’s Maryland county, but few have acknowledged his passion for
colonization. The lack of success of colonization in remedying the ills of American society in
the nineteenth century should not overshadow his contributions. Nor should we dismiss what he
did simply because Latrobe’s views on race made him like many other white Antebellum
Americans. Latrobe symbolized a generation in flux dealing with institutions, which most men,
if honest with themselves, could not reconcile within the context of the freest government in
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world history. Latrobe worked to preserve it while attempting to answer the most difficult
question of all in a race conscious society.
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